Somali independence and its political connections with Nasser’s Egypt

This week’s long read examines the dalliance between the Somali national movement and Nasser’s government in Egypt. Cairo played a little-known but intriguing role in Somalia’s push for independence from Italian and British rule and even supported Mogadishu’s brief, abortive attempt to reunify the five territories claimed by Somali nationalists in the Horn of Africa during the late colonial era.  

Nasser’s attempt to influence the Somali Youth League through his local affiliate, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen, ultimately came to nothing after Xuseen’s brand of fiery Somali nationalism lost out to Aden Abdulle Osman, who opted for a less confrontational strategy with the colonial powers and Ethiopia. Osman would go on to become Somalia’s first president. The article is written by Antonio M. Morone, a historian at the University of Pavia in Italy. The essay can be found in The Horn of Africa Since the 1960s: Local and International Politics Intertwined:

On February 24, 1941, British and Commonwealth troops entered Mogadishu, bringing to an end Italy’s colonial rule over Somalia. During the 1940s, the former Italian Somalia was dept under British Military Administration (BMA). Then, on April 1, 1950, the United Nations reverted it to Italian rule. The Italian Trust Administration of Somalia (Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia, AFIS) was the only case of decolonization that had been masterminded by Italy with the formal objective of making the Somalis ready for independence by the end of 1960. For this reason, the Somalis only achieved national independence on July 1, 1960, several years after Italy’s defeat in World War II. On that date, the former Italian Somalia merged with the British Somaliland Protectorate to establish the Republic of Somalia. The political and institutional process of integration of those two Somalias into the new republic was very problematic because of their different historical backgrounds and approaches to state building. In many sectors of the public administration, the new republic remained effectively divided into two different states for a long time afterwards.   

For many Somalilanders, the union was more an act of incorporation of the former Somaliland into Italian Somalia rather than a process of merger on an equal basis. It was no accident that in the referendum of June 1961 the majority of Somalis approved the Constitution that was elaborated by the Mogadishu Constitutional Assembly, but at the same time the Northern electorate clearly showed its discontent by voting against the Constitution. Furthermore, the abortive military coup of December 1961 testified to the “northern patriotism [of some] British-trained junior officers,” in addition to their personal ambitions. However, it is certain that prior to independence, the two Somali leaderships in southern and northern Somalia, respectively the Somali Youth League (SYL) and the Somali National League (SNL), were seriously committed to planning the union of the two Somalias and to achieve what they believed to be a first step towards total Somali unity. 

During the decade of Italian trusteeship, the political orientation of the soon to be independent Somalia was at stake, and consequently the struggle among the foreign players over Somalia and between the two principal Somali parties, the Somali Youth League (SYL) and the Conference of Somalia escalated. The SYL had been the most popular party in the country since its foundation in 1943 as the Somali Youth Club. The young militants, who were mostly merchants, craftsmen, employees, and civil servants, gave the Club a “radically secular” character of socialist leanings, even if its founding members had a common Islamic background. The most notorious among the Somali activists, Cabdulqaadir Sakhawadin, were not the only ones to have direct link with the Sufi Order of Qadiriyya. During the post-war period, the SYL identified the United Kingdom as its main ally for achieving national independence and carrying out the pan-Somali program that involved uniting the so-called five Somalias: the former Italian Somalia, the British Somaliland Protectorate, the French colony of Djibouti, the Northern Frontier District of British Kenya, and the Ethiopian Ogaden-Hawd. To the surprise of the Somalis, the UN General Assembly decided in 1949 on a conservative solution for the future of former Italian Somalia, restoring the territory to Italy under a trusteeship administration and frustrating any Somali aspirations for creating a united and independent Somalia. Furthermore, the alliance being forged between Ethiopia and its Western allies was the precondition for the BMA to hand over the Ogaden region to the Ethiopian Empire in September 1948, after the United Kingdom had decided to abandon the Bevin Plan for the formation of a Greater Somalia under British tutelage. For these reasons, the more committed supporters of the Pan-Somali program in the SYL sought alternative international allies outside the West. From the mid-1950s up to the mid-1960s, Nasser's Egypt was the main Somali alternative to relations with, or dependence on, Italy and other Western countries.  

