The resurgence of piracy in the Indian ocean and the gulf of Aden

In the early 2000s up until 2012, when Somali piracy was at its peak, counter-piracy forces and initiatives were established through cooperation between regional states and external countries with strategic interests in the region. These efforts aimed to deter the increase and strengthening of armed groups targeting maritime vessels. It became evident that these operations had a broad and positive impact in reducing and countering attacks, as well as diminishing the overall operational capabilities of these groups.

Between 2012 and 2019, Somali pirates succeeded in carrying out only two attacks. This demonstrates the effectiveness of these operations and the extent to which they contributed to reducing piracy. This was further reinforced by the fact that, after a prolonged period, the security vacuum along the coastlines of Somaliland, Puntland, and southern Somalia began to change following the recognition of the Mogadishu government in 2012, alongside other developments that enabled the establishment and advancement of maritime operational capabilities and the creation of specialized coastal security forces. These included the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), established in 2010–2011, and European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP), established in 2012, among others.

This transitional phase in which maritime security in the region underwent significant changes, was closely linked to the Gaza war, which erupted in October 2023. The conflict created broad, multifaceted fronts and triggered renewed security shifts across the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the wider Middle East. One month later, Ansar Allah (the Houthis) began targeting Israeli-linked vessels transiting the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with the aim of creating pressure that could contribute to achieving a ceasefire in Gaza. It was in this context that, in November 2023, a shift in maritime attacks and the resurgence of piracy capabilities in the Horn of Africa became evident.

This situation was further compounded when the war against Iran began, shaking the stability of the Strait of Hormuz. This widened the security vacuum that was exploited by piracy groups and non-state actors operating in the region, including the Houthis in Yemen, al-Shabaab, ISIS, and others. The increased pressure on the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb revived the need for alternative maritime routes through the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope, while also increasing the possibility of renewed security risks emerging in the western Indian Ocean.

This situation created a new dynamic in which the forces tasked with combating piracy, after having remained largely inactive for an extended period, began to focus their efforts on countering Houthi attacks and prioritizing the security of the Strait of Hormuz. On the other hand, however, this also created operational space that allowed pirates to resume their activities. Other related factors also contributed to this development, including Operation Hillaac, which Puntland launched against the Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS) in late 2024. The operation diverted a large portion of Puntland’s security forces, including the PMPF, Daraawiish forces, the Presidential Guard, and clan militias toward the mountainous areas where counterterrorism operations were underway.

Strategic alignment between Islamist groups and Pirate networks

The strategic alignment of non-state actors in the region represents another emerging development. Evidence has emerged of a formal agreement between Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. The agreement has multiple and complex dimensions, including the smuggling of technology and weapons, the exchange of training, and joint efforts to disrupt maritime shipping. As the Houthis target shipping routes in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Al-Shabaab, which has links to piracy networks and receives support from various sources, is similarly seeking to disrupt maritime activity in the western Indian Ocean. It appears that this strategy has been underway for some time, and the pressure and impact generated by this cooperation are now becoming increasingly evident.

According to the United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Al-Shabaab and the Houthis have reportedly reached an understanding on several issues: Al-Shabaab would receive weapons, technology, training, and other forms of support it requires, while in return it would intensify piracy activities off the Somali coast and collect ransom payments from hijacked vessels. Al-Shabaab is also seeking to modify and expand its military capabilities, including through the adoption of drone technology. Although its use of drones remains largely limited to surveillance, reconnaissance, and media operations, there are growing indications that this capability could progress toward an operational role.

This technical cooperation has enabled pirate networks to receive assistance in tracking and surveilling vessels. The American Security Project noted that pirates have acquired advanced GPS equipment that facilitates the tracking and targeting of vessels, while in some cases the Houthis directly provide intelligence information about vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden. As noted by the European Union’s Operation Atalanta Deputy Commander, Vice Admiral Ignacio Serrano, pirates are using satellite phones and heavy weapons, which has been attributed in part to the arms and technology transfers between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab. Africa Defense Magazine, which interviewed Mohamed Muse Abdulle, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), reported that some pirates had received training in Yemen and that the new technology they have acquired enables them to plan attacks farther from the Somali coastline.

