The war on Iran: Houthis and the rising threat in the Horn of Africa

The American–Israeli war on Iran has entered its second week, and its repercussions are already extending beyond Iran itself to the Gulf, the Red Sea, and international shipping lanes. Major shipping companies have begun rerouting their vessels away from the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, disrupting established routes and driving up the costs of transport and insurance. This was to some extent expected, unlike the persistent illusion that the Horn of Africa lies outside the arena of Middle Eastern conflicts.

Since October 7 and the outbreak of Israel’s devastating assault on Gaza, the Red Sea has become one of the central arteries of the regional confrontation. The Houthis, by virtue of their control over the northern entrance to Bab al-Mandab and the experience they have accumulated since October 7 in weaponizing maritime geography and turning international corridors into instruments of pressure, are no longer a secondary player in the regional struggle. They have become part of how the conflict itself is defined, not merely one of its consequences.

In June 2025, the group had already threatened to target American vessels in the Red Sea should Washington join an attack on Iran. Yet so far they have maintained a form of indirect involvement in the confrontation. Their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, has expressed clear political solidarity in mobilizing rhetoric but has kept a cautious distance from military escalation, unlike Hezbollah.

This caution may stem from the fact that the group emerged from previous rounds of escalation with the United States well aware of the costs of direct confrontation. Clashes with Washington impose heavy burdens on the structure of their rule in Yemen, particularly after the intensification of American strikes on their positions during 2025, aimed at halting attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Hence, the movement today appears less like the spearhead of Tehran’s axis and more like its strategic reserve. It retains the ability to threaten shipping lanes and strategic interests while delaying the use of that capability until the moment when expanding the war becomes more advantageous than merely declaring participation in it.

However, the most consequential shift for the Horn of Africa lies in Somaliland’s gradual transformation from an entity seeking international recognition into a space increasingly drawn into the Red Sea’s emerging security architecture. On December 26, 2025, Israel and Somaliland signed a declaration of mutual recognition, after which Hargeisa announced its intention to join the Abraham Accords. The visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to Hargeisa on January 6, 2026 further signaled the opening of a broader political, economic, and security relationship.

In February 2026, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi spoke again of a forthcoming partnership agreement with Israel and expressed hopes for future investment and cooperation, while at the same time denying that Israeli military bases had been discussed. Yet the denial, significant as it was, did little to calm the wider concern. The Houthis swiftly condemned the move and declared Somaliland a legitimate military target.

It is difficult to view Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a principled stance on the right of self-determination. There is little evidence to suggest that such a motive is decisive. More likely, the move reflects broader security calculations that see this location as a tool for counterbalancing the Houthi threat in maritime corridors.

In this context, the position of Somaliland, and of Berbera in particular, takes on renewed significance. The port is no longer simply a commercial hub underpinning Somaliland’s economy, nor merely a lever in Addis Ababa’s long-standing ambitions to diversify its maritime outlets, or, in Abiy Ahmed’s words, exercise its “right of access to the Red Sea.”

It is increasingly a site that could become entangled in the struggle over control of the Red Sea itself. Somaliland’s geography, situated where the Indian Ocean meets the Red Sea, carries a function that extends beyond economics into geopolitics. For this reason, it is difficult to view Israel’s recognition of the country as a principled stance on the right of self-determination. There is little evidence to suggest that such a motive is decisive. More likely, the move reflects broader security calculations that see this location as a tool for counterbalancing the Houthi threat in maritime corridors.

The deepening Emirati presence in Berbera further reinforces this shift. Through the $442 million investment by DP World, the port has become part of a wider network of regional interests where trade, security, and influence intersect. In this light, Mogadishu’s insistence on its sovereign claim over Somaliland in 2018 becomes easier to understand. The Somali government rejected the agreement at the time, but its objections produced little effect. What was unfolding was no longer just a legal dispute over borders or representation but the insertion of this location into a broader regional balance.

The reactions from African and regional actors to Israel’s recognition underline that the issue extends well beyond a routine diplomatic gesture. The African Union rejected the move, despite the fact that its own 2005 mission to Somaliland acknowledged the distinctiveness of its case and the strength of its legal and political claim to recognition within the framework of the Union. Egypt, Turkey, and Djibouti also moved quickly to condemn the decision.

Yet these responses, important as they are, cannot be explained solely by a commitment to Somalia’s territorial unity – a unity long marked by fragility and dispute, one that has never quite solidified into a stable political reality, whether at independence, after the collapse of the Somali state, or even today. The real danger therefore lies not simply in recognition itself, but in the possibility that it could re-internationalize the Somali question, turning it from an internal political issue into a new arena for regional alignment and political militarization. In that sense, recognition may not open a path toward resolution so much as it risks producing rival blocs instead.

With the renewed reports of an Emirati military presence in Berbera, it becomes clear that Somaliland is increasingly positioned within emerging maps of deterrence and strategic deployment.

From this perspective, the American–Israeli war on Iran cannot be separated from the Houthi threat, just as the Houthi question cannot be separated from the unresolved status of Somaliland. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi’s warning, issued after Israel recognized Somaliland, that any Israeli presence there would constitute a military target cannot simply be dismissed as rhetorical propaganda. For that reason, it is not enough for Hargeisa to deny the existence of Israeli bases or to emphasize the political and economic nature of its relationship with Israel. The mere association of its name with Israel at such a moment recodes Somaliland as a security actor in the eyes of forces that view the Red Sea as a battlefield. When this intersects with renewed reports, including a recent admission by Somaliland’s ambassador in an interview with local media about an Emirati military presence in Berbera, it becomes clear that Somaliland is increasingly positioned within emerging maps of deterrence and strategic deployment.

The deeper dimension of the issue lies not only in the risk of military targeting but also in the heavy toll that war imposes on societies already on the brink. The Horn of Africa, with Somaliland at its center, faces these shifts while grappling with severe economic and humanitarian fragility. It is therefore no surprise that the first visible form of cooperation with Israel has taken the shape of water aid and resource management. Such humanitarian or development initiatives offer the most politically palatable way to introduce a new presence domestically, before its broader political and security implications come fully into view.

In the end, the central question is no longer whether the Houthis will enter the war tomorrow or the day after, nor whether Israel will establish a base in Somaliland or simply coordinate with its regional allies. Those issues remain unresolved in the region. What matters more is that the war on Iran has already redefined the entire regional landscape, from the Gulf to Lebanon and from Bab al-Mandab to Berbera. The Horn of Africa, once imagined by some as a distant theater, now appears as a frontline of contact. Somaliland may eventually discover that what seemed like an opportunity for recognition was, in part, a transition from isolation into a position within conflicts far larger than itself.