Samira Gaid: “Mogadishu isn’t at risk, but it’s peripheries are”

Over the past few months, al-Shabaab has caused chaos for the federal government of Somalia in the country’s central regions and Mogadishu’s hinterlands. The militant group launched a new offensive in February called “Hawlgalka Ramadaanta” (Operation Ramadan), aimed at areas the government began expanding into in central Somalia shortly after Hassan Sheikh Mohamud came to power in 2022. The al-Shabaab assault targeted “Middle Shabelle, Hiraan, and Galgaduud, with an apparent aim to encircle Mogadishu and overturn the government’s 2022 gains.”

This offensive is opportunely timed by al-Shabaab, as the UN-backed African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (Aussom)—the peacekeeping mission intended to support government forces—faces several challenges, from funding shortfalls to troop drawdowns. 

As of May, it remains unclear where the funding for the mission will come from, and there are now broader questions surrounding funding for the UN, as the Trump administration views the organisation as expensive and inconsistent with its foreign policy vision. The UN partially funded prior AU peacekeeping missions in Somalia, and according to The Economist, UN secretary general António Guterres has “warned that the peacekeeping budget to pay for troops may run dry by mid-year.” 

“The next steps are crucial”, says Samira Gaid, a founding director of Balqiis Insights and a security analyst. She says they “will determine whether the AU mission comes to an ill-timed end—with significant security implications—or whether contingency measures, not yet disclosed, will be put in place.”

Faisal Ali: The Somali army has faced several serious setbacks in the Middle Shabelle region in recent weeks, most notably at Adan Yabaal last month, which had hosted one of the army’s largest bases—prompting a flurry of US airstrikes across Somalia, including on the town itself. What do you think are the key reasons for the challenges the army has faced in holding ground?

Samira Gaid: There are a number of challenges that have led us to the moment we see, but if I were to identify the most important factor, it would be the misplaced political imperatives that were hastily converted into military strategy—not by military experts, but by the civilian leadership. The anti-AS operations in 2022, which began spontaneously, were initially led by communities, but it was expected that the offensives would naturally transition to military leadership. Unfortunately, that never came to pass; the military was sidestepped, and the war effort was led at the highest levels, with objectives determined and targets set by politicians for political ends—without adequate planning or qualified military strategy.

Many other factors also came into play: logistical challenges, changes in security leadership at critical times, and the use of hastily trained forces rather than older, more knowledgeable units, among others.

FA: Al-Shabaab announced an offensive against the government way back in February, just ahead of Ramadan. Have you seen anything in their tactics to suggest they’ve introduced any innovations in how they’ve carried out their offensives? 

SG: Their strategy came into play over Ramadan, and what we witnessed were deliberate, strategic, and calculated tactical moves by the group, who adjusted their approach with communities in order to regain the initiative. That would be their main adaptation. They appeared less punitive than in previous campaigns against known and suspected collaborators of the Somali government and security forces, with Adan Yabaal being the only exception. They reportedly made calculated concessions, such as allowing clans to retain arms and offering “tax” breaks.

This shift appeared aimed at regaining the trust of communities—or at least reducing resistance to their presence. We also didn’t see the gory images and videos of beheadings of captured security personnel that they had previously circulated.

All in all, they seemed to have shifted their political approach, blending in co-option as a means of regaining access.

This was followed by the arbitrary sale of public land in Mogadishu—much of it inhabited by the families of soldiers actively fighting on the front lines—an act perceived as both unjust and demoralising.

FA: Many have pointed to the deeper political dysfunction across the country as one of the root causes of the security breakdown. How is this political instability affecting troop morale and the army’s performance?

SG: The Somali security forces are very much a part of society and deeply affected by its dynamics. We have witnessed a cumulative breakdown of morale, mainly due to strategic failures on the battlefield and political mismanagement at the centre.

One of the most significant turning points was the failed Galcad mission, in which we lost the respected commander Hassan Tuure in January 2023, followed by the loss of Osweyne later that same year. These were defining moments that exposed the strategic miscalculations of the current administration. Forces were deployed with unrealistic objectives, inadequate support structures, and no clear evacuation or medical contingency plans. This was interpreted as a clear signal that their welfare was not a priority, and many within the forces saw it as being treated like cannon fodder.

This was further aggravated by untimely changes to security leadership, including the appointment of a commander widely known for corruption, nepotism, and cronyism. It reversed what little progress had been made on security sector reform and severely eroded trust. This was followed by the arbitrary sale of public land in Mogadishu—much of it inhabited by the families of soldiers actively fighting on the front lines—an act perceived as both unjust and demoralising.

