Why some Terror threats matter more to Washington?

The United States continues its war on terrorism in Somalia at a steady pace, even as it has effectively withdrawn from the Sahel theater in Africa, despite the fact that the region stretching from Mali to Niger and Burkina Faso is today described as the most dangerous terrorist hotspot in the world. This striking contrast in military positioning raises questions about Washington’s priorities and the limits of its commitment to combating extremist organizations beyond the scope of its direct interests.

Washington views Somalia’s Al-Shabaab as a direct threat to its interests and those of its allies, not only because it is affiliated with Al-Qaeda, but also because its area of activity is linked to some of the world’s most important maritime corridors, foremost among them the Bab al-Mandab Strait and shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. These waterways constitute a vital artery for the transport of energy and goods between Asia and Europe, and any major disruption would have immediate repercussions for the global economy and U.S. national security.

By contrast, the picture looks entirely different in the Sahel states, where attacks by Al-Qaeda- and ISIS-affiliated groups are escalating in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Despite the danger these attacks pose to regional stability, these landlocked countries do not border strategic maritime routes and do not represent, in the narrow U.S. reading of interests, a direct threat to global shipping or U.S. territory. Instead, they are seen as a security and humanitarian burden whose greatest impact falls on Europe and neighboring African states.

Observers note that geography intersects with a decisive political factor: in recent years, the Sahel has become a hostile environment for Western presence following a series of military coups. Military juntas overthrew elected governments in Mali, then Burkina Faso and Niger, raising slogans of “sovereignty” and rejecting “foreign diktats,” while gradually turning toward security and military partnerships with Russia at the expense of cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western partners.

This political shift has effectively led to the collapse of the security frameworks on which Washington relied for field operations, from air bases used for surveillance and drones to programs for training local armies. With the absence of a reliable local partner, the U.S. military presence in the Sahel no longer enjoys political cover and clear operational benefit, paving the way for withdrawal and reduced direct engagement, despite mounting indicators of terrorist threats on the ground.

In Somalia, however, the equation appears almost reversed. The federal government in Mogadishu, despite its fragility, continues to request U.S. support and closely coordinates with Washington in operations against Al-Shabaab. The United States conducts targeted airstrikes and participates in training special units of the Somalia’s national army, following a model of a “light military footprint” that serves its interests at lower political and human cost than deploying large ground forces.

Analysts believe that any sudden vacuum in Somalia could open the door to Al-Shabaab’s expansion and its transformation into a greater threat to shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab, especially amid Red Sea tensions and Houthi attacks on vessels. For this reason, Washington tends to maintain a limited but effective military and intelligence presence, viewing it as a preventive investment in protecting global trade routes.

By contrast, the withdrawal of Western forces from the Sahel has created a vast security vacuum that extremist organizations have exploited to expand their influence. Groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS now control large swathes of rural areas and roads, impose taxes on local populations, and operate more like “quasi-state entities,” at a time when international estimates indicate that Africa now accounts for roughly half of all deaths resulting from terrorist operations worldwide.

Despite the gravity of this situation, Washington appears to treat it as a regional crisis rather than a direct threat to its national security. Unlike the Horn of Africa, the Sahel does not host vital maritime corridors or energy infrastructure of strategic importance to the United States, making the cost of direct military engagement higher than the expected return — especially in a political environment that calls for the expulsion of foreign forces and seeks Russian alternatives.

A number of experts sum up the U.S. position in a single phrase: the United States does not fight terrorism where it is necessarily most dangerous, but where it touches its vital interests and where a political environment exists that allows for stable military and intelligence operations. From this perspective, the continuation of operations in Somalia and withdrawal from the Sahel becomes a matter of strategic priorities rather than a contradiction in counterterrorism commitment.

As Washington moves toward redistributing its military resources globally and focusing on competition with major powers such as China and Russia, there are fears that the African Sahel will become a “forgotten front” paid for by millions of civilians, while Somalia remains a central arena in calculations of global maritime security — and therefore on the agenda of America’s war on terrorism.