Somaliland’s Western Fault Line

On 5 December 2025, Borama, the capital of Awdal region in western Somaliland, witnessed one of the most serious political and security crises since Somaliland declared its restoration of independence from Somalia in 1991. What began as protests against the government’s approval of a celebratory showcase for the “Xeer Ciise” quickly turned within hours into deadly confrontations between security forces and demonstrators. Estimates indicated that at least twenty people were killed and dozens injured, with live ammunition used to disperse the crowds. The issue had moved beyond a dispute over a cultural event and became a harsh test of Somaliland’s ability to manage its internal balances.

The immediate spark was the government’s decision to allow once again a public presentation and celebration of the “Xeer Ciise” charter after weeks of tension in the coastal city of Zeila over the same event. The “Xeer Ciise” is a body of oral customary law regulating the affairs of Issa communities in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somaliland. It was formally added in 2024 to UNESCO’s list of Intangible Cultural Heritage.

On the surface, an event to launch a book, which explains the charter, in Zeila could have been seen as a legitimate cultural celebration, especially after it's UNESCO enlistment. Yet the choice of timing and place gave the event a different political meaning. Zeila is contested by the Gadabuursi and the Issa, and the region is highly sensitive because of the overlap of land, identity and symbolism between these two clans. It is also a moment shaped by regional rivalries over maritime corridors, access to the sea and spheres of influence. This turned what appeared to be a cultural occasion into a deeply political act.

It became clear that some parties were ready to invest in a symbolic event, with the aim of creating the impression that state authority was collapsing

As soon as news spread about the renewed permission to hold the event, violent demonstrations broke out in Borama rejecting the decision and authorities quickly lost control. Within hours, the Central Bank branch was attacked, the governor’s office and several police stations were targeted in coordinated assaults, roadblocks appeared inside the city, many young men carried weapons, flags that challenge Somaliland's legitimacy were raised and security forces responded with gunfire and deployed army units to restore order.

It became clear that some parties were ready to invest in a symbolic event, with the aim of creating the impression that state authority was collapsing and that the link between Borama and Somaliland was weaker than the usual narrative of “partnership” built around the history of the “Borama Conference” and Awdal’s role in rebuilding Somaliland.

On the following night, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” attempted to absorb the anger. He condemned the casualties, ordered military forces back to their barracks, promised an investigation and accountability, and announced the next day that the celebration was cancelled. The Minister of Information then announced his resignation, stating that the decision to allow the event had been a collective government decision and that he could not bear its consequences, especially in a region to which he belongs by lineage. This sequence, the explosion of protests, the use of lethal force and a delayed retreat reflects a familiar pattern from previous crises, most notably the Las Anod crisis at the start of 2023.

Structural Fault Lines in Awdal

The most troubling aspect of the state’s behaviour in Borama was the ease and speed with which live ammunition was used. Reports from local media and human rights platforms indicate that unarmed demonstrators were met with gunfire. This pattern recalls the trajectory in Las Anod, where confrontations between government forces and local protesters eventually forced Somaliland to withdraw from the town and paved the way for the rise of SSC Khaatumo, later recognised by the Somali federal government as a federal member state.

The similarities between Borama and Las Anod include the excessive use of force against protests that began peacefully, yet the differences are also significant. In Las Anod, there was an organised military and political depth in Puntland and in the Khaatumo project prepared to capitalise on local anger. Awdal, and Borama specifically, does not have the same level of external organised military backing. This makes any escalation in the west slower and less predictable than in the east, but also more entangled because it intersects with the calculations of Djibouti and Ethiopia rather than a single Somali actor.

Both cases reveal recurring structural problems inside Somaliland. Security institutions fail to manage crowds using non-lethal means and there is no clear separation between the army and internal security forces. This accelerates the slide from political protest to armed confrontation driven by a logic of suppression rather than by crisis-management tools states normally use.

This fragility feeds on long-standing political grievances in Awdal much as it did in the east. Testimonies from local elites point to a widespread feeling that the region’s representation in government, parliament and security institutions does not reflect its demographic weight and clan composition. Decisions that affect local peace, such as the current event, are seen as being made in Hargeisa without genuine consultation.

