Starlink on the ruins of Sudan’s networks

War in Sudan has not only devastated cities and displaced millions, it has also dismantled the country’s digital lifelines. Telecommunications infrastructure became an early and deliberate target, pushing entire regions into prolonged digital isolation and bringing everyday life to a standstill. In this context, the internet ceased to be a secondary service. For millions of Sudanese, especially those dependent on remittances from abroad, connectivity became a condition for survival. Out of this digital vacuum emerged Starlink, not simply as an alternative internet service, but as a technology that would gradually entangle itself in the political economy of the war.

As fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces escalated after mid-April 2023, communications infrastructure was steadily absorbed into the logic of the battlefield. Both sides targeted networks in a systematic manner, resulting in widespread disruptions that cut off civilians from phone and internet services for months at a time. Entire cities were effectively erased from the digital map. Wad Madani, for example, endured a full year without internet access, a blackout that was only lifted in January 2025.

Alongside physical destruction, communication shutdowns were also weaponized. The Sudanese Armed Forces ordered the suspension of internet services in areas under RSF control, particularly across Darfur and Kordofan. In February 2024, nearly 30 million people lost connectivity for close to a month after RSF attacks struck the headquarters of Sudan’s three major telecommunications providers, Sudani, Zain, and MTN, in Khartoum. With state networks collapsing and ground infrastructure either destroyed or deliberately disabled, the search for alternatives became unavoidable.

It was under these conditions that Starlink’s role expanded. Operated by the American company SpaceX, owned by Elon Musk, Starlink provides satellite internet through a constellation in low Earth orbit. Its appeal in conflict zones lies in its independence from terrestrial infrastructure. The system relies on compact, easily installed terminals that can deliver relatively fast internet at low cost, making it particularly suited to remote areas and emergency settings.

Although Starlink is not legally authorized in Sudan, the service entered the country through informal and illegal channels. Organized smuggling networks, largely controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, facilitated its spread. With conventional internet services cut off in RSF-controlled areas by army orders, the militia turned to alternative systems to maintain communication during combat. According to a report by The Wall Street Journal, the initial point of the smuggling network starts at the factory in the United States, where Starlink devices are produced then redirected commercially toward intermediary markets, most notably the United Arab Emirates, before being smuggled into Sudan.

The UAE emerged as a central node in this network, not only as a logistical transit point, but as a site where devices are aggregated and technically activated, ensuring they are ready for immediate use upon arrival in conflict zones. From there, equipment was transported to Chad’s capital and eventually across the Sudanese border.

Smuggling routes are not limited to Chad. Reports by Agence France-Presse indicate parallel corridors running through Libya, South Sudan, and Eritrea. This multi-route structure reflects a regionally organized operation designed to minimize risk by diversifying pathways in case one line is disrupted.

Starlink’s use extended beyond internal communications among RSF members. Devices were observed at multiple RSF bases and mounted on Toyota pickup trucks commonly used by the force. The system was also employed to connect and guide drones during attacks against Sudanese army positions, embedding the technology directly into military operations

The political and military dimensions of this network became even clearer with reports that Abdel Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, deputy commander of the Rapid Support Forces, directly oversaw the purchase of hundreds of Starlink devices from traders in the UAE. This placed Starlink firmly beyond the category of civilian technology. It had become a strategic asset, actively integrated into the conduct of war, allowing armed actors to maintain communication, coordinate movements, and manage operations despite the collapse of state authority.

A black market quickly developed around these smuggled devices, dominated by the RSF. Individual terminals reportedly sold for around 2,500 dollars, roughly five times their official price. In several areas, particularly in Darfur, the RSF imposed annual taxes of 500$ per device. This system expanded further through the establishment of temporary internet cafés, where users were charged between two and three dollars per hour, with prices reaching six dollars in some locations. In this way, a shadow economy took shape within the war, generating revenue that flowed primarily to the Rapid Support Forces.

The precise number of Starlink devices operating in Sudan remains unknown. According to the Global Voices Advox Center, coverage includes much of Al-Jazira State, excluding the Managil area, and large parts of Khartoum State, excluding sections of Omdurman. Devices are also widely present across South, East, West, and Central Darfur. This distribution was confirmed by a map published in September 2024 by an independent Sudanese news platform, which showed that Starlink had become the primary source of internet access in densely populated areas such as Khartoum, Al-Jazira, and Darfur.

