Puntland’s war against IS-Somalia

Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Somalia, has been engaged in an intensive military campaign against the Islamic State's local affiliate, IS-Somalia, since early 2025. This ongoing struggle, triggered by a horrific ambush in December 2024 that killed several Puntland soldiers, highlights IS-Somalia's resilience and the challenges Puntland faces in maintaining security. Although Puntland receives backing from international partners, including the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and reportedly Morocco, local leaders argue that Somalia's federal government in Mogadishu has provided minimal support, failing to offer reinforcements or logistical aid.

IS-Somalia, formally established in 2015, splintered from al-Shabaab, adopting the Islamic State (IS) branding and ideology. Since then, the group, entrenched primarily in Puntland's mountainous Bari region, has attracted militants from both Somalia and abroad. IS-Somalia's ranks are estimated to include around 700 fighters, with foreign militants outnumbering local recruits. According to a UN report, the group has experienced a surge in manpower, nearly doubling in size in 2024, largely due to a steady influx of fighters from Yemen and neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania. 

Foreign fighters are drawn to IS-Somalia by a mix of ideological fervour, financial incentives, and the allure of belonging to a globally recognised jihadist network. Local recruits, on the other hand, are often drawn from marginalised communities in Puntland’s remote regions, lured by promises of financial rewards or a sense of purpose. Many cite economic hardship, grievances against local authorities, and ideological indoctrination as their primary motivations. Clan affiliations also play a role, with some fighters hailing from the leader's own clan, providing the group with a critical base of local support.

The United Nations stated it had not seen evidence supporting Mumin's elevation to global emir, noting his last confirmed role as “head of the general directorate of provinces,” overseeing ISIL affiliates in Africa.

The faction gained international notoriety when its leader, Sheikh Abdulkadir Mumin, formerly a prominent al-Shabaab cleric assigned to engage in dialogue with clan elders around Mogadishu during 2011-2012, pledged allegiance to IS’s central command in Iraq and Syria. Mumin, who hails from Puntland’s Majerteen Ali Saleban clan, initially gained prominence as a preacher, leveraging his clan ties to recruit fighters in Puntland. Mumin’s status has since grown within global jihadist networks, and US intelligence sources indicate that he may now be serving as IS’s global emir following the deaths of senior figures elsewhere. Abdirahman Abdishakur, a veteran Somali MP, similar said earlier this year that the “the main hub of ISIS leadership is in Somalia” in a social media post. 

This assertion, however, has been met with scepticism. The United Nations stated it had not seen evidence supporting Mumin's elevation to global emir, noting his last confirmed role as “head of the general directorate of provinces,” overseeing ISIL affiliates in Africa. Such prominence has elevated IS-Somalia's strategic importance within IS’s global operations, especially since Somalia hosts Al Karrar, a significant IS financial office responsible for channeling funds across global cells.

In short, the Puntland-based militants now function as the Islamic State’s continental treasurers and ideological stewards, ensuring that sister insurgencies remain plugged into a single funding stream.

In practice, Al Karrar has transformed IS-Somalia from a peripheral jihadist outpost into the centre of the Islamic State’s African ecosystem. From makeshift finance hubs in Puntland, Mumin’s lieutenants funnel an estimated US$4-5 million a year in extortion and smuggling profits to sister provinces: IS-Central Africa in the DRC and Mozambique, IS-West Africa around Lake Chad, and the emergent IS-Sahel network. UN investigators tracked at least $400,000 in 2024 alone passing through South African hawala brokers to bankroll IS-Central Africa training camps, while a separate $25,000-a-month cryptocurrency drip flows onward to IS-Khorasan in Afghanistan. Beyond cash, Al Karrar dispatches bomb makers and sharia judges, issuing playbooks on taxation, propaganda, and target selection that surface almost verbatim in communiqués from Nigeria to Mozambique. The late finance chief, Bilal al-Sudani, even convened regular encrypted calls with IS-West Africa commanders to mentor them on court administration and zakat collection. In short, the Puntland-based militants now function as the Islamic State’s continental treasurers and ideological stewards, ensuring that sister insurgencies remain plugged into a single funding stream.

