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Somalia’s emerging security vacuum

6 July, 2026
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Somalia’s emerging security vacuum
Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers walk near the frontlines in Sabiid, a town recaptured from Al-Shabaab, in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region on November 11, 2025. © TONY KARUMBA/AFP via Getty Images.
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Last week, Reuters reported that the United States had informed the African Union (AU) that it would no longer support United Nations-funded logistical assistance for the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) beyond the end of 2026. Although Washington does not oppose renewing AUSSOM’s mandate, Reuters reported that it intends to block any extension that depends on UN “operational or logistical support.”

The decision reflects growing U.S. dissatisfaction with Somalia’s political and security progress. According to a diplomatic communication reviewed by Reuters, Washington believes that persistent political divisions and internal rivalries have undermined efforts to combat al-Shabaab and other extremist groups, despite years of substantial international assistance. U.S. officials argued that Somalia has not assumed sufficient responsibility for its own security and said future resources should instead be directed toward priorities that more directly advance U.S. strategic interests.

Following reports of the U.S. position, the African Union convened an emergency meeting of its Peace and Security Council to assess the implications for AUSSOM. The emergency meeting highlighted growing concern among African diplomats that, unless an alternative and sustainable financing mechanism is secured quickly, AUSSOM could face severe operational constraints or even be forced to scale back its activities. According to an AU briefing prepared for member states, the Chairperson of the AU Commission warned that the U.S. decision would have “significant implications for the logistical sustainment, operational posture and financing of the Mission.”

The U.S. decision had been expected for some time. For the last few years, the financing of the mission has become one of the most contentious issues in discussions between the African Union, the United Nations, donor governments and the Somalia’s federal government. While the mission has remained central to efforts to contain al-Shabaab and support Somalia’s security transition, traditional donors have increasingly questioned whether the existing funding model can continue, citing a number of political, security and financial concerns. The mission has relied heavily on external partners for troop stipends, logistics, medical support, aviation and transport, with repeated warnings that voluntary donor funding can no longer provide a predictable financial base.

Concerns over donor fatigue intensified after the gradual drawdown of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and preparations for its successor, AUSSOM. European Union contributions, once the backbone of troop allowances, were reduced over time as Brussels shifted resources toward other global crises and encouraged African institutions to assume greater financial responsibility. Several donors including EU argued that, after nearly two decades of international support, Somalia and the African Union needed a more sustainable financing mechanism rather than continued reliance on voluntary contributions from a small group of partners.

These concerns prompted extensive negotiations at the United Nations over the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719, which created a framework allowing eligible African Union peace support operations to receive financing through UN-assessed contributions. The African Union and Somalia viewed the mechanism as the most viable long-term solution, proposing that approximately 75 percent of the mission’s budget be covered through UN-assessed funding while the remaining share would come from the African Union and bilateral partners.

The United States objected to applying the Resolution 2719 financing model to AUSSOM, arguing that the proposed arrangement would push UN assessed contributions beyond the intended 75% ceiling once UNSOS logistical support was factored in. However, Washington did not veto Resolution 2767; it abstained, allowing the resolution to pass by 14 votes in favour and one abstention.

Throughout 2024 and 2025, African Union officials warned that without guaranteed funding, troop-contributing countries could face delays in reimbursement, while critical logistical services -- including air transport, engineering support, medical evacuation, communications and fuel supplied through the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) -- could be disrupted.

A key concern among donors is the mission’s limited progress in decisively containing al-Shabaab. While African Union forces and Somali security units have helped prevent the militant group from overrunning major urban centers, al-Shabaab remains capable of carrying out attacks, controlling territory in some areas, and disrupting security operations. This has contributed to a perception that the mission has not achieved a clear, progressive path toward ending the threat or significantly reducing the need for international military support.

Donor frustration has also been fueled by the Federal Government of Somalia’s slow progress in fully assuming responsibility for the country’s security. Despite repeated transition plans, Somali security institutions continue to face major gaps in force generation, logistics, command and control, and the ability to hold areas recovered from al-Shabaab.

When the current government led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud came to power, it launched a major offensive against al-Shabaab in south and central Somalia. The campaign initially made territorial gains, particularly after local clan forces joined the fight. However, that early momentum has since slowed. Al-Shabaab’s 2025 counteroffensive allowed the group to regain some areas it had previously lost.

Moreover, Somalia’s political transition has been disrupted by growing political crises that have diverted attention from security priorities. Electoral and constitutional disputes have consumed much of the past two years, weakening cooperation between the federal government and federal member states. Relations between Mogadishu and several federal member states including Puntland and Jubbaland have deteriorated, creating further delays in security coordination. As a result, political and electoral disputes have often taken priority over the need to strengthen Somali security forces, stabilize recovered areas, and prepare for a credible handover from the African Union mission.

The latest U.S. decision, although it comes amid growing frustration among donor countries, signals the emergence of a major security vacuum at a critical moment for Somalia, both politically and in terms of security. The country’s electoral and constitutional crises remain unresolved, and uncertainty continues to surround the planned 2026 elections. These political challenges have further complicated Somalia’s ability to maintain stability and advance its security transition.

At the same time, al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat. The group has repeatedly launched offensive operations, demonstrating that it still retains the capacity to challenge Somalia’s security forces and destabilize recovered areas. Meanwhile, the presence of ISIS-Somalia remains another major concern, particularly in parts of Puntland. Although Puntland security forces have made significant operational gains against the group, the threat remains high in the region.