Will Russia’s base in Sudan materialise?

In 2017, the then-Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the city of Sochi, following his unsuccessful attempt to persuade the American administration to lift sanctions on Sudan entirely. This meeting coincided with Russia’s expansion into areas such as Syria, where it established itself as a key backer of Bashar al-Assad weakened government. 

Syria wasn’t the Kremlin’s only target; around the same time, Russia also began its intervention in the Central African Republic (CAR), marking a significant and unprecedented inflation of Russian influence on the international stage since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Sudanese president, for his part, explicitly requested expanded relations with Russia that could help his country withstand both external and internal threats. From this, the idea of a Russian military base in eastern Sudan, on the Red Sea coast, was born.

In February this year, Sudan’s foreign minister Ali Youssef announced in Moscow that Russia and Sudan had agreed on all matters concerning the planned Russian base on Sudanese territory along the Red Sea. On the surface, the statement conveyed no Sudanese intention to delay or withdraw from the path of building the base; however, at a deeper level, it also lacked a definitive confirmation of Sudan's intent to move forward.

Ties between the two countries date back to the 19th century, before Sudan became a republic, when a mission from Tsarist Russia helped construct a gold processing plant during the rule of Muhammad Ali Pasha. After independence, relations were generally stable, but the visit of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in the early 1960s bolstered cooperation in education, infrastructure, and military affairs. It came just a few months after Ibrahim Abboud, Sudan’s then military leader, visited Moscow. 

A pivotal moment came when Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri, backed by leftist groups, seized power. His coup was followed later that year by Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and then by Siad Barre in Somalia. With the exception of Ethiopia, leftist soldiers had seized power in every country in Northeast Africa, from the Mediterranean, along the Red Sea, to the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union strongly backed the new regime, despite Nimeiri own contentious relations with Sudan’s communists. Nimeiri said he would “crush and destroy” the party. The “men who run the Sudan have found foreign Communists a good deal easier to get along with than the domestic variety,” Time magazine said. Russian and East German experts assisted in establishing Sudan’s internal security service and in modernising its armed forces with Soviet weaponry. They were also reportedly involved in the elimination of Nimeiri’s chief rival at the time, Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi, on Aba Island in central Sudan. Soviet support for the Sudanese government even extended to fighting southern rebels alongside the army, with a reported 100 advisers sent.

However, this exceptional relationship was short-lived. Following a communist coup attempt against Nimeiri in mid-1971, he pivoted towards the United States as his primary ally, sidelining the Soviets, who subsequently became regional adversaries of Khartoum. “Sudan Turns to Friends”, the New York Times headline. Relations with Moscow later stabilised, with Nimeiri seeking to improve relations in the 1980s. Under Gorbachev, Moscow began to view its African relations as unproductive, a stance that persisted under President Yeltsin after the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Under former President Omar al-Bashir, relations with Russia grew closer, especially after Putin assumed power, with both countries aligning on numerous regional issues and sharing a common stance against US influence.

Following the Ukraine conflict and ensuing Western sanctions post-2014, Russia adopted a strategy to expand its regional influence in Africa. It encroached upon former French spheres of influence, such as Mali and the CAR, in a bid to challenge Western dominance. Another key motive was access to Africa’s mineral wealth, as seen in the CAR, where Wagner forces (now known as the Africa Corps) control gold and diamond mines.

The wave of coups in the Sahel—beginning with Mali, followed by Burkina Faso, and then Niger—embraced Russian influence while rejecting France, which was widely blamed for instability in the region.

Russia supported the new regimes, increasing investments in energy, mining, and security, with Wagner overseeing counterinsurgency operations. While many locals welcomed this presence, others voiced concerns over human rights violations.

Russia has said the naval base isn’t targeted at any third country, but it remains the only major global power without a presence in the Red Sea. China, the US, France and other countries have bases in Djibouti.

The planned military base in Sudan is expected to be a small logistics station with the capacity to accommodate 300 personnel, carrying out refuelling and maintenance operations for a limited number of small- to medium-sized vessels. It would provide Russia with a strategic military outlet on the Red Sea—through which 11–15% of international trade passes—and enhance its operations in the Sahel as well as the Africa Corps’ military and commercial activities. Russia has said the naval base isn’t targeted at any third country, but it remains the only major global power without a presence in the Red Sea. China, the US, France and other countries have bases in Djibouti. 

