Why Tom Perriello failed on the Sudan file

On January 18, Thomas (Tom) Perriello, the United States special envoy to Sudan, released a video on X, marking the end of his tenure. In the video, he outlined US efforts and achievements in alleviating humanitarian suffering, despite the failure to end the war. Perriello was appointed as the US special envoy to Sudan in February 2024, tasked—according to the secretary of state’s statement—with working to end the war, ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid, and supporting Sudanese aspirations for freedom, peace, and justice.  

However, after nearly a year in office, it is difficult to argue that Perriello succeeded—or even came close to success. The number of displaced persons, both internally and externally, increased from 8 million in February 2024 to 12.5 million by January 2025. While the humanitarian response plan for Sudan saw a slight improvement, with the funding shortfall decreasing from 49% in 2023 to 35% in 2024, the broader crisis persisted. The continued influx of weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their ongoing atrocities—committed openly and with impunity—took place under the watch of the US, which failed to take meaningful action. Even the genocide determination has been perceived as assuaging the “guilty conscience” of the Biden administration. According to Cameron Hudson, a former CIA intelligence analyst, it was a “a blatant attempt to position itself on the right side of history as it walks out the door”. In this context, it is fair to conclude that Perriello did not fulfil his mandate.  

The road to the State department

After earning his PhD in law in the early 2000s, Thomas Perriello served as a senior advisor to the prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone before joining the International Center for Transitional Justice, where he worked in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Sudan’s Darfur region.

In 2008, Perriello was elected to the US House of Representatives, representing Virginia’s 5th congressional district. He narrowly defeated the Republican incumbent, Virgil Goode, by just 700 votes. However, his tenure lasted only one term, as he lost his re-election bid in 2010. During his time in Congress, Perriello was a strong supporter of then-President Barack Obama’s policies, particularly on healthcare, including the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare).

In 2014, US secretary of state John Kerry appointed him as Special Representative for the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), a strategy document outlining the priorities of the State department and the US Agency for International Development (USAid).  

By July 2015, Kerry further entrusted Perriello, who had worked on his 1996 Senate campaign, with the role of Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, covering Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He remained in this position until the first Trump administration took office in January 2017. Perriello later attempted to run for governor of Virginia but failed to secure his party’s nomination.

After a seven-year absence, Perriello returned to the State department when secretary of state Antony Blinken, a former deputy to John Kerry, appointed him Special Envoy to Sudan.

The special envoy who avoided Sudan  

From the moment of Perriello’s appointment in February 2024, there was keen anticipation regarding when he would visit Sudan and engage with the country’s authorities in Port Sudan. The Center for Strategic and International Studies speculated about whether this was the US’s “Great Sudan Policy Reset”. This expectation stemmed from two key factors. First, his mandate explicitly required coordination with Sudanese authorities, who are a primary actor in the war, making an on-the-ground assessment crucial. Second, Perriello was notably active in his international travels.

Just two weeks into his tenure, he embarked on a diplomatic tour across seven countries in Africa and Asia—none of which included Sudan. In May 2024, he undertook another trip to four countries, ostensibly aimed at reviving negotiations to end the war. Yet, Sudan was again absent from his itinerary. He went to Kenya, Uganda, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

To justify his absence, Perriello placed the blame on Sudanese authorities, claiming in a meeting with civil society groups in Kampala that he had been denied a visa. However, Sudan’s foreign ministry officially denied this claim. He was asked about his alleged visa issues by Radio Tamazuj but avoided the question, saying he “initiated the process to obtain clearance for a trip and visas”.  

Perriello did make an attempt to visit Sudan on 7 August, shortly before the Geneva negotiations later that month. However, he insisted that Sudanese officials meet him at Port Sudan airport due to security concerns—a condition the Sudanese government rejected.  

Both the Sudanese public and government officials found Perriello’s handling of his Sudan visit highly problematic. His explanations were contradictory: at times, he claimed that his visit was blocked from the outset due to visa denial, while at other times, he cited security concerns as his reason for limiting his engagement to the airport. It was never clear why he, as the Sudan special envoy, couldn’t visit Sudan.  

Perriello ultimately arrived in the country in November 2024, but by then, it was too late to have any impact. The war had gone on for more than a decade, atrocities had been committed across Darfur by the RSF and millions of people were displaced. His visit also took place after the US presidential election, which resulted in a Republican victory and the impending departure of the Democratic administration—including Perriello himself.

To justify his absence, Perriello placed the blame on Sudanese authorities, claiming in a meeting with civil society groups in Kampala that he had been denied a visa. However, Sudan’s foreign ministry officially denied this claim.