Al-Shabaab has long maintained relationships involving both cooperation and exchanges with Somali piracy networks, arms-trafficking and kidnapping networks. Similarly, Al-Shabaab has many years generated finances and revenue through the kidnapping of foreigners and the collection of ransom payments. Whenever piracy resurges, it is often driven by interconnected factors that have strategic and security significance for the region. For example, the increase in fishing activities by foreign governments and companies can contribute to the emergence of various piracy networks, some of which are locally organized groups combining nationalist grievances with profit-seeking interests. At the same time, however, the resurgence of piracy can itself encourage further foreign fishing activity, while in other instances piracy may serve an external agenda, such as that of the Houthis aimed at disrupting maritime routes in the Horn of Africa in pursuit of particular political and strategic objectives.

Puntland and vulnerability to Piracy networks

In most cases, Somali pirates use the coastal areas of Puntland and Galmudug as bases from which they launch attacks or hold hijacked vessels. Galmudug is an administration that remains relatively weak and has not been in existence for very long. It lacks the centralized governing authority and capacity that Puntland has to make decisions or take effective action against piracy. Then, what is distinctive about Puntland?

The territories of Puntland and Galmudug have long served as operating environments for piracy and arms-trafficking networks. Puntland with support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) established its own coastal security force known as the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), which contributed to counter-piracy operations led by the European Union’s Operation Atalanta. Nevertheless, little has fundamentally changed within Puntland itself. Most of the attacks that have recently resurfaced in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean involve groups that hold hijacked vessels along the Puntland coast, while supplies and weapons are also transferred from the same areas.

On the other hand, at the beginning of July this year, Puntland rejected plans for the fishing company SomTurk to operate along its coastline. The company, which is jointly partnered by Somalia and Turkey, Garowe claimed that it had not been adequately consulted regarding the deal. One of the financiers of the piracy networks, based in Hul Caanood in Puntland, Somalia, told Reuters that the pirates were benefiting from the disruption caused by the Houthis in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, which had diverted shipping toward the western Indian Ocean. He also pointed to the decline in international naval operations along the Somali coast as another factor benefiting the pirates.

In addition, Puntland’s piracy networks have a clan-based dimension. Many vessels are hijacked by different armed clans, sometimes even by members of the same sub-clan. This makes it difficult for Puntland authorities to take action, as there are concerns that doing so could trigger inter-clan conflict. In many cases, piracy networks also serve as a source of income and livelihood for numerous families. Overall, in Puntland, when international naval operations decline and the limited capacity of local security forces and institutions is diverted toward other conflicts, such as counterterrorism operations, the operational space available to pirates expands, providing them with safer spaces to operate.

China and Turkey’s role in Somali maritime

In mid-July, Somalia and China signed an agreement aimed at expanding the fishery products export duty-free to Chinese markets. Turkey has also announced that it will send fishing vessels to Somali waters in the coming months as part of efforts to develop the blue economy. More broadly, China and Turkey are at the forefront of foreign engagement along Somalia’s coastline in areas related to the strategic development of the blue economy, including fisheries, oil, and gas.

At the same time, as Turkey has begun offshore oil exploration in Somalia, it has deployed the drilling vessel Cagri Bey, accompanied by three Turkish naval vessels which are TCG Gökçü, TCG Gelibolu, and TCG Bartın, as part of an operation known as the “Somalia Naval Task Group.” This task group emerged from the defense cooperation between Somalia and Turkey and has been specifically tasked with protecting Turkey’s energy exploration activities in the Indian Ocean. Similarly, China has begun deploying naval vessels to the Somali maritime to contribute to the security of commercial shipping in international waters and regional stability. China has been involved in such maritime security operations since 2008, when piracy attacks in Somali waters were at their height.

It appears that the expansion of fishing activities and oil exploration could be factors contributing to the emergence of piracy groups seeking to hijack these vessels, driven either by financial incentives or by grievances against such foreign activities. Similarly, it is important to consider the possibility of broader strategic dimensions, given that we are already witnessing how the strategic cooperation between Ansar Allah and Al-Shabaab has contributed to the resurgence of piracy. In the same way, external interests could potentially drive or shape what may appear to be Somali piracy at the local level.

