Understanding Irro's foreign policy

Seven months since President Irro took office, he has inherited various domestic and foreign policy challenges that are important and consequential for Somaliland’s future. Many of these issues cannot be resolved using the domestic resources available to Somaliland’s leaders, and so foreign policy is seen as an arena in which financing, investment, and expertise can be sought to realise Irro’s goals. Diplomatic recognition certainly remains a key priority, but Irro – a former diplomat himself – also appears less inclined to make that the sole prism through which his foreign policy is conceived and executed. 

The conduct of foreign affairs by this government so far has been a mixture of tactical successes and shortcomings. Recent trips to the UAE raised the profile and narrative of President Irro’s calibre. On the other hand, others viewed his trip to Qatar — which engaged with him within the framework of its broader foreign policy towards Somalia and sent Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani rather than the head of state, Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani — as a humiliation. A read out released after the meeting issued by Qatar, said it: “affirmed the State of Qatar’s belief that Somalia's future is built through openness and constructive communication among all its components, to ensure respect for the sovereignty and national unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.” 

Somaliland Standard termed Qatar’s statement on Irro’s visit as “a Diplomatic Sleight of Hand”, as Doha claimed it had discussed the political and security situation of Somalia with Somaliland’s delegation. Following the meeting Somaliland’s spokesperson, Hussein Deyr, issued his own statement saying the meeting wasn’t a “reflection not of weakness, but of Somaliland’s rising influence and the irreversible momentum of its statehood”.  

Irro has, to date, visited two Gulf countries, as well as Djibouti and Kenya. 

The much-anticipated trip to Ethiopia — which last year signed a preliminary deal for sea access with Somaliland — is yet to take place. Addis Ababa and Mogadishu have been engaged in rounds of talks in Ankara, aimed at carving out a deal that protects Somalia’s sovereignty while granting Ethiopia access to the sea. Cracks are now emerging in that deal, as Mogadishu builds relations with Egypt and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s most formidable regional adversaries. As Africa Intelligence reported, Ethiopia is expecting firm support for the sea access issue from Somaliland’s leadership before any high-level contact takes place. 

Irro’s approach to foreign policy so far is characterised more by a willingness to engage with all actors in the pursuit of Somaliland’s interests, in contrast to former President Muse Bihi, who operated with a clearer definition of who he considered Hargeisa’s partners and potential long-term allies. 

Talking to everyone 

Irro has clearly been seeking to diversify Somaliland’s partnerships — a departure from Bihi’s foreign policy. Bihi’s term coincided with Trump’s turbulent first term and was complicated by the zero-sum politics of the 2017 Gulf crisis, when a bloc of Gulf countries moved to isolate Qatar and adopted a hostile posture towards Türkiye. Somaliland had close economic, military and political ties with the leaders of the UAE. The UAE’s hostile relations with Qatar, and Qatar’s close ties with Somalia, curtailed the possibility of a fruitful dialogue occurring between both sides then. In 2017, Hargeisa ratified a deal which allowed the UAE to base its military in Berbera under late president Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Silanyo), where the Emirati company, DP World also invested heavily in building a modern port. President Muse Bihi later told AP in an exclusive interview that: “All our business, main assets, are in Dubai. All our imports depend on the United Arab Emirates, their ports”. He added: “We have relations of business and economic ties with them, so we are allies with them.”  

That era now appears to have come to an end, with reconciliation among those states creating new opportunities for Hargeisa to explore what Qatar and other non-traditional partners might offer. To that end, Irro visited Qatar, becoming the first Somaliland leader to visit the small emirate, which has long opposed Somaliland’s independence and maintains historically close relations with officials in Mogadishu, regardless of the incumbent. 

According to one writer commenting on Irro’s visit to Qatar, Suhaib Mahmoud, this reflects a “growing awareness of the need to diversify its partners and to enter political spaces that, until recently, seemed closed to it or might not be fruitful.” What transpired behind the scenes remains unclear, but public statements have been contradictory. Hargeisa hailed the trip as a success in bringing its case to a new forum, while Doha said that the meeting focused on securing a peaceful and stable Somalia within the framework of a federal system. 

It will be interesting to see if this “we talk to everyone” approach extends to China. During his presidential campaign, I previously noted that Irro wanted to adopt a different approach to China, as Somaliland under Bihi invested heavily in cultivating ties with Taiwan and had angered Beijing, a major global economic and political power. While official statements emphasise strong relations with the West and Taiwan, their openness to ‘exploring’ new partnerships could be interpreted as a signal to actors such as China or Russia. In a recent interview with Neue Zürcher Zeitung, a German newspaper, Irro said: “If the West is unwilling, then China will knock on the door. And Russia will, too.”

Beijing has repeatedly opposed Somaliland-Taiwan relations, and excluding Taipei from the strategic Horn of Africa would be regarded as a success. However, any meaningful dialogue with China carries one major precondition: severing ties with Taiwan. This scenario remains unlikely at present; Somaliland has recently dispatched a high-level delegation to Taiwan, including the commander of the coastal guards, which will further antagonise Beijing. Both sides signed a cooperative maritime security agreement involving the Coast Guard Administration of the Ocean Affairs Council and Somaliland’s Coastal Guard Command.  

China strongly condemned the move, accusing Somaliland once again of violating its territorial integrity and warning Hargeisa against going against what it called “historical trends.” A day later, the Chinese ambassador to Somalia, Wang Yu, met with Somalia’s military chief, General Yusuf Odowa, to strengthen cooperation and expressed firm mutual support in safeguarding the national sovereignty and security of both China and Somalia. 

