U.S. Congo–Rwanda deal faces fire as mineral power struggle deepens

Despite the recent signing of a U.S.-brokered peace agreement between President Félix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, hostilities persist in eastern Congo. The ongoing violence has fueled skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the accord, with critics questioning whether the new framework can bring an end to what many describe as a “protracted conflict.”

The arrangement reached in Washington is intended, in theory, to halt Rwandan support for the rebel movement “M23,” withdraw Rwandan forces from certain border areas, and open a path for security and economic cooperation between the two countries, at a time when the United States seeks greater access to Congo’s vast reserves of cobalt, copper, lithium, and rare minerals, in the face of China’s growing influence in the mining sector.

However, critics argue that the agreement effectively entrenches the continued presence of the Rwandan army in strategic areas of eastern Congo under the pretext of “pursuing Hutu militias” based there, even though these groups, according to previous international assessments, no longer possess the capacity to seriously threaten Rwandan security. There are also fears that the agreement could provide legal cover for Congolese minerals to flow through Rwanda to global markets, extending a long record of accusations against Kigali of profiting from resource-smuggling networks.

Some economists estimate the weight of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s natural wealth at around $24 trillion, including massive reserves of cobalt, tantalum, gold, and rare minerals essential for electric vehicles and advanced electronics industries. These resources have become the focus of intense competition among major powers, chiefly the United States and China, making any political settlement in eastern Congo directly tied to the map of investments and mining deals.

Circulating information indicates that American and Western companies, including investment alliances in the field of “critical minerals,” have obtained or are seeking licenses to explore for lithium and other minerals in conflict-affected areas, while the “M23” movement still controls towns and key routes in North and South Kivu provinces, accused of imposing parallel administration on the ground. At the same time, similar accusations are directed at Congolese army forces and allied militias for committing serious abuses against civilians.

Observers warn that the danger lies in the fact that the agreement was negotiated behind closed doors between governments, while Congolese civil society, victims’ groups, and miners’ cooperatives were excluded from the discussion process. So far, there are no clear details available to the public about which foreign entities benefit from mining contracts, or the actual revenues that will return to the state treasury compared to the cost of war borne by the population.

Congolese opponents also fear that giving Kagame a central role as a “peace partner” and guarantor of stability will cement Rwanda’s military and economic influence in eastern Congo, allowing it to retain escalation cards whenever it wishes, with a history of previous agreements that ended in continued violence and the changing names of armed groups more than they produced lasting peace.

On the other hand, Tshisekedi’s government is betting that direct U.S. involvement in the file could serve as a deterrent against major violations, and that linking aid and investments to the implementation of security commitments will create real incentives to reduce tensions. Yet the persistence of clashes on the ground, and the absence of transparent mechanisms for accountability and reparations, reinforce the impression among wide sectors of Congolese that the agreement is closer to a “resource deal” than to a comprehensive political settlement.

Meanwhile, as waves of displacement and abuses continue in eastern Congo, the question posed by residents and activists remains: Will the Washington track actually reduce militia influence and lead to the withdrawal of foreign forces, or will it pave the way for a new phase of organized exploitation of the country’s wealth under the banner of “peace and investment,” with no near end to their tragedy that has lasted for decades?