In parallel, the political leadership shifted focus away from the offensives and pressing security concerns, towards pursuing controversial constitutional reforms, widely seen as a power grab aimed at manipulating the upcoming electoral process. 

Perhaps most demoralising of all was the botched deployment to Ras Kamboni, where troops were sent without sufficient support and ultimately forced to surrender at the Kenyan border. This was a humiliating outcome—one that could have been avoided. Especially considering that, around the same time, there were pressing security challenges in Middle Shabelle and Hiraan that required urgent attention but were neglected.

In sum, I would say a combination of operational negligence, political overreach, and institutional betrayal has deeply damaged the morale and performance of the armed forces.

The next steps are crucial and will determine whether the AU mission comes to an ill-timed end—with significant security implications—or whether contingency measures, not yet disclosed, will be put in place.

FA: One of the more recent major concerns is the funding structure for the AU’s latest peacekeeping mission, Aussom. The United States is not keen on providing funds, and a conference is scheduled for May. Can you explain what the issue is, and what impact a withdrawal of American funding would have on the mission?

SG: The financing of AU peace support operations has always been challenging—for Amisom, its subsequent iteration Atmis, and now Aussom. These missions have consistently faced financial shortfalls, alongside recurring calls for drawdown and transition.

The current financing challenge stems from the EU’s decision to stop providing stipends to the mission, following earlier cuts. This prompted the search for alternative funding models. The model eventually agreed upon by the Somali Government, the AU, and later the UN, was the utilisation of UNSCR 2719. This Security Council resolution—recently passed—was intended to allow for UN-assessed contributions to cover 75% of AU peace support mission costs. However, the United States has consistently raised objections to this for a couple of reasons. First, it argues that the mission in Somalia may not be an appropriate test case for trialling this new framework. Second, the UN already covers logistics for the mission, so an additional 75% contribution would raise overall UN funding to potentially more than 90%.

We now know that UNSCR 2719 is effectively off the table. This means that, months into an approved mandate, the mission is operating with incomplete financing. The next steps are crucial and will determine whether the AU mission comes to an ill-timed end—with significant security implications—or whether contingency measures, not yet disclosed, will be put in place.

FA: Do you think other financial backers can be found to enable the force to meet its fiscal targets and operate effectively?

SG: I do believe there are still slim possibilities, but it is clear that we have left this very late in the day. There have been critical missteps, such as the government’s premature rhetoric about winning the war and the end of the AU missions. To convince any potential backer, the FGS and AU must present a very credible and compelling plan, primarily focusing on the prioritisation of the transition, the realistic rebuilding of the Somali security forces, the demonstration of the utilisation of both the federal government and member state capacities, and, crucially, the internal political cohesion necessary to turn this into a coherent success story.

However, given the current politically charged environment in Mogadishu, the administration’s insistence on a divisive and poorly conceived electoral approach, and the almost comical launch of a political party by the incumbent and allied federal states, it is evident that we are very far from achieving this vision.

In my view, back in 2021, I would have estimated that it would take at least a decade to fully assume responsibility through a focused effort to rebuild the security forces.

FA: Looking ahead, Egyptian troops are due to join. What kind of impact do you anticipate the more advanced capabilities of these forces will have on the fight against al-Shabaab?

SG: The issue of Egyptian troops is another faultline. The Burundian forces are expected to phase out of the mission and cannot exit until their replacement forces are in place. The Egyptian troops will require assurances regarding financing for their deployment, which was to include air assets that may currently be unfunded. Therefore, we must monitor the situation closely. 

FA: And a more speculative question—if you were to give a rough time frame, how far are Somali security forces from being ready to assume responsibility for the country? The State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Omar, has stated that he wants this to be the last peacekeeping mission, but we’ve heard that before. 

SG: I can't accurately answer that question, as it would require a comprehensive assessment of the current state of the security forces—their capacities, capabilities, and available support structures. It would also necessitate an understanding of other lines of effort that may be at play. In my view, back in 2021, I would have estimated that it would take at least a decade to fully assume responsibility through a focused effort to rebuild the security forces. However, I am no longer confident due to the degraded capabilities of the forces over the past few years. As for the issue of this possibly being the last mission, the choice and decision may already be out of our hands, given the current financing crisis. For now, we wait and see.