Supplementing its political actions with religious appeal, Nasser’s Egypt presented itself as a progressive, popular, and anti-imperialist movement which acted as the most committed sponsor of the Somali struggle for the independence and unification of all the Somali-speaking regions in the Horn of Africa. In doing so, the Egyptians promoted a close relationship that combined political influence with Islamic brotherhood whose underlying aim was to insert Somali affairs directly into the Arab ambit, the first and most important of Nasser’s foreign relations. Even though Nasser’s strategy was on a regional scale and his call was addressed to all the Muslims in the Horn of Africa, Somalia under the Italian Trust Administration was his main target in the UN’s internationalized context. The UN Trusteeship System in Somalia offered more room than other countries of the Horn for Egypt to maneuver. In British Somaliland and the French colony of Djibouti, the colonial authorities did their best to prevent Egyptian interference, as did the Ethiopian government in Eritrea and Ogaden.  

On the other hand, the pro-Egyptian Somali nationalists referred to the Arab Islamic alliance in order not only to gain leverage over the Italian rulers, but also to distinguish Somalis from other peoples and Muslims of the Horn of Africa. The pan-Somali movement was indeed directed “more towards the Muslim nations of the world than towards the African states,” because the Arab-Islamic brotherhood was reputed to offer a more viable (though not unconditionally so) prospect for transcending the colonial borders to merge all the Somali-speaking territories in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, Somalis and Egyptians converged in their perception of the Ethiopian Empire as the main antagonist for their respective political plans. The Somalis fought for the liberation of Ogaden from what they called Ethiopian occupation, while Nasser’s leadership among the Afro-Asian countries directly challenged Emperor Haile Selassie’s anti-colonial stature, his alliance with the United States, and his connections with Israel.  

This chapter examines how the Somali-Egyptian political partnership ultimately failed to subsume the pan-Somali project into the pan-Arabic association. The contradiction between pan-Somali and pan-Arab objectives was ultimately the main obstacle for the real durability and stability of the alliance between Egypt and Somalia. While the Somali-Ethiopian political partnership definitively failed during the 1960s, it was the Somali connection with Nasser’s Egypt that constituted one of the main premises for the increasing association of Somali affairs with Middle Eastern politics over the following decades and up to the present. By emphasizing the Somali Arab-Islamic belonging in contraposition to African loyalty, Nasser’s involvement in Somalia added controversy to the definition of Somalia’s post-independence identity, which is still under discussion today.  

Italian trusteeship over Somalia and Egyptian involvement in the Horn of Africa  

In making a conclusive assessment of Somali affairs on the eve of national independence in 1960, the British Consul General in Mogadishu defined the Egyptian representative to the UN Advisory Council of Somalia (UNACS) as “the most effective weapon used by the U.A.R. on opinion-moulders as distinct from the masses.” The UNACS was an ad hoc body based in Mogadishu, specifically designed by the UN–Italy trusteeship agreement over Somalia to supervise the Italian Administration and report to the Trusteeship Council. Egypt utilized its position inside the UNACS to enhance its influence over Somalia, a strategy that became manifest with the arrival of Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh in Somalia in November 1964. As the sixth Egyptian representative since 1950, he undertook an unprecedented anti-Italian stance and launched a media campaign against “Western colonialist maneuvers” by working together with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Guidance. Egyptian activism attracted the criticism of both the Italian authorities and the Colombian representative at the UNACS, who held a distinctly pro-Italian attitude. The then head of the Italian Administration, Enrico Martino, in a vexed and expressive manner, reported to Rome that “Egyptian influence is more aggressive, especially through Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh, who, in private, spares no criticism of our Administration.” Martino’s words echoed the Colombian Edmundo De Holte Castello’s report to his government: “Salāh went as far as to preach in the mosques against the faithless” Italian authorities. 

