“When constitutional change procedures are contested, political stability suffers.” M. Abdirizak

Somalia, in the literal sense of crisis, has endured a relentless succession of calamities. For more than three decades, the country has been shadowed by a civil war so prolonged that it now resembles an enduring condition rather than a transient affliction. The violence has hollowed its institutions and wearied its people. Hardly had the embers of war and conflict cooled when droughts and famine, in grim procession, laid claim to the country. In recent years alone, one such catastrophe has claimed the lives of more than a quarter of a million people. Such tragedies no longer arrive as aberrations. They recur. And in their recurrence, they have come to define the very image of the Somali state in the eyes of the world.

Yet the gravest anxiety of the present hour lies in the unravelling of whatever the state-building process has achieved over the last two decades. On the fourth day of March, Somalia’s parliament voted to conclude what was styled as the final stage of the country’s constitutional review process. In truth, the parliament adopted what amounts to an entirely new constitutional order. The act was presented by the current administration, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, as a culmination and, in a bizarre explanation largely divorced from the reality of the country’s situation, was portrayed as a “national milestone” — the end of the provisional constitution. To any sensible observer, however, it appeared more akin to an imposition. The process proved deeply contentious. Key federal member states, Puntland and Jubbaland, rejected the changes outright, contending that they were enacted absent the broad consensus that any federal arrangement must, by its nature, require. Opposition groups have since declared the amendments null and void.

The polity thus stands in a condition both uncertain and combustible. One academic, reflecting upon the implications of this hastily settled constitution, observed with some sobriety that “Somalia now finds itself in uncharted territory in a world that has changed in a big way.” Few would contest the sentiment. Indeed, many of the scholars and policy experts with whom I spoke regard the constitutional changes as a precipice, one that edges the country ever closer to fragmentation.

Nor does the peril end at the country’s borders. At the very moment when the Somali state appears most vulnerable to internal fracture, it also finds itself entangled in an increasingly competitive regional arena. Emerging Middle Eastern powers now vie for influence across the Horn of Africa with a vigour not witnessed in decades. Their presence, though couched in the language of partnership and investment, cannot be separated from the political realities it engenders. Several Gulf states, chiefly the United Arab Emirates, have cultivated direct relations with federal member states such as Puntland and Jubbaland, relationships that some critics argue embolden local claims to greater autonomy through the patronage of petro-wealth.

More dramatic still is the widening circle of external actors. Israel has now entered the equation following its recognition of Somaliland, an act whose political reverberations may yet prove profound. Meanwhile Turkey, whose presence in Somalia has been steadily expanded over the past decade, now occupies a position of considerable influence. Its reach extends across multiple sectors: the economy, where Turkish firms rank among the most prominent investors; the energy domain, where Ankara has secured rights over a vast share of Somalia’s prospective hydrocarbon resources; and the security sphere, where its partnership with Mogadishu has deepened into a central pillar of the federal government’s strategy.

These developments have placed Somalia in a difficult position. To discuss their implications, Geeska spoke with Mohamed Abdirizak, Somalia’s former foreign minister and now a member of the CERF Advisory Group to the U.N. Secretary-General. In the conversation, Abdirizak reflected on the country’s controversial constitutional changes, the slowing pace of its political and social progress, the rising competition among Gulf states in the region, and Somalia’s prospects in an evolving global order.

Mahbub M Abdillahi: The collapse of the recent talks between the Federal Government and the opposition bloc comes after nearly two years of constitutional deadlock. What does this crisis reveal about the current trajectory of the Somali state? Does this moment point to deeper structural weaknesses within Somalia’s constitutional and political order?

Mohamed Abdirizak: The collapse of the recent talks between the Federal Government and opposition actors, followed by the controversial adoption of constitutional amendments widely perceived as enabling an extension of federal institutions’ terms, is deeply unfortunate. However, it should be understood less as a dispute between personalities and more as a manifestation of deeper institutional fragilities within Somalia’s political order.

For nearly two years, Somalia has been grappling with unresolved questions concerning the constitutional framework, electoral arrangements, and the balance of authority between the federal government and the federal member states. This prolonged deadlock suggests that our constitutional architecture remains both incomplete and insufficiently internalized by political actors.