Starlink’s use extended beyond internal communications among RSF members. Devices were observed at multiple RSF bases and mounted on Toyota pickup trucks commonly used by the force. The system was also employed to connect and guide drones during attacks against Sudanese army positions, embedding the technology directly into military operations.

As a result of its availability, Starlink became a vital communications artery in the Sudanese landscape. It enabled humanitarian organizations, including Islamic Relief and others, to continue coordinating relief operations, assessing needs, and tracking the delivery of aid amid the collapse of terrestrial communications networks. It also allowed residents to stay in contact with their families and receive financial transfers from abroad through digital applications, directly contributing to the fulfillment of basic needs and to survival across large parts of the country.

The Sudanese Armed Forces, however, adopted a cautious and increasingly hostile stance toward Starlink from the outset, viewing it as a communications network operating beyond state control. On January 31, 2024, army-aligned authorities issued a formal ban on the importation, possession, and use of Starlink devices. Thousands of terminals were confiscated in areas under army control, though enforcement remained inconsistent, while the service continued to operate widely in RSF-held territory.

This opposition was not merely regulatory. Army leadership concluded that Starlink’s widespread use, particularly in Darfur and Khartoum, had given the RSF a decisive communications advantage. It enabled coordinated military action, drone operations, and the dissemination of propaganda on social media. As a result, Starlink was no longer viewed as a neutral technology, but as a tool serving the enemy.

On one hand, the army rejected Starlink as a threat to national sovereignty and a technology exploited by its main adversary. On the other, it sought to use the same system selectively to counter the RSF’s technological advantage and to ease public anger over internet outages.

In response, Sudan’s Ministry of Communications submitted a formal complaint to SpaceX, demanding either the suspension of Starlink services in Sudan or their regulation under state supervision, including control over coverage areas. When the company failed to respond, authorities tightened restrictions on importing devices and classified their use as a punishable offense, though enforcement mechanisms remained unclear amid ongoing conflict.

Yet this rigid position soon collided with realities on the ground. In areas such as Omdurman and the outskirts of Khartoum, prolonged communication blackouts left civilians in near-total isolation. The army faced a dilemma between maintaining the ban and deepening public hardship, or allowing limited access as an emergency measure. Reports indicate that the Sudanese Armed Forces ultimately permitted the installation of Starlink devices in certain areas under their control and provided the service free of charge to residents in parts of Omdurman, marking a practical retreat from the policy of total prohibition.

This shift exposed a deeper contradiction. On one hand, the army rejected Starlink as a threat to national sovereignty and a technology exploited by its main adversary. On the other, it sought to use the same system selectively to counter the RSF’s technological advantage and to ease public anger over internet outages. Later reports suggest that the army began exploring ways to acquire Starlink devices for its own use or to develop comparable alternatives, implicitly acknowledging that control over communications had become a central front in the war.

Elon Musk has consistently framed Starlink as a critical tool in conflict zones. This was evident during the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022, when the service was activated to support Ukraine, including for military purposes. Musk also pushed to enable Starlink in Iran during the 2022 protests following the killing of Mahsa Amini, despite opposition from Iranian authorities, and announced its activation in Venezuela amid recent political developments.

Sudan, however, has been treated differently. Despite being among the conflicts most in need of reliable connectivity and humanitarian coordination, Starlink later on gestured to suspend its service in the country, citing violations of its terms of use. The announcement raised widespread concern, particularly given the service’s central role in sustaining communication under conditions of near-total network collapse.

In response to Musk’s warning that service could be suspended as of April 30, 2024, ninety-four humanitarian organizations issued a direct appeal, warning that such a move would amount to collective punishment for millions of Sudanese who depend on Starlink for communication, aid coordination, and financial transfers. While the service continues to operate in several regions, the threat of sudden disruption remains, deepening digital uncertainty in a country where conventional telecommunications have all but collapsed.

Starlink’s presence in Sudan ultimately reveals how the destruction of communications infrastructure has reshaped access to the internet during war. The service has filled a critical gap, enabling civilians and humanitarian actors to remain connected, while simultaneously providing armed groups with new tools to manage warfare. Caught between official bans, unregulated expansion, and the overlap of civilian and military uses, Starlink has become less a political choice than an imposed reality, its future inseparable from the course of the war itself.