The massive Egyptian campaign of political information peaked in coincidence with the Suez Channel Crisis in 1956, when Egyptian involvement in Somalia definitively shifted from a broad cultural agenda to the pinpointed political intent of using the SYL to influence the future international alignment of independent Somalia. Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh’s political speech connected the Nasserite struggle against Franco-British neo-colonialist meddling in Egyptian affairs with the Somali struggle for independence and unity. The Somalis shared that view, and on November 2, 1956 the first Somali Legislative Assembly, established on April 30 of the same year, unanimously passed a formal resolution expressing “Somali solidarity with the Egyptian Government and people” and deploring “aggression by Israeli troops and Anglo–French operations.” In the meantime, a Somali crowd in Mogadishu demonstrated in support of Nasser, and some Somalis even left the country to fight as volunteers in Egypt.   

Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh distinguished between the “bravery” of the Somali Assembly in condemning the aggression against Egypt and the bad faith of the Somali Prime Minister, Cabdullaahi Ciise Maxamuud, in distinguishing “Israeli aggression” from “Anglo–French operations in order not to provoke France and the UK.” Furthermore, the Egyptian diplomat publicly accused the Somali prime minister of having progressively “softened his position towards the Italian Administration” and of having “blamed Islam as the cause of Somali backwardness” in order to challenge Egyptian friendship and bolster collaboration with the Italians. Clearly, Egypt’s strategy was to undermine the moderate Somali government, which in effect was collaborating with the Italians, and to impose on the SYL leadership a closer pro-Egyptian orientation. In trying “to insert Somalia in their own [Egyptian] zone of influence,” Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh turned his criticism against the United States of America (USA) and Ethiopia by accusing them of working “to break the Islamic brotherhood by emphasizing Somalis’ African loyalty and advocating identity on the basis of skin color.”  

In reality, Ethiopian politics was pragmatic rather than racial (and still less racist), as Egypt alleged: Haile Selassie’s strategy in the Ogaden region mixed violent political repression with a systematic policy of cultural assimilation.  

In attempting to stir up the Somali people against the Western countries, the Egyptian information campaign politically emphasized Somalis’ Arab–Islamic belonging by opposing them to both Ethiopian pan-African politics. The Egyptians tried to delegitimize the Ethiopians for their supposed racial attitude, while Western politics was branded alternately as “colonialist” and “Christian,” Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh accused the Italian Administration of “tacit favoritism” towards Christian missionaries, who “fight in opposition to Islam in order to transform Somalia into a Christian country.” Even if the Italian missionaries provided some social services on behalf of the Italian Administration, especially in the field of education, it was far-fetched to construe it as a concerted plan to proselytize the Somali youth. On the contrary, Egyptian arguments were likely to find an increasing consensus among ordinary Somalis and even among SYL cadres. Another issue of the Egyptian diplomat’s campaign was to accuse the Italian authorities “of using economic and technical cooperation to influence the Somali Government.” On this score, as opposed to the religious one, Italy’s attempt to link the new Somali institutions and leadership to the Western world by means of post-independence financial and technical aid was undeniable and clearly shown by foreign interference during the Somali general elections of 1959.  

Far from gaining unanimous and uncontested support, Egyptian involvement in Somalia provoked an increasing debate within the SYL, which led to a growing division between a pro-Egyptian faction and another faction, which was more critical of and even opposed to the Egyptian connection. Since the mid-1950s, as a consequence of that struggle inside the SYL, the pro-Egyptian current within the SYL became more and more synonymous with anti-Italian militancy.  