Although this sentiment clashes with rival narratives accusing the Gadabuursi of monopolising political representation at the expense of other clans in the region, it is increasingly used to fuel the discourse of those who oppose Somaliland’s political project. Some of whom are pushing for a “special state” linking Awdal directly to Mogadishu outside the Somaliland framework. This idea had existed in faint form for years, but the current events in Borama allowed it to reappear on the street and in the digital sphere.

Is Awdal’s Place in Somaliland at Risk?

Awdal has historically been a space of delicate balance between the Gadabuursi and the Issa, both with cross-border extensions into Djibouti and Ethiopia’s Somali Region. Borama hosted the 1993 “Borama Conference”, which gathered about 150 clan elders from across Somaliland and produced a national charter and a hybrid political system combining a traditional upper house, the Guurti, with modern institutions. The conference shifted power from the Somali National Movement (SNM) leadership to a more consensual government in which the Gadabuursi gained the vice presidency, a position they still hold.

However, the memory of the civil war left different narratives in Awdal about the region’s relationship with Somaliland as a state-building project. During the SNM’s war against Siad Barre’s regime, the movement was predominantly composed of members of the Isaaq clans. Many Gadabuursi communities took varied positions that leaned toward supporting the regime. This background remains present in the discourse of some elites who argue that the narrative of resistance to the Somali military regime was framed mainly through the lens of one group. According to this view, regions like Awdal participated in reconciliation conferences because of the new reality created by the SNM, yet did not receive an equivalent share in building the new state.

Alongside this history, intellectual and political voices from the region, including figures such as Professor Ahmed Samatar, have long criticised the centralisation of power in Hargeisa and demanded a more inclusive distribution of authority and resources. These factors help explain why a symbolic decision such as celebrating a cultural event like the “Xeer Ciise” in Borama becomes a sign of deeper crisis in the balance among the region's social components.

Djibouti and the ‘Issa’ card

The “Xeer Ciise” file cannot be understood without looking at Djibouti. The country’s political system rests on the dominance of elites from the Issa, alongside a delicate internal balance with the Afar. In October 2025, the Djiboutian parliament approved a constitutional amendment removing the maximum age for presidential candidates, allowing President Ismail Omar Guelleh, now 77, to run for a sixth term in 2026.

In this electoral context, the Issa’s cross-border symbolism becomes a domestic political resource. The inscription of the “Xeer Ciise” on the world heritage list and the celebratory tone around it in Djibouti’s media reinforce the idea of the Issa as a community stretching from Djibouti through Ethiopia and Somaliland, unlimited by the borders of the modern nation states. Some elites in Hargeisa and Awdal see this symbolic expansion as a tool Djibouti uses to maintain influence on the western Somali coast and keep Awdal and Zeila within a sensitive orbit between Hargeisa, Addis Ababa and Djibouti on the basis that these areas are an Issa heartland.

Djibouti uses this cross-border dimension in a dual way. Domestically, it nourishes the idea of a broader Issa identity to reinforce the regime’s legitimacy and divert attention from self-profiting constitutional changes. Externally, it pressures Ethiopia through the Afar–Issa file and pressures Somaliland through Awdal and Zeila. Any armed clash between Gadabuursi and Issa in western Somaliland would reverberate inside Djibouti’s ethnic balance and could destabilise security along the vital Addis Ababa–Djibouti corridor. This raises the question of whether Djibouti’s interest lies in dismantling Somaliland or simply keeping it weak and manageable amid competing Ethiopian, Emirati and Turkish projects in the region’s struggle over ports and maritime access.

From this angle, the statements issued by the Issa Ugaas in Ethiopia, calling for proceeding with the celebration even by force and urging all armed men of his clan to head to the Awdal border, carry serious implications. On one level, they send a direct escalatory message to the Gadabuursi, to which Gadabuursi Ugaas responded in an equally sharp language, accepting the challenge and declaring readiness for war to defend Zeila. On another, the vague responses by President Irro’s government, reiterating statements like “external hands” and “subversive plots,” reflects the state’s inability to address Djibouti and its allies with clear and direct political language proportional to the risks.

These campaigns have not yet turned the protests into a collective break with the Somaliland project. Much of Borama’s street discourse still speaks of grievances within the state framework, not of separation.