Additionally, China maintains strong influence in the region, particularly with Ethiopia and Kenya, and has a military presence in Djibouti. China’s closer relations with Kenya have irked some anti-China members of Congress, including Jim Risch, the senate foreign affairs committee chairman, who said the US should review Kenya’s major non-Nato ally status. Some experts wonder whether Kenya might become the next South Africa, given Washington’s developing hostile attitude towards it. Supporting Somalia is another tool China has been using against Somaliland, which undermines the latter’s cause. 

However, the nature and scope of any forthcoming engagement with Washington will be decisive. In Hargeisa, expectations of the United States are currently very high. US President Donald Trump recently said at a press conference that Somaliland was a “complex” issue, but one that the US was “working on right now.” Irro’s government sees an opportunity to use this engagement to address many of the socio-economic and political challenges facing Somaliland. During his campaign for the presidency, Irro promised major reforms and projects that will be difficult to implement, given Somaliland’s worsening economic situation. External partnership in this context is necessary.  

Trump is the main bet 

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea remain a flashpoint for major contention among superpowers, Middle Eastern states, and non-state actors. Israel’s war on Gaza, Syria, and Yemen has increased insecurity in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Somalia’s war with al-Shabaab and ISIS continues, with a major operation in Puntland reported to have been successful against ISIS. Trump’s return to the White House ushered in a sense of expectation in Somaliland, with hopes of utilising geopolitics to push for closer relations with Washington. Conservative congressmen, lobbyists, and allies are increasingly eyeing Hargeisa as part of the anti-China alliance in Africa. 

Irro, like many other leaders, is betting on Trump’s business-minded approach to politics for a better deal. Except Africa has not been a priority for Washington, aside from critical minerals and commercial diplomacy. The administration's diplomatic success in the DRC is also tied to securing mineral deals for American companies — not necessarily out of deep concern for the fate of the region. This, experts explained, will usher in the “resource-for-security” paradigm, resembling the Russian mercenary group Wagner’s “regime survival package”. It seems Somaliland has taken note of the centrality of access to critical minerals in Washington’s Africa policy and has begun offering critical minerals to the US in ongoing conversations for enhanced cooperation.  

It is clear now that the Somaliland issue has fallen on Trump’s desk as he mentioned during his press conference with the president of Azerbaijan and prime minister of Armenia. But the administration’s reduction of diplomatic expertise and the absence of Africa experts in the State Department mean that the administration’s ability to navigate complex issues, such as those in Somaliland, will be difficult. The New York Times obtained a draft executive order overhauling the State department, and it includes eliminating the Africa Bureau which would be replaced by a special envoy office for Africa. As it stands, Massad Boulos serves as the senior Advisor for Africa.  

Normalising relations with Israel and displacing Palestinian refugees have been other significant news stories involving Somaliland. Most recently, CNN reported that an Israeli official had briefed them that Somaliland was among several states that negotiations were on-going with to resettle Palestinians from Gaza — viewed widely as a blueprint to ethnically cleanse the besieged strip. South Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, and Indonesia are among the states mentioned too. South Sudan, which itself has been on the brink of renewed fighting between the country’s two largest ethnic groups, put out a statement yesterday denying such talks had taken place.  

Somaliland has also denied that any such negotiations are ongoing, but Israeli officials, including prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have repeatedly briefed both their media and international media that talks are taking place.  

Trump appears keen to kill two birds with one stone — pursuing his Riviera Plan while also expanding the Abraham Accords. On the sidelines of a mini US–Africa summit, he reportedly arranged a meeting between the Mauritanian president and the Israeli prime minister. Were Washington to push Somaliland to similarly normalise ties with Israel as part of a bargain with Hargeisa, its leadership would face a dilemma: whether to take whatever measures are required to strengthen ties with the US and benefit politically from the windfall or to rebuff the opportunity in order to avoid antagonising the public. Several Arab and Muslim states have been considering joining the Abraham Accords — most notably Saudi Arabia, which has used its considerable leverage to condition its acceptance on ending the war and achieving a two-state solution for Palestine.  

Dealing with the deal-maker will not be easy business. Unfavourable power dynamics mean Washington could still push through a deal tilted in its favour — one that may not recognise Somaliland’s sovereignty at first, while securing access to the strategic facilities Somaliland controls along the Red Sea. Irro’s only leverage, as he pointed out to Neue Zürcher Zeitung, is that if the West doesn’t deliver, he will look elsewhere. However, Somaliland’s consistent lobbying and the political capital it has built in Washington may give it a strong starting point and a large number of supporters in the ruling Republican party. For example, US lawmakers have introduced bills — albeit dead on arrival — pushing for Somaliland’s recognition.  

Meanwhile, the Somali government’s efforts in Washington have also gained momentum. Whilst the US has sought to assuage concerns that it will scale back security cooperation with its Somali partners, signals from Trump’s camp suggest some ambivalence on the Somaliland issue. Somalia has taken note of this and hired lobbying firms in Washington in an attempt to counter these developments. In March, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud wrote to the Trump administration offering air bases and ports in Somaliland and Puntland. In the wake of the Trump administration’s overhaul of its Somalia policy — and recent setbacks in Mogadishu’s counterterrorism efforts — the Somali government is working hard to preserve the current status quo. In the UK, where several MPs also support Somaliland’s independence, Somalia’s prime minister Hamsa Barre recently called on Somali communities residing there to step up efforts to block this momentum.