The murder of Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh and the SYL crisis of 1957   

A dramatic turn of events occurred on April 16, 1957, when Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh was murdered  while he was leaving the UNACS headquarters in Mogadishu. The official account tells of a lunatic who committed the crime to avenge himself for having been denied a renewal of his scholarship by Egyptian institutions. The Egyptian government challenged this version, maintaining that Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh was murdered for political reasons related to his activity in Somalia. Beyond the truth of the matter, which still remains difficult to assess, the Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh affair was the starting point for a deeper Egyptian involvement in Somali politics from 1957 to 1958. During the same period, the pan-Arab momentum of the Egyptian revolution had reached its peak with the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. The merger of Egypt, Syria, and Yemen seemed to realize Nasser’s pan-Arab unity “at the expense of Egyptian territorial aspects and the historical concept of Egypt’s uniqueness.” The UAR evaporated soon after, in 1961, when Syria seceded. However, in 1958 Somalia was in the position of being the next country to enter the pan-Arab federation under Egypt’s leadership.  

The Somali protagonist of this renovated Egyptian attempt to influence Somalia was Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen, who was one of thirteen founders of the Somali Youth Club in 1943 and previously president of the League in the early 1950s. He left Mogadishu on November 2, 1952 for Egypt, where he had obtained a scholarship to study Islamic law at al-Azhar University and Mosque. In Cairo, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen became a very committed supporter of Nasser’s Revolution, making radio broadcasts and publishing tracts against “Italian imperialism” in Somalia and in favor of independence and the union of all Somali territories under Egyptian sponsorship. Kamāl al-Dīn Salāh’s assassination was taken up by the former SYL president to launch a vigorous propaganda campaign to attribute the Egyptian diplomat’s murder to Western plots in Somalia.  

On the wave of his media campaign based on the trilogy of national independence, the unity of all Somalis and Egyptian–Somali friendship, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen outpolled the pro-Italian moderate faction inside the SYL and was re-elected president of the party on July 28, 1957, while he was still residing in Cairo. The event was very favorably reviewed in Mogadishu by Muhammad Hassan al-Zayyāt, the new Egyptian representative at the UNACS. According to the new Egyptian diplomat’s report, the League was “the only big party in the country” and the takeover of its presidency from Nasserist Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen was the only way to obtain “the correct political and national orientation” for the soon to be independent Somalia. His recommendation to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cairo was “to go on to support and advise Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen, but without giving the impression of interfering in the internal affairs of the party.”  

The early declarations of the new SYL president, broadcast from Cairo, left no room for doubt about what his future intentions would be:  

“Italy is a colonial power which is oppressing the Somali people. Ethiopia, which has occupied a fraction of the Somali region, has also participated in this oppression. […] To achieve our independence, we must keep Somalia neutral [in the Cold War] and to appeal to the guidance of Arab and Asian countries. There are plots by the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the United States, especially the United States, in Somalia. [… Their goal is] to delay the independence of African countries under the Trusteeship System, saying that these territories are not ready for self-rule.”  

After his return to Mogadishu, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen resumed the main themes of his oratory and particularly emphasized that the achievement of a “Somali union [and] freedom from Christian colonialism” would be the only condition for the full and true profession of the Islamic faith. Furthermore, he provocatively posed the alternative between ending the trusteeship or applying it correctly by implementing Somalization (i.e., the substitution of Italian administrators with Somali ones), avoiding any foreign aid with strings attached, marking the Somali–Ethiopian border, and establishing an educational system oriented to Somali culture. All these points were in fact among the objectives that Italy had set out to accomplish during its international mandate and were under discussion in the Somali parliament. Nevertheless, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen’s activities radicalized political discussion on all these issues and made it impossible to achieve workable solutions.  

In the following weeks, the Somali political crisis moved towards an increasing internationalization. Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen’s declarations alarmed Italy, which considered his election a “threat” to the collaboration that had been achieved between the AFIS and the SYL. According to the head of the AFIS, Ambassador Antonio Di Stefano, “without the collaboration of the Somali people and parties” the only alternative would be to remit the trusteeship to the UN. Echoing the Italian considerations, the USA considered a pro-Egyptian League as “a loss of power” for the West. On a very similar position, the United Kingdom reputed Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen to be a threat to its strategic interests in the whole Horn of Africa and, together with Italy, it recognized the “political and strategic importance” of Somalia within the broader Western strategy in Africa: for this reason Italy and the United Kingdom jointly agreed “to retain [Somalia] in the Western orbit” and to use post-independence economic and technical aid to prevent Egyptian (and potentially Soviet) interferences.   