Mogadisho’s Digital Front in Awdal

At the same time, Mogadishu appeared as an actor seeking to undermine Somaliland’s project from within since the signing of the maritime memorandum of understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa in January 2024. The federal government and officials originally from Awdal used every tension in the region as evidence of popular rejection of Somaliland rule. They issued official statements insisting that Awdal is an inseparable part of Somalia, coordinated media campaigns promoting an “Awdal State”, and mobilised digital networks through hashtags and narratives portraying the events as an uprising for “liberation from Hargeisa’s occupation.”

Behind this confrontation lie quieter economic interests. Tension in Awdal intersects with a broader struggle over ports, trade routes and the jobs linked to Berbera port and the roads leading to Ethiopia. Business networks from both the Issa and the Gadabuursi, whether inside the region or abroad, are watching the redrawing of trade maps between Zeila, Berbera and Djibouti. Some could benefit from weakening state presence in certain areas, whether through smuggling, informal fees or control of transport routes. In this sense, sabotage becomes a mixture of clan rhetoric, digital trolling and concrete economic interests on the ground, not only a hashtag war between Hargeisa and Mogadishu.

These campaigns have not yet turned the protests into a collective break with the Somaliland project. Much of Borama’s street discourse still speaks of grievances within the state framework, not of separation. The risk lies in the possibility that continued government mistakes will allow these campaigns time and symbolic ammunition to evolve from digital agitation into organised political projects on the ground. This is what happened in Las Anod two years ago, when accumulating errors opened the door for a new entity linked to Mogadishu. The irony is that digital actors aligned with Mogadishu and those close to Hargeisa meet, despite their rivalry, on one point: they reduce the people of Awdal to pawns in a war of narratives rather than seeing them as political actors with clear demands.

Zeila and Ethiopia’s sea-access calculus

Since his speech in October 2023 saying Ethiopia cannot remain landlocked even through force or through smart manoeuvring, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has made sea access central to his domestic narrative. On 1 January 2024, he signed a memorandum of understanding with former Somaliland president Muse Bihi granting Ethiopia use of a coastal strip near Berbera in exchange for a future commitment to recognise Somaliland’s independence. Mogadishu responded by declaring the agreement null and void and a violation of Somali sovereignty. It recalled its ambassador and threatened extensive diplomatic and legal measures.

As tensions grew and regional pressure mounted, Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration in December 2024 under Turkish sponsorship. Both sides committed to resolving sea access through bilateral agreements that uphold Somalia’s territorial integrity, which removed Hargeisa from the negotiation room for a matter concerning land Somaliland claims as its own. In September 2025, the completion and full activation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was announced, strengthening Addis Ababa’s confidence in imposing new realities. In this context, access to the Red Sea became Abiy Ahmed’s new project and a lever to redefine Ethiopia’s regional standing.

Ethiopia has three options for gaining sea access: pressure on Eritrea to the north, pressure on Djibouti or movement toward the western Somaliland coast around Zeila. The first two options are expensive since Djibouti hosts multiple foreign military bases and any renewed confrontation with Eritrea carries enormous risks. The third path appears to many analysts relatively less costly because Somaliland lacks binding defence guarantees, has limited international presence and remains entangled in a legal dispute with Mogadishu over its status.

In this context, President Irro visited Addis Ababa in October 2025, his first official visit after his election. It became clear that the maritime memorandum had reached a dead end under regional pressure. Both sides seemed to be trying to reframe the relationship on the basis of cautious economic and commercial cooperation without any explicit Ethiopian commitment to the earlier agreement. Meanwhile, Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh, one of the strongest opponents of the memorandum, moved to consolidate his influence along the Zeila coast. He improved relations with Gadabuursi elders who had been in exile and returned to Borama, and deepened ties with Issa figures on both sides of the border. He used this influence to pressure Abiy Ahmed inside Ethiopia and to build a Djiboutian sphere of influence that could preempt Ethiopian or Emirati arrangements in coastal areas of western Somaliland.

For Hargeisa, any weakening of state authority in Awdal or a slide into armed clashes would effectively open the door to maritime arrangements that might not favour Somaliland, whether emerging from Addis Ababa’s dealings with Mogadishu or through informal understandings with local actors.

