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Saudi diplomatic push reaches Addis Ababa

12 February, 2026
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Saudi diplomatic push reaches Addis Ababa
© Gazette Plus
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Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, arrived in Addis Ababa on Wednesday for an official visit aimed at what the Saudi Foreign Ministry described as “discussing developments in the region” and “enhancing regional security and stability.”

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed received the delegation and described their discussions as productive. “Received His Highness Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, today for productive discussions on a broad range of bilateral and multilateral issues,” Abiy said in a post on his official X account. “Our talks focused on strengthening the longstanding ties between our two countries, expanding cooperation across key sectors, and enhancing coordination on regional and global matters of mutual interest.”

The visit comes at a time of significant geopolitical developments across the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea region. Long considered a strategic corridor linking the Middle East, Africa, and global maritime trade routes, the region is undergoing a recalibration of alliances, and spheres of influence.

Riyadh’s renewed diplomatic engagement appears to reflect a broader strategic shift, aimed in part at counterbalancing the expanding footprint of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In recent years, Abu Dhabi has consolidated a strong political, military, and economic presence across the Red Sea basin, including reported covert security activities in limited capacities.

Over the past decade, the UAE has expanded its influence in the Horn of Africa through port investments, security partnerships, and political alliances. Emirati involvement has been particularly visible in Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia, as well as in strategic maritime infrastructure projects along the Red Sea corridor. This positioned Abu Dhabi as a dominant Gulf actor in the region.

Saudi Arabia now appears to be challenging that dominance. The shift follows growing diplomatic tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, particularly over differing approaches to the war in Yemen. While both countries were key partners in the Saudi-led coalition, disagreements over military strategy, political outcomes, and support for local actors gradually strained relations. That friction has since evolved into broader regional competition.

Riyadh is pursuing a more assertive regional policy, seeking to reassert its influence, prenece and its strategic interests along the Red Sea.

Sudan has become a central arena in this evolving rivalry. The country’s conflict has drawn regional involvement, with persistent allegations that the UAE has provided arms and political backing to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group engaged in a power struggle with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

Saudi Arabia has reportedly grown increasingly critical of alleged foreign UAE involvement in Sudan. Riyadh has long attempted to position itself as a mediator, hosting talks aimed at ending the conflict.

Multiple reports and investigations have pointed to credible evidences indicating Emirati support for the RSF, including allegations of arms transfers and logistical assistance. A recent Reuters investigation reported on the alleged construction of a UAE-backed military training facility inside Ethiopian territory, which it said may have been linked to support for RSF operations.

The UAE has consistently denied direct involvement in Sudan’s internal conflict, maintaining that its engagement in the region is focused on “humanitarian aid and stability initiatives.”

The allegations have also drawn international attention. The United States has imposed sanctions on RSF leadership, as well as on SAF officials, over serious human rights violations. There have been growing calls in Washington for stronger measures targeting individuals and entities accused of providing material support to armed actors in Sudan.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia has also moved to formalize its security presence elsewhere in the Horn of Africa. Riyadh recently signed a security and military cooperation agreement with Somalia.

The timing is notable. The agreement comes weeks after the Somali government terminated previous arrangements with Abu Dhabi, signaling a potential realignment in Mogadishu’s external partnerships. The Saudi–Somalia accord reportedly includes cooperation in defense training, counterterrorism, and broader military coordination. For Saudi Arabia, the deal provides a strategic foothold along one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors.

Taken together, these developments indicate that the Horn of Africa is becoming an increasingly competitive arena for Gulf powers. The evolving Saudi–UAE rivalry is reshaping diplomatic alignments, security partnerships, regional influences, and conflict dynamics across Sudan, Somalia, and potentially Ethiopia.

The Red Sea’s strategic importance, both as a global shipping lane and as a security buffer for Gulf states, ensures that competition for influence is likely to intensify. Prince Faisal’s visit to Addis Ababa, therefore, should not be viewed in isolation. It forms part of a broader Saudi effort to reposition itself in a region where Gulf rivalries are extending far beyond their borders.