So, the two allies finally agreed to make such aid conditional on the “moderates’ victory at the forthcoming elections” scheduled for October 1958. The United States converged on this plan, accepting the principle of sharing the economic burden of Somali aid with Italy and releasing it “in the most possible calculated way to influence the election.” However, the explanations for the subsequent fall from favor of Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen are attributable not only to external pressures, but also to internal Somali dynamics.  

In March 1958, an extraordinary meeting of the SYL General Assembly was called in order to discuss the escalating contraposition inside the party between the pro-Egyptian and the anti-Egyptian factions. The key speech was delivered by the former president of the SYL and at that time current president of the Somali parliament, Adaan Cabdulle Cisman, who was a very moderate leader collaborating with the Italians. During his speech, he accused Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen of acting outside the party rules for personal gain and betraying the values of the League. Moreover, Adaan Cabdulle Cisman branded Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen’s alternative—between ending the trusteeship and applying it correctly—as a false, unfounded issue. From the very beginning of trusteeship, Somali independence was scheduled for 1960; on the contrary, the Italian threat of giving up their mandate if the Somalis no longer wanted to collaborate with them would very likely have endangered the achievement of independence. The international debate on the future of Somalia would necessarily be reopened at the UN and, as Adaan Cabdulle Cisman concluded, the General Assembly “can give the mandate to others, take it over, or say: ‘make the Somalis go on without us’.” As a consequence of his speech, Adaan Cabdulle Cisman was unanimously re-elected party president, and the Central Committee of the SYL was reshuffled to ensure the prevalence of a moderate, pro-Western current.  

After having lost the presidency of the SYL, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen persisted with his policy and continued to attack the Western powers and their alleged Somali intermediaries to such an extent that in May 1958 he was expelled from the party “for not submitting himself to democratic practice.” In reaction, he founded “a new party, though old in spirit,” the Greater Somali League (GSL) on July 24, 1958. The new party agenda resumed the themes of anti-colonialism, neutralism, and a Somali union in such close connection with Egypt that Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen’s speech for the party’s inaugural ceremony on July 24, 1958 was “sent for approval to Cairo” by the Egyptian Vice-Consul in Mogadishu, Ahmad Fu’ād Abū Sabba. During the electoral campaign, political tension escalated into violence and the opposition parties led by the GSL protested against the alleged abuses of the SYL that were perpetrated at their expense by means of the government apparatus. The opposition front finally decided not to present any candidates for the election of October 20, 1959, as an extreme gesture of protest.  

Internal political dynamics combined with external influence. The Italian Administration strategically announced just days before the election of October 12, 1958 the details of its post-independence aid to Somalia: 250 technicians, 80–100 scholarships, and US$2 million. Not by chance, immediately after that, the SYL gained an overwhelming majority, Italy confirmed its commitments on October 29. The potential conditioning of post-independence aid would have been very high if we consider that the modern institutions transferred to Somalia during the AFIS decade could not have survived too long after independence without international financing because of the low income and the perennial shortage of the State budget. Nasser’s Egypt unsuccessfully tried to undermine that powerful lever of Western influence by proposing to link international aid for Somalia to a multilateral fund under UN guidance, but the limited amount of Egypt’s possible contribution and the lack of co-sponsors made this project insubstantial. By the end of 1958, “the good orientation” of the SYL was assured; Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen’s GSL was defeated and Nasser’s influence over Somalia began to decline. However, the Somali multi-party system and, broadly speaking, the new Somali democratic institutions were significantly undermined: the SYL became a de facto hegemonic party within a formally multi-party system.  

