Sudan’s War fuels regional arms markets and mercenary networks

A new report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime warns that Sudan’s ongoing conflict has created “collateral circuits” of weapons and mercenary labour that are reshaping the security economies of Chad and Libya.

the report finds that the collapse of Sudan’s military command structures since April 2023 has triggered both “inbound and outbound flows” of arms, embedding Sudanese-linked materiel into regional markets. Mercenary groups, drawn from remnants of rebel factions and newly recruited fighters, have become central to these logistics, escorting convoys, negotiating access through checkpoints, and linking manpower directly to weapons transfers.

In Libya, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), Khalifa Haftar’s military coalition and a powerful hybrid force that controls much of eastern and southern Libya, have consolidated control over key southern trafficking routes. Alongside them, Tebu intermediaries, an ethnic group spread across Libya, Chad, and Niger, dominate the Murzuq–Qatrun corridor, specializing in arms, fuel, and migrant smuggling. Meanwhile, Tuareg intermediaries, indigenous to southern Libya, northern Chad, and Niger, control the Ubari–Ghat corridor, facilitating passage through checkpoints and organizing convoy protection. Together, these networks maintain corridors that extend into Chad and Niger. In Chad, armed groups retained their networks and weapon stockpiles. Many have embedded themselves in goldfields, where local economies now intersect with regional arms flows.

In September 2025, Sudan’s government submitted a formal complaint to the UN Security Council accusing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of recruiting, financing, and deploying hundreds of foreign fighters — predominantly former Colombian soldiers — to fight alongside the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Among the most dramatic claims, Sudan’s military said that on 6 August 2025 it shot down a UAE-chartered aircraft attempting to land at an RSF-controlled airport in Nyala, South Darfur. According to Sudanese officials, the plane was carrying roughly 40 Colombian mercenaries and military equipment destined for the RSF, and all aboard were killed.

Credible reporting indicates that the mercenary trade linked to Sudan’s war has become increasingly lucrative. A recent analysis by watchdog group The Sentry traces recruitment and deployment networks to UAE-based private security firms, specifically Global Security Services Group (GSSG) and International Services Agency (A4SI). According to the report, GSSG contracted A4SI to recruit former Colombian soldiers, with payments routed through an offshore-linked company registered in Panama.

Testimonies from former fighters strengthen the picture of direct combat involvement and human-rights abuses. Reporting by The Guardian cites Colombians who said they were flown through intermediary countries, reportedly via the UAE to Somalia, then through Libya and Chad, before being deployed to Sudan. Many were sent to active combat zones alongside the RSF and were allegedly tasked with training new recruits, including children. One former fighter told the newspaper they trained “lots and lots of children” to use weapons before sending them to the front lines. The same reporting describes the arrival of mercenaries at locations such as the Zamzam displacement camp, where multiple accounts allege recruitment, forced conscription, looting, and grave violations of human rights.

A recent Middle East Eye investigation revealed a clandestine operation in Bosaso, where senior military officials who spoke with MEE reported covert activities at both Bosaso airport and port.

The mercenary economy and war profiteering surrounding Sudan’s conflict have exacted a devastating toll on civilians. Tens of thousands of people have been killed since the war began, and millions remain trapped in a rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis. Mass executions, sexual violence, and widespread human-rights abuses continue to be documented as the conflict grinds on and the RSF persist with offensive operations aimed at consolidating their territorial control.

Following the fall of El Fasher, captured by the RSF in October, the group went on to seize the Sudanese Armed Forces’ 22nd Infantry Division headquarters in Babanusa, West Kordofan. The takeover came after sustained assaults that overwhelmed SAF defenses, already weakened by attrition. With the division’s collapse, the RSF now controls nearly all of West Kordofan. This expansion has further complicated the war, deepening the humanitarian crisis and accelerating the deterioration of peace efforts, while enabling lucrative war profiteering by mercenaries that is now spreading across the region.