Discussions about the base resurfaced in 2019 following Sudan’s uprising and the ousting of Bashir. The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition, which reflected Western-aligned views, opposed the base, while military leaders left the door open.

Libya is also viewed as a potential site for a Russian base, due to Moscow’s coordination with warlord Khalifa Haftar, who has fought against the internationally recognised government in Tripoli. Russia has already reportedly begun using the al-Khadim airbase which is approximately 100km east of Benghazi. "We saw a kind of logistical ballet of Russian planes towards Libya,” Lou Osborn of the All Eyes On Wagner collective told Radio France Internationale. Wagner mercenaries have supported Haftar since 2018 in his campaign against Islamist militias and the Tripoli-based forces.

However, while the alliance between Russia and Haftar is relatively solid, it is unlikely to extend to allowing Moscow to build a military base on the Libyan coast, which faces Europe and Nato countries. Europe—particularly France—engages with Russia on the Libyan issue but would not welcome the establishment of a permanent Russian base on the Mediterranean, merely a two-hour sail away.

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria threatens Russia’s naval bases in Tartus and Hmeimim—two key outposts for its overseas military presence. Russia has sought to ingratiate itself with the new authorities in Damascus, who have also expressed interest in maintaining ties. For now, both sides say they will review agreements made by the previous government. If forced to evacuate these bases though, Moscow would be forced to seek alternative footholds, increasing the strategic appeal of Sudan’s Red Sea coast.

On the other hand, Sudan now urgently needs a strong ally, especially following the rebellion by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the weakening of state institutions. It also requires a dependable arms supplier to maintain and drive home its edge on the RSF.

Russia publicly supports Sudan’s government and opposes the RSF rebellion. Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, visited Sudan and pledged “uncapped” support for its army last year. Its allies however, in Africa—Haftar and the CAR—maintain strong ties with the RSF. In Libya, RSF fighters have fought alongside Haftar, including during the 2019 Tripoli offensive. Reports suggest that Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel are assisting the RSF in Sudan, particularly with operating armoured vehicles and tanks. An RSF base has also been uncovered in southeastern Libya.

Moscow's relationships with actors in Africa also have unusual overlaps tying them together beyond the Kremlin. In the CAR, the RSF maintains a working relationship with the government in Bangui, using the country as a supply route and bypassing Chad, where elements of the government oppose support for the RSF. Despite bilateral agreements, Sudan has also become a haven for mercenaries from the CAR—both pro-government and opposition.

Sudan’s current leadership places a high priority on relations with the United States and its regional allies, as seen in its foreign policy since Bashir’s fall. If the US or its regional allies come out forcefully against a Russian base this could obstruct plans these plans, as the US perceives Russian expansion in Africa and the Middle East as a threat.

However, President Trump—often accused of showing little interest in Africa—may be less concerned. His rapport with Russian President Vladimir Putin, bolstered by their recent breakthrough in Alaska on Ukraine, could lessen the perceived significance of a potential Russian base in Sudan.

For Russia, the base would enhance logistical coordination across Africa, improving operational efficiency for the Africa Corps. Sudan, in turn, would gain better access to Russian arms, strengthening its position against the RSF. 

Improved intelligence-sharing with the Sahel’s new quartet of military regimes, who are allied with Russia, could offer opportunities to hamper RSF recruitment and intensify financial and economic pressure on the group. In the past, Russia has been accused of “playing both sides” in Sudan’s civil war. 

Nonetheless, Sudan fears that Russia may play a double game, maintaining ties with the RSF despite officially backing the central government. Russia’s good relations with the UAE and Haftar—both accused of supporting the RSF—further fuel these concerns. 

Russia’s own fragility, exacerbated by the Ukraine war, also limits its ability to support Sudan effectively. Some analysts argue that Russia follows a "friend to all, ally to none" strategy, with Belarus as its only reliable partner. Its pragmatic, short-term foreign policy, combined with post-2014 sanctions, undermines its credibility as a steadfast ally.

Yet, Russia presents itself as a reliable partner that respects sovereignty—unlike France, often accused of exploitation in Africa, or the US, seen as domineering in the Middle East and intrusive.

Ultimately, the construction of the Russian base will not be straightforward for either side. Defining the terms of cooperation and establishing a stable framework must take priority. Nevertheless, the challenges both parties face may necessitate serious collaboration—extending beyond the base itself and into areas such as UN security council coordination and higher-level strategic alignment.