Regional context

All of this is unfolding in a region undergoing deep reshaping. Sudan has been engulfed since 2023 in a civil war described by UN and human rights reports as the world’s largest internal displacement crisis, with more than eleven million displaced and refugees. The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have seen repeated Houthi attacks on commercial vessels since late 2023, pushing shipping companies to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing travel time and insurance and transport costs.

In Mogadishu, the federal system is breaking down as Puntland and Jubbaland practically withdraw from its arrangements, while Al Shabaab still controls large rural areas and builds a shadow state, benefiting from the fragility of the centre and disputes between the federal government and the regions. Meanwhile, on the Ethiopian plateau, new alignments are forming through rearranged alliances between Asmara, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Amhara factions at the expense of Addis Ababa.

In this theatre, regional and international powers are repositioning themselves. Cairo is strengthening its diplomatic and military presence in the Red Sea. Djibouti is capitalising on its role as a garrison for major armies. Ankara is building a long-term defence partnership with Mogadishu through a ten-year defence and economic pact, even as Turkish circles warn of Somalia’s fragility. The United Arab Emirates is working to consolidate its footprint in multiple ports, including Berbera.

Somaliland sits at the centre of these overlapping maps. President Irro’s government shows a clear desire to avoid openly aligning with any axis. It is not formally part of the Egypt–Eritrea–Djibouti axis or the Ethiopia–Somalia–Turkey axis. In practice, it pays the price of this neutrality through a very narrow margin of manoeuvre. Any internal mistake, such as the handling of the “Xeer Ciise” crisis, becomes an opportunity for all these actors to reinforce their own narratives: the federal government in Mogadishu depicting Somaliland as a failing entity, the Djiboutian regime using the Issa card, Ethiopia searching for a seaport at any cost and international powers viewing the Somali coast as part of the security architecture of global trade routes.

Extinguishing the Borama fire through justice and dialogue is not a political luxury but a basic condition for preserving one of the last remaining stories of possible stability in the Horn of Africa.

Reform or Rupture in Awdal

Following these premises, Somaliland now faces two distinct paths. The first is containment through reforming the behaviour of the state rather than merely extinguishing the security fire. This requires upholding the decision to withdraw heavy forces from Borama and Awdal, assigning public-order tasks to disciplined police trained in non-lethal methods and opening an independent, transparent judicial investigation into the deaths and injuries that is made public and clarifies responsibilities.

Alongside these urgent security and judicial measures, a deeper institutional and constitutional work is required. Much of the Awdal question is tied to how the region is represented in the Guurti, Parliament and the Cabinet, and to the absence of clear criteria governing how clans share offices. This calls for a review of the representation formula and the establishment of a permanent consultative framework linking Awdal, Sool and Sanaag with the Presidency and the Guurti, or even convening a “Borama Conference II” to renew the social contract in a manner suited to the post-Ethiopia MoU era and the regional competition over seaports triggered by Addis Ababa’s ambitions. Without this institutional dimension, any political settlement will remain temporary and liable to collapse at the first serious test.

Reform also requires reopening the “Xeer Ciise” file inside Awdal through a participatory mechanism bringing together Gadabuursi and Issa elders alongside civil figures. This would allow future celebrations to manage disagreements rather than deepen them, and ensure that official and pro-government media adopt more responsible language and avoid accusations of treason or foreign agendas against protesters. The success of this path is not about sparing Irro’s administration from criticism. It is about restoring Somaliland’s image as a polity capable of correcting its trajectory before external actors impose solutions or exploit its fragilities.

The second path is a slide into the normalisation of violence. This would mean continuing to deny responsibility, reducing Awdal to a security file defined by countering tribal extortion and leaving the digital space to online provocateurs. Under such conditions, the slogan of an “Awdal State” could shift from a protest chant to an armed political project and clashes between Issa and Gadabuursi youths could recur along grazing routes and in mixed villages, drawing in cross-border kinship networks in Ethiopia and Djibouti amid the wider Issa–Afar tension along the Addis Ababa–Djibouti corridor and Ethiopia’s maritime calculations.

Extinguishing the Borama fire through justice and dialogue is not a political luxury but a basic condition for preserving one of the last remaining stories of possible stability in the Horn of Africa. The cost of failure will not be borne in Borama alone. It will be felt along the coastline from Zeila to Berbera and potentially on the negotiating tables shaping the future of the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.