Where does the Ankara Declaration leave the Horn?

They say a week is a long time in politics and so I suppose a year, when it is eventful enough, can feel like an era.  

On 1 January, Ethiopia’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, stood alongside his ally, Muse Bihi, as the two leaders announced a memorandum of understanding—a move that would spark a diplomatic crisis engulfing the Horn of Africa for the past 11 months. The contents of the memorandum were unclear from the outset, prompting one western diplomat to wryly remark that it was more of a “memorandum of misunderstanding”. Nonetheless, a few aspects have been relatively clear to observers. Bihi claimed that, once implemented, the memorandum would result in Addis Ababa recognising Somaliland as an independent state and grant it a share in Ethiopia Airlines. In exchange, Hargeisa would grant Ethiopia access to its coastline.  

Mogadishu has said that the deal is an attempt by Ethiopia to annex its territory and use the land granted by Somaliland to build a naval facility which has infuriated its elites. Since the announcement, Somalia has threatened war and vowed to expel Ethiopia from the African Union’s peacekeeping mission. The Somali public broadcaster has also aired footage from 1977 of its armed forces, an interesting video choice, given Somalia invaded Ethiopia that year.  

Just 11 months later and the picture is very different; Muse Bihi is out of office following his electoral defeat in November to Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro). Meanwhile, Abiy Ahmed stands alongside Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—who had previously refused to meet him—as a new dispensation is announced, dubbed the Ankara Declaration. Somalia has said that it will focus on moving forward in its relations with Ethiopia and “leave behind differences and contentious issues”. Erdoğan also says he’ll visit both capitals to check implementation of the new agreement is on track too.  

Suddenly, everything is apparently fine.  

After Ethiopia seemingly committed to a deal that would legally divide Somalia in two—resolving the disparity between the de jure and de facto realities in the north—Abiy Ahmed reluctantly agreed to a joint statement affirming Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In return, Hassan Sheikh pledged to grant Ethiopia commercial access to Somalia’s coastline. When asked about the inclusion of a naval component in that discussion, a senior Somali official tersely replied: [only] “commercial”. Another Somali official told the Economist’s Africa correspondent, Tom Gardner, that the memorandum of understanding which started the drama was “retracted”.  

After seemingly committing to a deal that would legally divide Somalia in two—resolving the disparity between the de jure and de facto realities in northern Somalia—Abiy Ahmed reluctantly agreed to a joint statement affirming Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial “retracted”

Initial verdicts suggested this was a triumph for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who not only managed to repel the Ethiopian threat but also capitalised on strained relations with Addis Ababa to strengthen ties with Egypt and coordinate more closely with Ethiopia’s other regional foe, Eritrea. Egypt will now participate in the new African Union peacekeeping mission and has already begun sending arms to Somalia, expanding its options in security partners.  

But that reading has been complicated by mixed messages coming from Somaliland’s diplomats and Ethiopia state news reports which suggest the memorandum of understanding with Hargeisa still stands despite the change of government. It wouldn’t be the Horn of Africa if things were just that simple.  

Ismail Shirwac, a Somaliland diplomat posted on X: “Ethiopia has firmly insisted NOT to withdraw from the MoU with the Republic of Somaliland, and there is no where this issue was mentioned in the Ankara Communique.” The new deal, Shirwac says, isn’t a replacement for what Somaliland was offering Addis Ababa, but is a “competing option”. A post on the Ethiopia Press Agency’s X account similarly said the Ankara mediated deal “secures Ethiopia’s right to sea outlets while upholding MoU with Somaliland”. It was later deleted and as was the case a year ago, no one really knows what is going on. Even the Economist says “there are reasons to be sceptical” about the commitment of Abiy Ahmed to the Ankara Declaration.  

Abel Abate Demissie, an Ethiopia-based analyst for Chatham House told the Economist: “From what I understand, Abiy is not deterred by international pressure, and is determined to pursue the MOU by any means necessary”. Abiy, the article continues, has also set his sights on Assab, the Eritrean port, which he hopes Ethiopia can re-acquire. French president Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit has also been interpreted in some quarters as a sign that Abiy is determined to press ahead, given Paris’s commitment to help Ethiopia rebuild its navy. Macron was more careful, saying he supported Ethiopian sea access, on the condition Somali territorial integrity was respected. An aside: If you haven’t seen the edit that the Ethiopia team published on the prime minister’s twitter account, I strongly suggest it. The music is dramatic, but the videography is pretty cool.  

Abiy, the article continues, has also set his sight on Assab, the Eritrean port, which he also hopes to re-acquire.

