Why Somaliland remains a diplomatic dilemma for Egypt

Egypt’s view of Somaliland, particularly in the wake of Israel’s recognition of it as an “independent and sovereign state” and Tel Aviv’s announcement of full diplomatic relations with Hargeisa on December 26, appears clear and decisive at first glance. Cairo, in coordination with Riyadh, mobilized an Arab and Islamic position against the recognition and reaffirmed, in a statement issued on December 27, its support for the unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, treating Somaliland as an inseparable part of it.

In practical terms, the Somaliland file falls within a broader set of issues that have continued to pose challenges for Egyptian foreign policy in recent years. It sits at the center of Cairo’s efforts to compensate for lost time that has resulted in cumulative losses and raised the cost of regaining initiative. This is particularly evident when considering Egypt’s prolonged silence toward what could be described as overreach by countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates across many of these files, including Somaliland, as well as Sudan and Libya.

Egypt’s recent move clearly clashes with the regional policies of its ally, the UAE, in addition to the more traditional and expected confrontation with other regional actors such as Israel and Ethiopia. This dynamic is also linked, in one way or another, to Saudi Arabia’s firm regional posture, further complicating any assessment of Egypt’s approach to what it frames as the “Somaliland crisis.” These complexities are compounded by visible confusion within Egypt’s research and policy circles, which tend to rely on historical narratives that may no longer be adequate for interpreting the current situation. This approach often avoids naming actors that have actively reinforced Somaliland’s secessionist trajectory on the ground, most notably the UAE, instead reducing the crisis, from an Egyptian perspective, to a matter of Israeli penetration into the Horn of Africa.

The issue has been raised in Egypt across multiple academic and media platforms, including discussions that took place during the Cairo International Book Fair, which concluded on February 3. Several Egyptian specialists on African affairs addressed the topic, most notably Professor Hamdy Abdelrahman, a professor of political science at Cairo University and Zayed University, and a former visiting professor at the University of Hargeisa. Abdelrahman outlined what he saw as the main features of the crisis, situating it within a broader condition of continuous fragmentation and reconfiguration affecting the Horn of Africa, and, by extension, the Middle East. This process, he argued, is unfolding amid the erosion of the international order established under the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which laid the foundations for the modern concept of the state and its borders.

Abdelrahman pointed to strategic threats surrounding Egypt, including one from the northeast that threatens the political system, and another from the south that affects the structure of Egyptian society itself through the Nile water issue. These threats, he suggested, implicitly shape Egypt’s approach to Somaliland based on its historical experience. He noted that the first martyr of Egyptian diplomacy was Mohamed Kamal El-Din Salah, who was killed in Somalia in April 1957, adding that his killer had studied at Al-Azhar Islamic University in Cairo. For Abdel Rahman, this incident reflected the depth of historical and religious ties between the two countries.

The professor traced the roots of the Somali crisis to the period of independence, arguing that while independence was a shared aspiration among all Somalis, achieved through the union of the north and south, the unity itself was deeply flawed. Power and wealth, he noted, were disproportionately concentrated in the south. He recalled that the first coup attempt, led by northern youth, occurred in 1961 as a result of the hastily constructed union built on unsound foundations. The drafting of a constitution without consulting northerners and the cancellation of a referendum intensified tensions, which ultimately peaked with the assassination of the president in 1967, leaving a lasting wound in relations between the two sides.

This perspective can be understood as an attempt to explain the enduring roots of Somalia’s state-building crisis. Abdelrahman linked this crisis to the African system’s foundational principle of the sanctity of borders, which renders recognition of secessionist entities an exceptionally sensitive issue on the continent. At the same time, he emphasized Somaliland’s strategic importance, given its location along the Gulf of Aden and the entrance to the Red Sea, a position that has attracted growing regional and international attention.

The legacy of Somalia under Siad Barre also looms large in Egypt’s political memory. Barre was deeply embedded in the politics of Arab nationalism during its final phase, shortly before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. His repeated refusal to join the Arab Cooperation Council, which included Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen, remains notable.

Analysts from Somaliland have recalled Barre’s attempt to persuade Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, during the extraordinary Baghdad summit in May 1990, to mobilize an Arab position against the Somali National Movement (SNM), which he labeled a terrorist organization. He accused it of collaborating with Ethiopia and Israel and of seeking to divide the country. These analysts also point to Egypt and Gulf states supplying Barre with hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of weapons, “which were later used in the atrocities committed against the Isaaq population.”

What stands out in this renewed engagement by Egypt, particularly through unprecedented military and security cooperation with Mogadishu, is the resurgence of a discourse that emphasizes Egypt’s role as an “older brother” and the historical weight of its involvement in Somalia.

The global shifts that followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, however, created the conditions for the collapse of Barre’s regime and the outbreak of civil war in Somalia. During this period, Somaliland managed to maintain a democratic trajectory and a degree of relative stability. As Somalia’s situation deteriorated, it gradually fell outside Egypt’s strategic focus. This disengagement persisted until a significant statement by former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in early 2007, when he expressed “understanding” of Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia, amounting to implicit acceptance of the US-backed intervention.

