The Tigray crackdown: Power struggles and regional stakes

In the early morning of 7 November 2025, TPLF Chair Debretsion Gebremichael sent letters to the UN Secretary-General and the African Union Chair complaining that a government drone strike hit his forces on the Tigray–Afar frontier, causing casualties and material damage. He called the strike a “blunt and concerning violation” of the Pretoria cessation-of-hostilities agreement. Federal officials have not publicly acknowledged the incident.

Two days earlier, the Afar Regional State government said that the TPLF and allied forces had staged a cross-border attack and temporarily seized six villages in Megale district. RAS officials accused the attackers of shelling civilians with heavy weapons. They warned that unless the “reckless action” stopped, they would have no choice but to protect their people, defend its boundaries and “legitimately respond to any external aggression.”

The Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) in turn accused the Tigray Peace Forces (TPF) of launching attacks on Tigrayan units from Afar. TPLF forces operating in Afar have since returned to Tigray. These competing narratives reflect a deeper reality. Tigrayan politics have fractured, command-and-control has crumbled, and both Addis Ababa and Asmara are experimenting with leverage along a volatile frontier. In his last speech to Parliament, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed disowned the TPLF, insisting that the Pretoria agreement was effectively being implemented by its signatories, “Getachew Reda, Tsedkan Gebretensae and Assefa,” as if the agreement was signed by individuals rather than a party. Meanwhile, new actors are emerging inside Tigray.

The new political map

First in the list, and the oldest, is the Tigray Liberation Front (TPLF, Mekelle). The TPLF still claims to represent Tigrayans and points to its long wartime record. Its political weight was sharply reduced when the National Election Board of Ethiopia deregistered it in May. The faction has built a working relationship with Eritrea, which has allowed access to supplies through Massawa. Debretsion’s camp portrays recent fighting as federal “provocations” executed through Afar-based militias. It is difficult to see how this faction can govern Tigray without military support. The Tigray Defence Forces (TDF), formed during the war, remain linked to this group, although many fighters insist they are not partisan.

Secondly, the Tigrayan Interim Administration under Lt-Gen Tadesse Werede. Tadesse was appointed by Prime Minister Abiy as a stabiliser in federal attire after months of internal factional crisis and street-level turmoil. During the Tigray war, he was the Chief commander of the Tigray Defence Force (TDF), an armed force formed by Tigrayan regional security units, defected ENDF soldiers, local militias and volunteers. He later became Getachew Reda's deputy in the first term of the TIA. His rise came after Debretsion-aligned commanders had taken control of parts of Tigray and sidelined Getachew Reda’s team. He gradually attached himself to Debresion’s camp and adopted its agenda.

Thirdly comes the Simret or the Tigrean Democratic Solidarity (TDS). A small, newly registered party backed mainly by younger Tigrayans and intellectuals. Getachew Reda was elected president at its inaugural congress in Addis Ababa. Now serving as an adviser to the federal government, he accuses the Debretsion faction of corruption, militarism and mishandling the return of displaced people from western Tigray. The TPLF leadership considers Simret a group of traitors and has blocked it from opening offices in Tigray. Getachew denies any link with the TPF. Under Getachew, the TIA hosted the most democratic debates that Tigray has ever seen. Many criticisms have been levelled against the TPLF, holding it accountable for plunging Ethiopia into a catastrophic war.

Finally, the Tigray Peace Forces (TPF or “Hara Meret”). These anti-war fighters, mostly former TDF members based in Afar, number in the low thousands. Mekelle accuses them of receiving federal support, and Afar accuses them of reacting to TPLF incursions. Their existence shows that part of the wartime base is unwilling to join either Eritrea-leaning leaders or a renewed push for conflict. Following the TPLF offensive in Afar and a drone strike targeting them, TPLF leader and former high-ranking member of the Tigrayan military, Brig-Gen Gebre-Egziabher Beyene (aka Wedi Anteru) said his forces had withdrawn to Tigray. The TPF insists that the TDF must remain non-partisan.

Across the border, Eritrea’s position is shaped by its exclusion from the Pretoria agreement. It has drawn closer to Debretsion’s faction, and Eritrean military sources indicated that Eritrea has provided a supply route through Massawa. Debretsion states that Tigray is “no longer encircled on all sides”. Addis stands alarmed by any sign of cooperation between Mekelle and Asmara, while Eritrea, for its part, watches closely for moves that might link Tigrayan forces with federal authorities.

Afar remains the other immediate external factor affecting Tigray. It could serve as a staging ground for federal action against the region. Afar officials repeatedly accuse the TPLF of crossing into Megale, while Mekelle accuses Addis of arming Afar-based proxies like the TPF to trap Tigray in a limbo, in “neither war or peace”. Fragmented command structures and militia politics raise the risk of escalation, even when neither side desires so.

