Total victory in Sudan over the RSF is now possible

For two years, conventional analysis has insisted that Sudan’s brutal war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is unwinnable. Pessimistic voices argue that neither side can achieve a decisive victory, but recent developments on the ground tell a different story. The SAF’s steady advance—liberating Sinnar, al-Gazira, and much of Khartoum—proves that total victory remains a real possibility. The RSF is only present in a few areas of the capital city now. This momentum, supported by popular backing and historical precedent, suggests that the SAF can bring lasting security and stability to Sudan.

In conflicts where two factions battle for dominance, the will of the people is often the ultimate tiebreaker. The Sudanese people have shown a clear preference for the SAF over the RSF for several reasons. The SAF has long been regarded as an institution of the state, whereas the RSF is seen as an illegitimate force with a history of atrocities, mercenary ties, and a lack of national vision. The RSF has terrorised civilians—looting homes, committing serious human rights violations, and fostering chaos—while the SAF has provided security, stability, and essential services to displaced populations. With the liberation of key regions, displaced Sudanese are now returning home, signalling renewed confidence in the SAF’s ability to restore order.

The SAF’s advance towards al-Fashir marks a pivotal development in the conflict. Reopening the national highway to Kordofan and ending the siege of al-Obayed will pave the way for breaking the RSF’s grip on Nyala, al-Geneina, and al-Daein. The city of al-Fashir has resisted RSF control with remarkable resilience. If it holds, the SAF will be positioned to deliver decisive blows that could unravel RSF control in Darfur. Furthermore, the strategic importance of al-Fashir cannot be overstated. It serves as a critical supply and logistical hub, and its liberation would severely cripple the RSF’s operations in western Sudan.  

Additionally, the history of African conflicts underscores that peace agreements are not a reliable solution, especially in wars marked by mass atrocities. Even if the international community pushes for a negotiated settlement, Sudan’s history—and that of many African conflicts—shows that such agreements often fail. The devastating Rwandan and Ethiopian civil wars ended not with negotiations, but with total military victories. Peace deals, particularly in conflicts where civilians have suffered widespread violence, have historically collapsed under the weight of unresolved grievances and unpunished crimes. Hence, in Sudan, a negotiated settlement with the RSF would likely leave the door open for future instability, as it would fail to address the fundamental power imbalances and war crimes committed by the RSF.

Furthermore, a closer look at Sudan’s internal dynamics reinforces the SAF’s potential for complete victory. Unlike the RSF, which operates as a loosely structured militia, the SAF benefits from a more hierarchical and disciplined command structure. This distinction is crucial, as it allows the SAF to coordinate large-scale operations effectively and maintain control over the areas it liberates. On the other hand, the RSF’s reliance on decentralised, opportunistic tactics has granted it short-term advantages in urban warfare but has proven unsustainable in prolonged military engagements. As the SAF consolidates its gains, the RSF’s weaknesses will become more apparent, hastening its eventual collapse.  

Internationally, there is growing recognition that a strong and stable Sudan hinges on the SAF’s victory. While some external actors have called for negotiations, others understand that any agreement that allows the RSF to retain influence would only prolong the suffering of Sudanese civilians. The SAF’s military progress is being closely watched, and its continued success could shift international perceptions in its favour, encouraging more support for its efforts to restore national unity and security.

The humanitarian implications of the SAF's victory are equally significant. With the RSF’s defeat, millions of displaced Sudanese would have the opportunity to return to their homes without the fear of further violence. The SAF’s ability to provide governance and essential services would help rebuild the country’s war-torn infrastructure, paving the way for a sense of normalcy and stability. Moreover, eliminating the RSF’s influence would deter future militia uprisings, sending a strong message that armed groups cannot hold the nation hostage.

As the war reaches a critical juncture, those who continue to propose a false balance—suggesting that neither side can win—will soon find themselves on the wrong side of history. The tide of war has turned decisively in favour of the SAF, and those who once believed in a power-sharing agreement will see their arguments crumble. Ali Youssef Ahmed, Sudan’s foreign minister, told Al Arabiya earlier this month that the war was nearing its end. Babikir Elamin, Sudan’s ambassador to the UK, told The Guardian that it was a “matter of days before Khartoum is cleared of RSF”. The narrative that the conflict is unwinnable is not only misleading but also dismisses the realities on the ground. The SAF’s steady progress, supported by both strategic military operations and unwavering civilian support, has debunked the notion that Sudan’s war is a stalemate.

The coming months are likely to be pivotal in Sudan’s modern history. As the SAF continues its advance toward total victory, the collapse of the RSF appears inevitable. Those who advocated for a negotiated settlement with an irredeemable force will lose their credibility. The SAF’s triumph will not only restore stability to Sudan, but will also serve as a powerful lesson to other nations facing similar insurgencies—demonstrating that total victory is possible when backed by the will of the people and a disciplined national military.