Sunday 18 January 2026
Since the beginning of January 2026, Sudan has witnessed an intensified continuation of military operations between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), accompanied by a clear shift in the center of military gravity toward the peripheral regions, particularly Kordofan and parts of Darfur. These battlefield developments have coincided with an official political discourse emphasizing military decisiveness while maintaining a narrow window for political pathways. This was reflected in the speech delivered by the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, on the occasion of Sudan’s Independence Day on January 1, from the Republican Palace in Khartoum State, in which he reiterated the determination to proceed with “ending the rebellion,” alongside external diplomatic efforts aimed at securing political and military support from regional allies.
Al-Burhan’s speech coincided with a significant military escalation, as the army continued offensive operations across multiple fronts targeting wide areas of Darfur. The Sudanese Armed Forces carried out drone strikes on Nyala Airport, which the RSF uses as a primary supply base, as well as on areas in Central Darfur. According to some Sudanese media sources, the army also targeted the security adviser to the RSF commander, Hamed Abubakr.
In addition to targeting RSF gathering points, the army has increasingly relied on airstrikes and unmanned aerial vehicles, while the RSF has resorted to temporary control of supply routes and rural centers. Attacks were also intensified on the cities of El-Obeid and Kosti using suicide drones, which struck both cities at dawn on January 4, according to eyewitness accounts cited by the Sudan Tribune.
These operations have led to an expansion of clashes beyond major urban centers and triggered new waves of displacement, particularly in contact zones across Greater Kordofan states, where villages and small towns have become open battlefields amid a near-total absence of humanitarian services.
In the Kordofan region, reports indicate that the Sudanese army managed to achieve significant advances in North Kordofan, regaining control of several areas that had fallen under RSF influence in previous months. These advances included strategically important logistical areas along the connecting routes between northern and western Kordofan, including the Al-Debeibat area south of El-Obeid, as well as Al-Hamadi and Kazgei, towns that link North Kordofan with its southern and western parts. This was seen as an attempt to re-secure supply lines and cut RSF movement between Darfur and central Sudan. However, these gains did not lead to a decisive outcome, as intermittent clashes and counterattacks continued, leaving the battlefield situation fragile.
In South Kordofan, the situation has taken on a more complex character due to the involvement of multiple actors in the conflict and the presence of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu as an independent armed actor. Military escalation around cities such as Kadugli and Dilling prompted the SPLM-N to issue direct warnings to civilians to leave certain areas, indicating expectations of broader battles or the use of heavy weapons in or near populated areas. This has further exacerbated the region’s humanitarian fragility, as residents are already suffering from the effects of a prolonged siege and severe shortages of food and medicine.
At the end of December, SPLM-N forces heavily shelled the city of Dilling, resulting in a large-scale mass displacement. Meanwhile, the Sudanese army has been making desperate attempts to reach Dilling in order to break the military siege imposed on the city for nearly two years. Kadugli has also experienced intense shelling by SPLM-N forces, as the city is considered the most important node on the movement’s military operations map.
Military operations in Kordofan have been accompanied by rapidly deteriorating humanitarian conditions. The fighting has disrupted seasonal agriculture, severed internal trade routes, and caused sharp increases in the prices of basic commodities. The internal displacement crisis has also worsened, with thousands of families seeking relatively safer areas within the state or neighboring states, amid weak humanitarian response and significant difficulties faced by international organizations in accessing active conflict zones. Reports from the region indicate that civilians have become trapped between the warring parties, with some areas being used as supply corridors or military strongpoints.