The third external factor is the legal and diplomatic foundation governing Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia formally recognised Eritrean sovereignty on 4 May 1993, following a decision by the Ethiopian Council of Representatives at its 68th session on 29 April 1993. That decision accepted and respected Eritrea’s choice for independence, and Eritrea was admitted to the United Nations soon after. This created a firm boundary in international law. Despite this, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has argued that there is no “official record or institutional decision” explaining how Ethiopia lost access to the Red Sea. Rhetoric about “returning Assab” are resurfacing and circulating in military and media circles lately. Thus, any Ethiopian escalation on the Assab front would inevitably have repercussions for Tigray.

In the concluding remarks of the 7th TPLF conference, the veteran TPLF leader, former Foreign Minister and former Ambassador to China, Seyoum Mesfin, stated that there is no other organisation in the world that matches the TPLF, not even the Chinese Communist Party, in terms of self-criticism and openness.

Yet after the Pretoria agreement, the TPLF admitted it lacked strategic leadership and spent months in closed-door discussions about internal power struggles, showing little concern for the daily realities facing Tigrayans. Senior commanders and politicians continue to profit from gold mining in ways that damage the environment, while most Tigrayans live in deep poverty. In one displaced persons camp, a child was killed by a hyena in broad daylight, a stark reminder of the region’s collapse. Despite this, the Debretsion faction insists that the TPLF and the Tigrayan people are inseparable and treats criticism of the party as an attack on the Tigrayan people themselves.

Perhaps the TPLF’s suppression of dissent, its restrictions on journalists, and its forceful takeover of the TIA might be likened to the actions of the Chinese Communist Party during the Tiananmen Square protests of April to June 1989, which ended in a violent crackdown when the People’s Liberation Army used tanks and troops to clear the square and surrounding streets.

Some argue that if the Tiananmen protesters had succeeded, China might have become a Western client state instead of a global power. Yet neither Tigray nor a divided TPLF in 2025 resembles China or the CCP of 1989.

The recent five-day protests by TDF veterans over pay and future prospects show the extent of political decay in Tigray. Many insist they are not a TPLF army. Legitimacy has shifted away from political parties toward armed groups, displaced civilians and frustrated youth. Mixed orders, patchy DDR programs and growing criminal networks have created a vacuum that Simret uses politically and Addis exploits administratively.

There are four possible pathways for Tigray in the next 6–12 months.

The first is the maintaining of the status quo with gradual centralisation under the TIA with federal protection. Lt-Gen Tadesse’s administration solidifies control over Mekelle and major towns with steady federal backing. Debretsion’s deregistered TPLF remains influential but weakened. Simret grows mainly in Addis and the diaspora. The TPF continues to operate from Afar. Addis channels resources and selectively co-opts mid-level TDF officers to undercut Debretsion. Simret functions as a tolerated “loyal opposition,” gaining visibility but little ground inside Tigray. Skirmishes persist, yet neither side chooses full-scale war. The risk lies in accidental escalation from militia clashes or a drone strike, especially among frustrated demobilised fighters.

The second scenario a quiet Mekelle–Asmara tactical understanding, where a faction within Debretsion’s camp pursues low-key coordination with Eritrea, driven by fears of federal encirclement. Even a whiff of logistical cooperation along the border could provoke a harsh federal response and hand Simret a propaganda victory. The likely result would be intensified raids, targeted arrests and possible use of airpower near the frontier.

A third scenario is a Simret-led inside-out coalition: Getachew uses his federal advisory post and the launch of Simret to build support among municipal officials, disaffected administrators and urban youth. With federal help, he facilitates the return of large numbers of displaced people to western Tigray, weakening a major political card of the Debretsion faction. The TPF operate in West Tigray with ENDF support. If Tadesse falls in bread-and-butter issues, a brokered opening would allow Simret to compete in local councils and erode the TPLF patronage network. Drone strikes quietly target commanders aligned with Debretsion, his faction moves closer to Eritrea, with both it and Asmara increasing support to Fano forces, though without direct Eritrea–Ethiopia war.

Finally, the worst-case scenario: a deadly confrontation around Megale/Abala rapidly spirals as Afar auxiliaries, TPF units and TDF elements exchange fire. Addis responds from on high, remotely cutting electricity, banking and telecommunications to Tigray. Eritrea moves troops toward the border naming self-defence. Skirmishes break out between Eritrean and TPLF forces. The Pretoria agreement collapses and humanitarian access withers. International actors intervene to prevent a wider Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict. This is the nightmare pathway, and it can only be prevented through renewed engagement from the AU and other partners.

In conclusion, Tigray’s crisis is no longer a single-centre versus Addis dispute. It has become a four-corner struggle in which law, reflected in NEBE’s ban, geography in Afar, and the demands of war-weary youth matter far more than political slogans. The most likely near-term outcome is an uneasy cold partition inside Tigray under Tadesse’s interim administration, with Simret probing for openings and Debretsion fighting to remain relevant. The most dangerous outcome is an escalation in Afar that draws in Eritrea. The window for preventing that scenario is still open, but it is narrowing quickly.