The 2012 Provisional Constitution was intended to serve as a transitional framework to be refined through broad national consensus. Instead, it has increasingly become an arena of contestation, often interpreted through the lens of immediate political advantage rather than long-term institutional consolidation. When the procedures governing constitutional change themselves become contested, political stability inevitably suffers. Yet moments of crisis can also be clarifying. This period should remind Somali leaders that durable state-building depends on consensus-based constitutionalism rather than unilateral political maneuvering.

MA: Since the Arta Conference, Somali politics has largely revolved around elite bargaining. Why has the Somali political class struggled to transition from these informal arrangements toward rule-based institutional governance?

M. Abdirizak: To understand the persistence of elite bargaining in Somali politics, one must begin with the nature of the state collapse itself. Somalia did not merely experience institutional failure; it endured a prolonged civil war in which political contestation was mediated through violence rather than institutions. Crucially, the country never underwent a comprehensive society-wide reconciliation process or transitional justice mechanisms that might have addressed the legacy of that conflict. The absence of such processes has left a profound deficit of trust within the political system. Building a culture of constitutionalism, where institutions are respected and judicial decisions are accepted as final, takes time, often generations.

In the absence of that institutional trust, Somali politics has repeatedly fallen back on familiar mechanisms rooted in negotiation and mediation traditions. Since the Arta Conference, therefore, governance has largely been structured around negotiated settlements among elites.

At the time, this approach was necessary. The Somali state had collapsed, institutions were absent, and elite bargaining provided a pragmatic pathway toward restoring political order. Over time, however, what began as a transitional arrangement gradually hardened into a political culture. Informal accommodations, power-sharing formulas, and negotiated understandings frequently substituted for rule-bound institutions. The challenge now lies in gradually shifting incentives toward institutional governance. Durable progress will depend on strengthening independent electoral bodies, reinforcing judicial credibility, and building administrative systems capable of functioning consistently across political transitions.

MA: Many Somalis today feel that their future has been repeatedly negotiated by political elites with limited public participation. In your view, has Somalia’s state-building project failed to develop a genuine social contract between the state and its citizens?

M. Abdirizak: The question of whether Somalia has succeeded in building a genuine social contract between state and citizen is both important and complex. My own experience working in governance and development has often reminded me that the very concept of a “social contract” presupposes two parties capable of engaging one another with a certain degree of parity. In Somalia, this assumption has historically been difficult to sustain. I once organized a series of town hall discussions on pressing national issues with the aim of encouraging public dialogue.

What I observed was striking: many citizens were present, attentive, and interested, but they were largely in listening mode rather than participatory engagement. This reflected something deeper in our political culture. For decades, Somalis were accustomed to political systems in which authority spoke and society followed. Our upbringing, educational structures, and social norms often encouraged deference to elders and authority figures, while debate and disagreement were sometimes interpreted as confrontation rather than constructive engagement. It is therefore understandable that many citizens feel that major political decisions have been negotiated primarily among elites with limited public participation. Yet this perception also highlights an evolving reality. As Somalia’s institutions gradually take shape, citizens increasingly expect governance that is transparent, accountable, and participatory.

The eventual transition toward more inclusive electoral processes has the potential to strengthen this social contract. However, legitimacy cannot be produced through procedures alone. It must be cultivated through trust, civic education, and an education system that encourages analytical thinking and active citizenship.

MA: There is growing concern among Somalia’s international partners about the slow pace of institutional reform and political progress. Do you sense a growing reluctance among donors to continue investing in Somalia’s state-building project? And how worried should we be about the long-term sustainability of Somalia’s institutional development?

The question of donor fatigue is often raised in discussions about Somalia’s future. In May 2025, I participated in a panel discussion at the University of Oslo examining the question “After USAID—What now for Africa and development aid?” My central argument was that while humanitarian assistance has played a critical role during moments of crisis, development aid more broadly has sometimes created patterns of dependency.

This is not an argument for abruptly ending development assistance, after all, much of my professional career has been devoted to international development work, but rather a call for developing countries to increasingly rely on their own human and natural resources while steadily improving governance and productivity across sectors.

In Somalia’s case, international partners have invested considerable political and financial capital over the past two decades in supporting reconstruction. What we are witnessing today is not a withdrawal of support, but rather a recalibration of expectations. Donors are increasingly emphasizing measurable progress in governance, accountability, and institutional resilience. This emphasis is understandable. Ultimately, the sustainability of Somalia’s institutions cannot depend indefinitely on external assistance. A durable state must strengthen domestic revenue mobilization, professionalize its civil service, and establish public financial management systems that inspire confidence among both citizens and investors. International partnerships will remain essential, but long-term success will depend primarily on domestic political commitment to institutional continuity.

