Yale humanitarian research Lab identifies new RSF drone launch site in Sudan’s Nyala

The Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) at Yale University’s School of Public Health says it has identified a newly established launch site for loitering munition drones used by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the city of Nyala, South Darfur.

In a situation report released on Friday, HRL said analysis of satellite imagery from January 2026 showed at least 85 objects consistent with loitering munitions, commonly referred to as “suicide drones,” across two RSF-controlled locations in Nyala.

According to the report, at least 40 loitering munitions were visible near Nyala Airport as of Feb. 4, 2026, a site previously identified by HRL in May and September 2025. The drones appeared in consistent positions across multiple satellite images taken between Jan. 10 and Feb. 4. HRL also identified a second launch site approximately 2.5 kilometers east of the former UNAMID Sector South headquarters, where at least 51 loitering munitions and accompanying launchers were visible in imagery collected on Jan. 5, 2026. The drones were no longer present in imagery by Jan. 22, though most launch platforms remained visible.

The lab said the drones observed at both locations are consistent in shape and dimensions with Shahed-style loitering munitions, including variants previously documented at Nyala Airport. Such systems have a reported operational range of between 1,500 and 2,500 kilometers. Satellite imagery also showed the presence of a vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft system near the former UNAMID base. HRL said the system, first visible in mid-2025, appeared to have been repositioned to face westward by early January 2026.

The findings come amid an increase in reported drone attacks across Sudan in January, many of which local sources and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) attributed to RSF. HRL listed multiple incidents involving alleged drone strikes on military targets, markets, and residential areas across North Kordofan, Gezira, Sennar, White Nile, and other states.

However, the report said HRL could not independently verify or attribute each reported attack, nor confirm that all involved the same type of loitering munitions identified in Nyala. The lab noted that SAF has also conducted UAV strikes during the same period.

HRL said Nyala has become a key logistical hub for RSF, with the city’s airport used for the movement of equipment and materiel by air and land. The report cited previous documentation of external support to RSF and parallel foreign military backing for SAF.

The Rapid Support Forces have increasingly integrated low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles into their military operations, drawing primarily on drones that are becoming widely available. These platforms are typically reconfigured for hostile use and are favored for their modular construction, small physical footprint, and ease of transport. Their commercial origins make them difficult to trace and regulate, allowing RSF to adapt procurement methods that reduce exposure to international sanctions and monitoring mechanisms. This approach reflects a deliberate shift toward flexible, deniable technologies that can be quickly replaced if lost.

Available reporting indicates that RSF’s access to drones is sustained through informal cross-border trafficking networks that exploit Sudan’s limited border controls. Suspected transit corridors run through neighboring states such as Libya and Chad, with some reports also pointing to possible indirect connections to Gulf supply chains, including the United Arab Emirates. However, definitive evidence on the exact points of origin remains inconclusive. In addition to imported systems, RSF has modified locally obtained civilian quadcopters and agricultural UAVs, equipping them with payloads for explosive delivery or intelligence collection.

RSF drone operations have targeted high-value locations across multiple regions. In May 2025, aerial strikes in Port Sudan hit fuel storage facilities, power infrastructure, the airport runway, and a naval installation, signaling a notable escalation toward attacking strategic assets along the Red Sea corridor. Earlier and concurrent strikes in Khartoum and El-Fasher throughout 2024 and 2025 intensified pressure on both cities, particularly during the siege of El-Fasher. These attacks increasingly affected civilian spaces, including medical facilities, commercial areas, and densely populated neighborhoods, contributing to rising non-combatant casualties.

The operational use of drones has significantly altered the conflict’s dynamics by enabling RSF to conduct attacks well beyond front-line positions, including deep inside territory held by the Sudanese Armed Forces. Drone strikes also serve as force multipliers within RSF’s broader campaign of encirclement and denial, reinforcing ground-based sieges in locations and tightening blockades that limit access to food, medical care, and relief assistance.