Somali independence and beyond   

Having failed to master the mainstream of Somali nationalism in former Italian Somalia, Nasser rethought his strategy in order to face SYL predominance at the regional level. His plan was to promote the establishment of a new political party, an umbrella party, which would have gathered all Somali political parties throughout the five Somalias, SYL included. The attempt clearly was to water down SYL supremacy within a broader political context. Of course, the popularity of SYL in former Italian Somalia was not comparable with its appeal in British Somaliland and in French Djibouti, or even in Ogaden, and the NFD, where the party was banned by the Ethiopian and British colonial authorities at the end of the 1940s. Once again, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen was the pivotal element of the Egyptian strategy to build the new Pan-Somali National Movement (PSNM) around the GSL.  

The founding conference of the new party was organized in Mogadishu, on August 30, 1959: according to the Italian archival records, the Egyptians “instructed” Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen in the preparation of the meeting and facilitated contacts with other Somali leaders. Nasser’s regime indeed “had strong links with the Somali National League (SNL)” in British Somaliland Protectorate, while in French Somaliland, it was fostering close ties with two key politicians, Maxamuud Xarbi Faarax and Cali Cabdullaahi Ibraahin. Both those politicians left Djibouti for Cairo after the victory of the pro-French party in the 1958 constitutional referendum for the Communauté Française, so that they were strongly committed to participating in the PSNM Conference. Thanks to the Egyptian groundwork, the PSNM conference gathered in Mogadishu several delegates of the SNL and the United Somali Party from British Somaliland, representatives of the Union Démocratique Somalienne from Djibouti, and several independent representatives from Ogaden and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, in addition to the SYL delegation and Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen and his GSL from the former Italian Somalia.  

From Nasser’s and Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen’s perspective, this gathering of the representatives of the five Somalias was an attempt not only to overcome a pan-Somali agenda led by the SYL, but also to get rid of the Italian-British plan to limit pan-Somali project at the union between the former Italian Somalia and the British Somaliland Protectorate. Of course, for the Italian and British leaders, the possibility of supporting a limited union between British and Italian Somalias under the guidance of the SYL was made contingent on the territorial integrity of French Somaliland, British Kenya, and Ethiopia. On the eve of Somali independence a different interpretation of the pan-Somali agenda was at stake. The SYL promoted a moderate plan for the immediate union of the two Somalias and the postponement of any further step towards accomplishing the union among all five Somalias after achieving independence. On the contrary, Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen clamored for the immediate and definitive union of all five Somalias. Once again, moderation prevailed among the Somali delegates, at the expense of the Nasser’s and Xaaji Maxamed Xuseen’s plans.  

According to the British diplomatic reports from Mogadishu, the agenda of the new party “was demolished by the pro-Western Prime Minister of Somalia,” confirming that “Egypt overplayed its hand.” The PSNM’s militant irredentism was “considered dangerous for Somalia” by the Somali prime minister and “suicidal for himself,” a consequence he thwarted by imposing a more moderate line. At that moment, the fulfillment of Somali independence and the possible union between two of the five Somalias were reputed to be the primary goal. The independence of Somalia came about on July 1, 1960 in the context of a formally multi-party system, even if the system in reality worked as a one-party system under the SYL’s overwhelming majority in the Somali parliament.  

Soon after independence the moderate approach to the pan-Somali issue was progressively pushed aside in contradiction with the Constitutional provision for pursuing the union of all Somali-speaking territories “through legal and peaceful means.” Paradoxically, the further enhancement of the pan-Somali agenda after independence was exactly what undermined the relations between Somalia and Egypt. 