MA: Recent geopolitical developments, including Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, have generated considerable unease within Somalia. While many interpret this move within the broader framework of Tel Aviv’s strategic interest in the region, could it also reflect shortcomings in Mogadishu’s foreign policy toward the Somaliland question?

M. Abdirizak: The recognition of Somaliland by Israel has understandably generated concern among Somalis. While such developments are often interpreted through the lens of broader regional strategic calculations, they also reveal underlying weaknesses in how the Somaliland question has been approached diplomatically. The collapse of the Somalia–Somaliland dialogue reflects not simply a breakdown in negotiations but the exhaustion of a political framework that was designed primarily to manage tensions rather than resolve the underlying dispute over sovereignty.

The talks were never structured as a conventional peace process aimed at a definitive political settlement. Instead, they functioned largely as a holding mechanism that allowed both sides to maintain engagement while postponing decisions on the core political question. Following Somalia’s re-entry into international politics after 2012, Mogadishu viewed the dialogue as a means of preserving international support for Somalia’s territorial integrity while hoping that economic integration and normalization would gradually reduce the appeal of separation.

For Somaliland, participation served a different strategic purpose: engagement demonstrated political maturity and institutional stability while waiting for a favorable geopolitical moment for recognition. In this sense, the process was shaped by fundamentally divergent strategic objectives. Somalia sought eventual reintegration, while Somaliland sought international recognition. Technical cooperation in areas such as aviation or security coordination could not bridge this underlying divide. Over time, the dialogue risked becoming symbolic rather than substantive. This experience underscores the need for a more realistic and strategically coherent national approach to the Somaliland question.

MA: Somalia now finds itself at the center of intensifying rivalries among Gulf monarchies and other Middle Eastern powers. At a time when the country is facing a constitutional crisis, do you worry that these geopolitical dynamics could exacerbate Somalia’s internal tensions? To what extent might competition for external patronage between the federal government and peripheral states deepen domestic rifts?

M. Abdirizak: Somalia’s strategic location along the Red Sea corridor has increasingly drawn the country into the orbit of intensifying rivalries among Gulf states and other Middle Eastern actors. These rivalries intersect with Somalia’s internal political economy in ways that can amplify existing domestic tensions. External partnerships are not inherently problematic—indeed, they can provide valuable economic and security cooperation. The challenge arises when competing regional actors cultivate relationships with different Somali political constituencies. In such circumstances, external engagement risks reinforcing internal fragmentation by providing political actors with alternative sources of financial or diplomatic leverage.

This dynamic has occasionally manifested itself in tensions between the federal government and some federal member states, particularly when external agreements appear to bypass federal coordination. The result can be the emergence of parallel diplomatic channels that blur the boundaries between domestic political competition and regional geopolitical rivalry. Somalia therefore faces a delicate balancing act: engaging constructively with external partners while ensuring that foreign relationships reinforce rather than undermine national cohesion. Achieving this balance will require clearer institutional frameworks governing external agreements and stronger coordination between federal and regional authorities.

MA: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently proclaimed that the “old world is gone,” suggesting a reconfiguration of global politics and the rules-based international order as we once knew it. Considering growing rivalries in the region, does this proclaimed shift in the world order offer emancipatory possibilities for Somalia, or does it risk reinforcing existing crises with no foreseeable certainty?

M. Abdirizak: Rubio’s remarks reflect a broader recognition that the international system is undergoing significant transformation. For countries like Somalia, this evolving geopolitical landscape presents both opportunities and risks. On one hand, a more multipolar international environment may allow smaller states to diversify diplomatic and economic partnerships rather than relying on a narrow set of traditional allies. Such diversification can expand development opportunities and strategic flexibility. On the other hand, periods of systemic transition often intensify competition among major powers, sometimes turning strategically located states into arenas of geopolitical rivalry.

Somalia’s response to these shifts should be guided by strategic clarity and institutional coherence. Diversifying partnerships can be beneficial, but such engagement must remain anchored in clearly defined national interests and supported by stable domestic governance. Ultimately, Somalia’s ability to navigate an evolving global order will depend less on the turbulence of international politics and more on the strength, legitimacy, and unity of its own institutions.