The timeline of maritime attack incidents

The increase in pirate attacks forces vessels, governments, and companies to strengthen private security measures, increase insurance premiums, and enhance preparedness for high-risk threats. In the early 2010s, pirate attacks occurred on a weekly basis, with pirates hijacking as many as 53 vessels and taking approximately 1,181 people hostage in that year alone. In financial terms, between 2005 and 2012, Somali pirates received an estimated $339 million to $413 million from ransom payments.

During this second phase of resurgence, between 2024 and 2025, incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea worldwide increased by 17%, rising from 146 to 171 incidents. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), within a three-month period, 24 attempted attacks and armed robberies against vessels transiting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden were recorded. Between April and May 2026, pirates hijacked three vessels carrying oil and chemical fertilizers, MT Honour 25, Eureka, and Sward with 44 sailors still being held hostage and their condition a matter of serious concern.

On 27 July, a fourth vessel, named Asana and sailing under the Tanzanian flag, was hijacked by pirates from waters off Yemen and brought to the coast of Eyl in Puntland. On 17 August, the UK Coastguard and Maritime Agency (MCA), through its division responsible for providing information and guidance for commercial maritime operations in East Africa, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea, known as UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMT), reported that a cargo vessel near the coastal area of Maraya in Bari region, Puntland, had been seized by pirates. The fifth vessel, named M/V LUTUF, was sailing under the flag of Cameroon.

On 19 August, four individuals were killed in an airstrike, while two others were injured. They were accused of being among the eight people who had hijacked the M/V LUTUF. Their relatives, however, denied their involvement, stating that they were civilian fishermen. The group used another vessel that they had previously hijacked, the MV Sward, in carrying out the hijacking of the vessel. The strategy of seizing a large vessel or boat and using it to hunt and capture other vessels is one in which Somali pirates have extensive experience. In 2010, they used this method to operate across a wide area stretching from Mozambique in southern Africa to Oman in the Arabian Gulf.

According to some reports, the airstrike is attributed to a Turkish unmanned aerial vehicle, given that Turkish naval forces and vessels were operating near the area where the vessel was being held. On 23 August, another strike was carried out against a boat near the Jiifle area of Nugaal region, Puntland, after an attempt was made to move the MV LUTUF closer to the Jiifle coastline. The strike killed nine people aboard a boat that had departed from the coastal settlement of Dhiinowda-dhig. When questioned about the strike, the Turkish government stated that it had no information about it. This did not constitute an explicit denial of the strike, nor did it indicate that Turkey had accepted responsibility for it.

The M/V LUTUF was carrying weapons and equipment used for communications and satellite to the Turkish military base in Mogadishu. This highlights the growing risks associated with targeting vessels carrying weapons and military equipment. At the same time, it creates the possibility of strategic attacks whose objectives may extend beyond simple profit-seeking or disruption. Emerging reports indicate that the group holding the vessel has demanded a ransom of up to $2 million, although it remains unclear whether any negotiations have begun. On 20 August, the sixth vessel to be seized, named M.T. Sibu 1, sailing under the Eritrean flag, was hijacked by pirates from waters east of Al Mukalla in Yemen and taken to the coast of Puntland.

The increasing security cooperations in the region

Over the past several years, as vulnerabilities in the region’s maritime security have emerged and geopolitical and strategic tensions have intensified, there has been a growing number of agreements and memoranda of understanding related to defense, security, ports, and maritime affairs. In January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding concerning ports and maritime access. In August 2024, Somalia and Egypt signed a defense agreement focused on security cooperation, including countering Al-Shabaab and ISIS. In August 2025, Pakistan and Somalia signed a defense agreement focused on building the capacity of Somalia’s armed forces, providing technical assistance and training, and equipping them with modern capabilities.

Similarly, in July 2026, Somalia approved a memorandum of understanding on maritime transport and ports with Egypt. On 4 August 2026, Pakistan and Somalia signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation covering a range of areas, including defense, security, military capacity-building, counterterrorism, and military training.