Perriello’s contradictions  

Perriello’s positions on various issues have often been characterised by contradictions. While he was among the most vocal American critics of the Iraq War, he later advocated for US intervention in Syria under the Obama administration suggesting an “aggressive posture that would potentially include regime transition”. He was asked about the difference between Iraq and Syria by The Atlantic and he said: “The difference between force and violence is legitimacy. As progressives in foreign policy, we tend to believe legitimacy matters.”

He also shifted from accepting campaign contributions from the National Rifle Association (NRA) to labelling the organisation as “nut-job extremist organization”.  

This inconsistency was also evident in his approach to Sudan. During his earlier involvement in Darfur, Perriello was a staunch critic of the 2006 Abuja Peace Agreement, arguing that civilians and displaced persons preferred continued conflict over a ceasefire that he believed would merely reinforce oppression. He promoted the idea that solutions prioritising humanitarian concerns over justice caused more harm than good. He even went so far as to claim that any internationally backed agreement supported by Sudan’s central government effectively positioned the global community on the “wrong side of genocide”.

Yet, as special envoy, he adopted the opposite stance. Perriello became an advocate for an immediate ceasefire, opposing the very armed groups in Darfur he had once supported. He also sought to create negotiation platforms that lent legitimacy to the RSF, despite the group’s well-documented massacres in al-Geneina, al-Jazira, and Sennar. His approach ultimately proved misguided within just two weeks, when the RSF’s so-called “commitment to a code of conduct” was exposed after a security staff member of the US embassy in Sudan died while in RSF custody.

Perriello became an advocate for an immediate ceasefire, opposing the very armed groups in Darfur he had once supported. He also sought to create negotiation platforms that lent legitimacy to the RSF, despite the group’s well-documented massacres in al-Geneina, al-Jazira, and Sennar.  

The roots of the crisis  

A 2022 Foreign Policy report highlighted a critical shortage of experienced US diplomats in Africa, with staffing levels in some embassies reduced by as much as 50%. Several current and former US diplomats attributed this to a lack of incentives for serving in impoverished and conflict-prone regions. As a result, the US has often had to appoint individuals with limited expertise in African affairs to key diplomatic positions. Robert Jenkins, a senior USAid official, testified before Congress that the agency lacked the necessary skilled personnel to fill posts in Africa.

Perriello’s tenure as special envoy to the Great Lakes Region did not signal strong diplomatic success. He left the region without achieving any of his stated objectives. He failed to de-escalate tensions between former Congolese President Joseph Kabila and the opposition, nor did he help resolve the electoral crisis that had delayed the 2016 elections.

Congolese dissatisfaction with Perriello was evident. In September 2016, he was confronted and verbally attacked at Kinshasa airport. The US said it was “outraged and deeply disturbed by the physical obstruction and verbal aggression” aimed at Perriello. When the Roman Catholic Church successfully brokered an agreement among Congolese political factions in early 2017, the US envoy played no discernible role. Similarly, when he was assigned to de-escalate tensions between Burundi and Rwanda, statements made by Perriello and Linda Thomas-Greenfield, who was then the assistant secretary of state for African Affairs, only exacerbated the crisis, prompting Rwanda to expel hundreds of Burundian refugees.

Perriello’s statements on Sudan further raised concerns. In a television interview, he admitted that US officials lacked real-time knowledge of Sudan’s situation, relying instead on Sudanese sources for updates. That isn’t very promising.  

The poll, conducted by UNICEF goodwill ambassador Emtisal Mahmoud, a Sudanese American, was reportedly administered through an online platform called “Taharruk” with just 100 followers on X. Despite claims that 12,000 Sudanese participated, there was no transparency regarding the methodology, sample selection, or geographic distribution.  

Perriello’s approach to Sudan was ultimately as flawed as the survey he relied upon. As pointed out by Akshaya Kumar, director of crisis advocacy at Human Rights Watch, the Sudanese crisis, unlike Ukraine and Gaza, had a greater deal of consensus among US lawmakers and the foreign policy establishment. “But practically that has meant little to Sudanese who have seen their country go up in flames over the past nine months,” Kumar told Devex. Whether his failures stemmed from indifference, ignorance, or broader systemic issues within US diplomacy, one thing remains clear: American envoys to Africa not only lack the tools and expertise to resolve conflicts but often exacerbate them.

As the Trump administration picks up the broken pieces left by Biden's team, the baton on Sudan is passed on with little progress made by the outgoing administration.