In the years following what many labelled the “Ethiopian Invasion” of Somalia, Egypt did not treat the Somaliland issue as a serious priority. This period also witnessed similar Kenyan military operations in southern Somalia in 2012. The recent Israeli recognition of Somaliland, shifts in Saudi Arabia’s posture in the southern Red Sea, and Cairo’s perception of direct threats posed by the alignment of diverse regional powers behind Somaliland’s independence have forced a fundamental shift in Egypt’s position. These developments coincide with Egypt’s broader efforts to restore its influence across multiple national security arenas.

However, what stands out in this renewed engagement by Egypt, particularly through unprecedented military and security cooperation with Mogadishu, is the resurgence of a discourse that emphasizes Egypt’s role as an “older brother” and the historical weight of its involvement in Somalia. This framing persists despite profound regional changes and points to a highly complex political landscape in Somalia, one that is increasingly visible in the evolving Somaliland question.

Some observers argue that Somalia’s state failure over recent decades stems from the absence of a unifying national project, the prioritization of individual interests over collective ones, and the long legacy of crisis inherited from the end of the Siad Barre era more than four decades ago. From this perspective, Somaliland is seen as having no future as an independent state, and Israel’s recognition is dismissed as noise without real consequence. Such assertions reinforce the impression of an unrealistic or tactical discourse that avoids confronting the current Emirati-Israeli nexus and fails to adequately address Somalia’s crises or its place within the Horn of Africa.

This context is increasingly difficult to ignore, particularly as Ethiopia seeks to reassert leadership in regional collective action and revive economic cooperation with Djibouti and Somalia, as demonstrated during a summit hosted in Addis Ababa in early February.

For Egypt, the Somaliland issue undoubtedly represents a pressing concern tied to its interests and its immediate Red Sea security environment. Yet the prevailing approach raises questions about the depth and seriousness of this concern and its connection to broader regional shifts, including Saudi escalation and Israeli expansion in support of Emirati policies. These dynamics intersect with the need for balanced bilateral relations, adding further complexity.

Although Somaliland’s ties with Israel offer an attractive entry point for Israeli interests, particularly given the Somaliland government’s enthusiasm for such cooperation, Israel’s moves remain carefully calculated and consistent with its long-standing regional strategy and historical experience in the Horn of Africa and in its rivalry with Egypt.

Professor Abdelrahman highlighted a central dimension of Somalia’s crisis: the idea of independence is not limited to Somaliland alone, but has extended to other regions such as Puntland. These aspirations have been met with widespread rejection due to fears of complete state fragmentation.

He further linked Israel’s awareness of vulnerabilities in the southern Red Sea to its efforts to strengthen influence from the south through Somaliland, securing a strategic foothold in the waterway. He identified three key milestones in the path toward Somaliland’s recognition, including the memorandum of understanding signed by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed with Somaliland in January 2024, alongside efforts to form military forces in the region. He also pointed to indirect American interest, as some think tanks have described the region as an ideal site for protection and positioning amid scenarios involving US-Iran conflict, competition with China, and broader plans to reshape the region.

While this framework is largely sound, the details suggest a more complex reality. Israeli activity in the southern Red Sea predates recognition of Somaliland by several years. Reports indicate that Israel was already involved during the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen, providing intelligence support under the pretext of protecting its interests in the Red Sea and combating terrorism.

Although Somaliland’s ties with Israel offer an attractive entry point for Israeli interests, particularly given the Somaliland government’s enthusiasm for such cooperation, Israel’s moves remain carefully calculated and consistent with its long-standing regional strategy and historical experience in the Horn of Africa and in its rivalry with Egypt.

Observers have also pointed to a critical factor often overlooked in Egyptian commentary: Israeli influence is typically accompanied by external financial backing. In this case, that backing is centered on the UAE, whose massive investments in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are difficult to replace in the foreseeable future.

Some commentators in Cairo have attempted to downplay concerns over Israel’s relationship with Somaliland, arguing that it cannot fundamentally reshape the Horn of Africa or the Middle East and will amount to temporary noise. Such arguments overlook lessons from recent transformations in Syria and the Palestinian case. They also underestimate Ethiopia’s ability to skillfully exploit regional contradictions under consistent American support, regardless of political leadership in either Washington or Addis Ababa.

One strand of the Egyptian view holds that the Somaliland question is among the most complex issues in the Horn of Africa, as it sits at the intersection of national identity, colonial legacies, and the principle of state unity in tension with the right to self-determination. While Somaliland has maintained its declaration of separation since 1991, fears persist that international recognition could trigger a new wave of fragmentation across Africa.

According to Professor Abdelrahman, the issue also directly affects Somalia’s stability, deepening political divisions, weakening central institutions, and creating fertile ground for external intervention. It risks prolonging conflict and obstructing state reconstruction at a time when Somalia urgently needs internal cohesion to confront its security and economic challenges.

Regardless of these debates and the reinforcement of established positions, it appears increasingly necessary for Egypt to develop a new reading of the scene and its shifting calculations. Such a reassessment would need to take Somali perspectives seriously, account for regional dynamics, and engage with the realities of state-building, moving beyond assumptions of guardianship or absolute correctness.