Coming back to the Ankara Declaration, which has been widely praised, we need to be clear on what happened (and what didn’t). Firstly, the meeting was definitely a good thing. Ethiopia and Somalia’s bilateral relations reached a nadir not seen since the days of the cold war. Somalia threatened to re-start arming Ethiopian armed groups – of which there are dozens these days, but no Somali ones weirdly – whilst an Ethiopian diplomat called Somalia’s foreign minister an “al-Shabaab agent”. That is dangerous rhetoric.  

Secondly, a deal wasn’t signed in Ankara between Mohamud and Abiy. They made an important step of releasing a joint statement, addressing Somalia’s serious concern about Ethiopian intentions toward Somaliland. That likely helped create a better environment for talks between the leaders, but Ethiopia’s ambiguity regarding the original memorandum of understanding with Hargeisa leaves an important issue unresolved for officials in Mogadishu.  

For Ethiopia, it doesn’t appear that commercial access to a seaport was the real issue. In August, Djibouti offered terms that Somalia really can’t compete with, in the form of another port, providing Abiy Ahmed with a respectable off-ramp at the height of regional tensions. A port is one piece of a broader jigsaw that facilitates international trade, including security, the infrastructure that connects the ports to the markets they serve, and the human capital needed to ensure the operation of those ports. Djibouti outperforms Somalia in all these areas. Somalia was also mute when Ethiopia purchased a share in Berbera port during the Farmaajo administration, so there is little indication that Somali leaders fear deeper trade ties with their larger neighbour in principle.  

Ethiopia, as pointed out by its intelligence chief, Redwan Hussien, likely has larger ambitions, including re-emerging as a maritime power. To what extent can any of its neighbours facilitate that, especially when they view Abiy Ahmed as a threat? Isaias Afwerki isn’t likely to bend the knee and Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud has clearly made that a redline. Even Muse Bihi couldn’t prevent his defense minister from resigning when the idea was initially floated. On his way out, Abdiqani Mohamud Ateye said: “Ethiopia remains our number one enemy”.  

Hargeisa appears to have completely moved on with the change of government, likely having made its own assessment of how to proceed with its primary objective: resolving the issue of its international status. Ethiopia has neither denied nor affirmed its commitment to recognising Somaliland, which has demonstrated diplomatic weakness on its part. Essa Kayd, Somaliland’s outgoing foreign minister said point blank: “Without that, nothing is going to happen”.  

The new Cirro administration has signalled that it will no longer target small players in the global system to make its case for full statehood but will lobby the world’s most important power: the US. The Somali Guardian has reported that Bashir Good, Somaliland’s envoy to the US said Hargeisa is planning on offering the US a naval base on the Red Sea for recognition. Cirro has raised the stakes by revising Bihi’s stratagem first outlined in early 2019: we will offer bases, Djibouti-style, if you give recognition. News reports have been playing up the prospect of the incoming Trump administration eventually extending recognition to Somaliland, due to the sympathy think-tankers close to the Republican party have for its cause and their view of its strategic value to the US.

Republican congressman Scott Perry has already re-introduced a bill to recognise Somaliland as an independent state this month. He last did this in 2022. Republican dominance of both houses of Congress will increase his confidence in securing progress on this. But will Trump flaunt the most fundamental norms and conventions of the international system and unilaterally recognise Somaliland? Would he go through the trouble given the dim view he takes on Africa generally? It remains to be seen.  

I’m also not sure what would the US gain from a military base in Somaliland that it doesn’t already obtain from its bases in Djibouti and Kenya? Rashid Abdi has suggested that the US would use a base in Somaliland to push back against the Houthis, but it is unclear why Somaliland would expose itself to a threat that even Israel has been unable to deter: Houthi rockets. Ismail Osman, a former senior Somali spy, said Abdi’s post was a “classic example of a lobbyist-driven attempt to inflate Somaliland’s geopolitical importance by framing it as a critical player in the anti-Houthi strategy.” It lacks merit, he added.  

This also leaves aside more immediate US interests in the Horn of Africa. How would this factor into the US’s primary concerns about al-Shabaab in Somalia which Africom has said is the most dangerous al-Qaida affiliate in Africa. Such a development would likely leave the group feeling vindicated and give it a major propaganda boost providing it with an opportunity to rhetorically replace the Somali government as a protector of Somali unity and dignity. Important Somali poets have already defected to the group.  

Does Trump care about that?  

He likes to see himself as both a dealmaker and a disruptor, qualities that all actors in the Horn will view as an opportunity. Mogadishu has begun setting out its stall by hiring one of DC’s best lobbying firms, BGR Group. Speaking to Geeska in November, Mursal Khaliif, a Somali MP and chairman of the bicameral committee on friendship with the United States, said that a “narrow window of opportunity” remains to influence the Trump administration. That applies to all, but it appears that Somaliland has gained a head start with the incoming administration.