On the other hand, following a meeting on 2 August 2026 between Puntland President., Said Abdullahi Deni and Major General Claude K. Tudor Jr., Commander of U.S. Special Operations Forces Africa (SOCAFRICA), the two sides signed a security agreement aimed at expanding the U.S. military base in Bosaso and strengthening cooperation on counterterrorism operations and maritime security. Political and security disputes within Puntland could, however, delay efforts to build capacity against terrorism and piracy, secure the coastline, and reduce security gaps that can be exploited. Puntland recently dissolved the Puntland Security Forces (PSF), which had operated alongside the central administration’s forces in Garowe, and seized their facilities in Galkayo, Bosaso, and Armo. In light of the new U.S. agreement, this may indicate a move toward consolidating Puntland’s internal security forces under centralized state control.

In addition, earlier this month, China and Somalia discussed strengthening defense cooperation, counterterrorism efforts, and the challenges emerging from the AUSSOM mission. In March 2026, China pledged to support Somalia in its fight against Al-Shabaab and ISIS. This indicates that Beijing’s engagement in Somalia is moving beyond its earlier focus on fisheries and trade, diplomatic support, and interest in regional maritime routes and infrastructure, toward a new phase of security and military engagement.

Similarly, in July 2025, Somaliland and Taiwan signed an agreement on coast guard cooperation aimed at strengthening maritime security and combating piracy and illegal fishing, as well as facilitating the exchange of training, maritime rescue operations, and broader maritime security cooperation. On the other hand, the mutual recognition between Israel and Somaliland has created the possibility of an Israeli presence along the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean.

For some time, reports have emerged suggesting the completion of a military base at Berbera, although neither side has fully confirmed these reports. Nevertheless, there is evidence indicating that the base is nearing completion and that it is reportedly being developed by the United Arab Emirates for joint use by Israel. Somaliland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdirahman Dahir Adan, when previously asked about the possibility of such a base, stated that there were no limits to relations between the two sides and that cooperation could extend across all areas. The development has raised concerns among the Houthis, who have threatened to attack any Israeli presence in Somaliland intended to influence regional maritime routes.

Elsewhere, on 7 August 2026, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed and brought into force the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement. The agreement is based on deterring any attempt at aggression against any of the three states and guaranteeing that an attack against one of them would be regarded as an attack against all three. This agreement, along with the other arrangements, forms part of efforts to strengthen security in a region that has become increasingly vulnerable, whether due to conflicts among states or the activities of non-state actors that have exploited these security imbalances.

The renewed security and defense cooperation agreements emerging across the region reflect attempts to fill security gaps created by failed or weakened states, or by states that have been unable to rely fully on the broader fragmentation of the liberal international order. These developments have been particularly influenced by the consequences of alignments among non-state actors that have disrupted maritime security, the war involving Iran, and renewed political disputes within individual states across the region. The emerging direction is, therefore, toward regional alliances and interest-based security cooperation aimed at addressing newly emerging security needs.

Ultimately, maritime security in the western Indian Ocean region and its most important routes has entered a new phase of security transition. This has contributed to a decline in the stability and maritime security that previously prevailed. At the same time, the competition among regional powers that has fueled security and geopolitical tensions has created a vacuum that non-state actors operating in the region have exploited, including the Al-Shabaab-Houthi alignment and the Islamic State’s campaign in Puntland. These actors have viewed the situation as an opportunity to expand their power and influence. On the contrary, however, there are increasingly positive signs in the form of defense agreements, military bases, and security partnerships that could help reduce the security vacuum that, over recent years, has contributed to the resurgence we are witnessing today.

However, this can only be achieved through a collective commitment by local, regional, and international governments to jointly address security threats, develop effective security strategies, strengthen coast guard forces, and expand naval presence and maritime capabilities in order to fill existing gaps in maritime security. It is equally important to recognize that insecurity is not confined to the coastline or in whole maritime alone. Its roots often lie on land, and governments and administrations responsible for the territories surrounding these maritime areas must, therefore, address the social and socioeconomic factors that fuel piracy and incorporate them into the broader security framework for the maritime domain.