The newly independent SYL leadership did not hesitate to change its international affiliations when the relations with the Western countries proved to be unsuitable to effectively support the irredentist policy of the Somali Republic. Between Somalia and Ethiopia, the USA identified Emperor Haile Selassie as its main ally in the Horn of Africa. For this reason, the Somali request for substantial military aid in terms of material and training was disregarded by the Italians and other Western allies. The Somali leadership pragmatically reacted with a rapid realignment from the Western to the Eastern bloc. In November 1963, Somalia refused an “offer of Western military assistance valued at almost £6.5 million in favour of Russian military aid to the tune of nearly £11 million.” The introduction of Western arms to Ethiopia and Eastern arms to Somalia rapidly exacerbated sub-regional tensions. The Somali government actively supported armed insurgency in Ogaden and provoked the Ethiopian government to mobilize an opposition. The political and military situation rapidly deteriorated until the sequence of Somali–Ethiopian border incidents erupted into a real war in 1963 between the two countries for the possession of the Ogaden region.  

Egypt’s firm reaction against the eruption of the war in the Horn was the premise for a broader revision of its policy. In order to prevent any possible allegations of direct association with the Somali guerrillas, Nasser contacted both conflicting factions, urging them to stop the “bloodshed and settle the dispute within the framework of African unity.” Nasser’s support for Somalia was contingent on the “neutrality” of the Somali national movement and its dissociation from an armed solution for the pan-Somali question, coupled with the revocation of its support of the Eritrean separatist movement, which had been fighting against the central Ethiopian government since 1962. Broadly speaking, this change reflected Nasser’s effort to remain in the mainstream of African politics after the failure of the UAR experiment in 1961 and the isolation of the Casablanca Bloc. Moreover, Egypt was not willing to open another military front in addition to the Yemeni crisis that since November 1962 “was sapping Egyptian funds and wasting its scarce resources.  

The Egyptian involvement in Yemen was a clear sign of Nasser’s willingness to replace the old polarity of his struggle against colonialism with a “new polarity of Arab revolutionaries struggling against Arab monarchies” which were reputed to be both reactionaries and intermediaries of the Western Bloc. In this new framework, the Somalis became less important than in the past for Nasser’s strategy, and Egypt’s influence in Somalia was taken over more and more by the Soviet Union as part of a broader Egyptian–Soviet “pragmatic” cooperation.  

A ceasefire was agreed upon in February 1964, thanks to covert American and Soviet pressure on their respective allies and thanks to the diplomatic mediation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was founded in 1963 in Addis Ababa. Somalia did not obtain any substantial gains from the war. On the contrary, its political influence in the Horn and in African affairs in general was undermined. Somali irredentism and its policy of calling into question the boundaries in the Horn of Africa directly conflicted with the OAU’s commitment to keeping the former colonial borders unchanged throughout the African continent. So, the war provoked the diplomatic isolation of the newborn Somali Republic in the context of African international relations. International isolation had been one of the reasons for the growing crisis in internal Somali Affairs until the 1969 military coup.  

During the 1950s and early 1960s, Nasser’s Egypt tried to include Somalia in the Arab sphere, the first and most important circle of its three political dimensions—Arab, Muslim, and African—in order to enhance and increase his leadership among the Afro-Asian countries and its strategic role along the Red Sea. However, Nasser’s plan stumbled over the fact that his support for pan-Somalism contradicted his attempt to consolidate Arab identity among Somalis, and the final outcome was that “the Somalis are Somalis first and anything else second.” Nevertheless, even if Egyptian influence did not succeed in promoting a Somali revolution on the basis of the Egyptian example, Nasser’s legacy resurfaced almost ten years later, after General Mohamed Siad Barre’s 1969 coup. After his seizure of power, Somalia in 1970 became a Scientific Socialist regime that emphasized its ties and relations with the Soviet Union. However, the by now President Mohamed Siad Barre implemented a double-track policy of forging good relations simultaneously with the Soviet Union and the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, which was the “first market for Somali goods.” By no accident, Mohamed Siad Barre decided to enter the Arab League in 1974 to acquire new popular support by means of economic aid coming from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Arab countries. However, it would not have been possible without the precedent of the involvement of Nasser’s Egypt in Somalia during its struggle for independence, which had definitively shaped an expanding pathway between Somalia and the Arab world in cultural and political terms.