Recognition at what price? Somaliland’s soft power after Israel’s recognition

On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member state to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state, leading to widespread jubilation. Images of Somalilanders celebrating with the flags of Israel and Somaliland side by side were broadcasted by international media, bringing Somaliland to the attention of global audiences. For Somalilanders, Israel’s move towards recognition was long overdue, and the prevailing sentiment was that 34 years of political wilderness had come to an end. So far, however, not a single other country has recognized Somaliland. Instead, Somaliland’s soft power has suffered a significant blow.

Somaliland’s soft power

Prior to December 2025, Somaliland was relatively little known outside specialist circles, with discussions of it largely confined to academic and policy circles. Somaliland stood out as a case of large-scale, self-led peace and state-building. Communities that had fought on opposing sides of a long civil war voluntarily negotiated peace, rejected external involvement in their peace process, and built an inclusive democratic state from scratch. As a result, Somaliland was seen as an “oasis of stability”, “the little country that can”, and as a “beacon of hope” in an otherwise volatile region. In short, Somaliland was recognized for its achievements and was often portrayed as an entity that had succeeded in contrast to many of its neighbors.

Why Israel recognized Somaliland

Israel’s impetus for recognizing Somaliland extends beyond addressing the immediate challenge posed by the Houthis in Yemen, located across the Gulf of Aden from Somaliland. The ongoing conflict with Iran has revealed that even the United States faces significant challenges in effectively protecting its own bases and regional partners in the Middle East. In light of this, it is highly questionable whether Israel would even seek to establish, at least openly, a military base in Somaliland.

It is equally doubtful whether Somaliland would agree to this, given that such a move would turn Somaliland into a target. Unlike Israel, Somaliland does not possess sophisticated and advanced defense systems capable of shielding its population from attacks. Hence, it appears nonsensical for Somaliland to allow itself to become entangled in regional conflicts that do not directly concern its core interests.

A careful analysis reveals that Israel, rather than addressing acute challenges, may be motivated by long-term geostrategic calculations – namely, to counter and disrupt Turkey’s attempt to establish itself as a dominant force in the increasingly important Horn of Africa region. Turkey has invested heavily in both Somalia, where it maintains its largest embassy and military bases, and Ethiopia. In Israel, Turkey is increasingly being discussed as a geopolitical adversary that must be addressed. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has recently stated publicly that Turkey constitutes a strategic threat to Israel, describing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “a sophisticated and dangerous adversary who wants to surround Israel.”

Somaliland’s precarious strategic position

Somaliland’s decision to establish diplomatic and strategic ties with Israel are best construed in the context of domestic pressures, the bulk of which have been shaped by external actors. Several influential states strongly oppose Somaliland’s independence. Neighboring Djibouti benefits significantly from landlocked Ethiopia, a country of more than one hundred million people, relying on Djibouti’s ports for much of its trade. Somaliland’s Berbera port, in which the UAE has invested heavily, is viewed as a potential competitor. Consequently, a recognized Somaliland is perceived by Djibouti as a potential threat to its economic and strategic interests. These concerns were further intensified when Somaliland and Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding in 2024, which included provisions for Ethiopian access to the sea in exchange for diplomatic recognition of Somaliland. Adding to the complexity, Ethiopia and Egypt remain engaged in regional competition and a dispute over the Nile River. Most significantly, Somalia – backed by Turkey, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar – strongly opposes Somaliland’s independence and has sought to ignite and exploit internal divisions and tensions within Somaliland. In light of these challenges, it is not surprising that Somaliland seeks and welcomes support wherever it can find it.

Attack on Somaliland’s soft power

That said, Somaliland is not immune from criticism for the strategically catastrophic ways in which it has handled its rapprochement with Israel and the resulting damage to its soft power. Led by media outlets such as TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation), Al Arabiya, and Al Jazeera, a wave of negative narratives about Somaliland emerged following Israel’s recognition. The initial allegation was that recognition of Somaliland was contingent upon the forced displacement of Palestinians. This allegation was strongly rejected by both Somaliland and Israel. Now that it has become increasingly evident that forced displacement of Palestinians in the foreseeable future is unlikely, as had initially been discussed by some Israeli and U.S. politicians, the narrative has shifted. The focus has moved toward portraying Somaliland as having “sold its soul to the devil” – namely Israel – as a prominent Al Jazeera news anchor recently stated during an interview with a Somaliland MP.

The politics of double standards

Upon closer examination, however, the criticism directed at Somaliland appears deeply unfounded. Thus far, Somaliland has merely established diplomatic relations with Israel. It has neither contributed to nor enabled Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, nor has it sided with Israel in a conflict against another Muslim majority country. The same cannot be said of several Muslim majority states that have condemned Somaliland for its rapprochement with Israel.

During the Gaza war, Egypt’s trade with Israel increased by $199 million, while Jordan’s increased by $41 million. Turkey initially announced a suspension of trade with Israel, but subsequent reports indicated that commercial ties continued. Following the Gaza war, Egypt signed a $35 billion natural gas deal with Israel. In the ongoing U.S. – Israel conflict with Iran, all GCC member states, to varying degrees, have supported the U.S. and Israel against Iran, a Muslim majority country. In short, the criticism directed at Somaliland is often framed as an expression of solidarity with the Palestinians but is driven primarily by geopolitical concerns.

Strategic incompetence in Somaliland

Despite the apparent fallacy surrounding the criticism directed at Somaliland, its international reputation has undoubtedly suffered a significant blow. Somaliland has failed to forge a coherent and disciplined counter narrative, and its perspective has been largely absent from the debates shaping public perceptions of the issue. Even in Western countries, where public support for Israel has declined, Somaliland is increasingly being associated primarily with its relationship with Israel and Netanyahu. It is therefore imperative that Somaliland urgently develops a strategy to effectively address hostile narratives and protect the soft power it has spent decades cultivating.

With a young and well educated population, Somaliland has no shortage of human capital. The apparent passivity and inability to effectively address criticism – thereby weakening its soft power – reflects a deeper structural problem. A central challenge is the increasingly limited importance of merit in relation to senior appointments. As in previous ones, the current government appears to appoint ministers, senior advisers, and other high-ranking officials based less on experiences, education, and professional competence than on personal proximity and political loyalty to the president. Practically, the most qualified candidates are often overlooked in favor of individuals who supported or financed the president’s election campaign. The result being that positions are not filled by those best equipped to perform them. This weakens institutional capacity, reduces the effectiveness of government decision-making, and limits Somaliland’s ability to respond strategically to external challenges.