Following the group’s defeat in Syria and Iraq, IS has been looking to establish a new stronghold and Somalia seems to be a perfect candidate for that. The group sees in Somalia a patchwork of semi-autonomous regions, porous coastlines, and chronically overstretched security forces, conditions that allow militants to entrench themselves with limited outside interference. Puntland in particular has a long coastline which faces the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and offers opportunities for smugglers and fighters to move around. The remote Cal-Miskaad and Galgala mountains of Puntland offer natural hideouts much like the caves of Tora Bora, while nearby smuggling routes facilitate the import of weapons and foreign fighters and the export of illicit gold and contraband that bankroll operations.  

Initially, Puntland's campaign, known locally as Operation Hilaac (Lightning), achieved rapid territorial gains, recapturing key IS-held towns like Ballidhidin and mountainous hideouts in Bari. The first two phases have been a success and Puntland is now entering its third and final stage to clear IS from the region. Despite these early successes, the rugged terrain and guerrilla tactics employed by IS fighters have considerably slowed progress. As Puntland forces moved deeper into IS-controlled territories, ambushes, roadside bombings, and targeted assassinations surged, dramatically increasing casualties and complicating efforts to sustain momentum.  

While Puntland maintains an active communications strategy, including a Telegram channel where it regularly posts updates on military operations, IS-Somalia maintains a sophisticated media operation of its own. 

Their publications such as Al-Naba, circulated through Telegram and other platforms, portray Puntland's forces as proxies of foreign “Crusader” agendas, exploiting anti-government and anti-Western sentiments that allowed them to grow so much in the first place. IS-Somalia regularly claims successful ambushes, publishing graphic footage and testimonials from foreign fighters, designed to attract new recruits internationally.   

Somali media coverage of the offensive provides insight into local perceptions. Puntland’s media outlets, while supportive of the offensive, highlight the human cost, airing appeals from local elders and displaced families pleading for assistance.

In last week’s statement from IS's Al-Naba publication following a clash in the Miraale Valley, the group claimed to have killed 120 Puntland troops stating: "The crusader coalition’s air force” is failing. In addition, the group has claimed to have launched 55 operations including 38 IED attacks, 10 firefighters, and 7 mortar strikes. Propaganda such as this seeks to boost the morale of IS fighters on the backfoot and bolster its ranks. 

Somali media coverage of the offensive provides insight into local perceptions. Puntland’s media outlets, while supportive of the offensive, highlight the human cost, airing appeals from local elders and displaced families pleading for assistance. Meanwhile, IS-held areas remain largely inaccessible, though sporadic reports from local journalists embedded within Puntland forces suggest civilians in these territories experience profound suffering, trapped between the militants' oppressive rule and the violence of military operations.  

... President Deni has even pledged to send Puntland troops south to help President Mohamud fight al-Shabaab once the Bari campaign ends, signalling he still seeks a cooperative national role.

In Garowe, Puntland's capital, there is clear frustration with the Mogadishu government. Local leaders complain bitterly that Puntland’s appeals for support have fallen on deaf ears, claiming that Villa Somalia has made minimal concrete efforts beyond empty promises. Earlier this year, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced in parliament plans to establish a committee to support Puntland’s war against IS-Somalia, but no such committee has materialised. Despite offering little tangible help, President Mohamud regularly claims the successes of the Puntland Defence Forces. This has not gone unanswered, with many local politicians expressing their anger at the President's claims. Yet President Deni has even pledged to send Puntland troops south to help President Mohamud fight al-Shabaab once the Bari campaign ends, signalling he still seeks a cooperative national role.

With little concrete support from Mogadishu, Puntland’s main external backing comes from airstrikes conducted by the United States and the United Arab Emirates. Since February, the United States has carried out 14 strikes against IS. These targeted strikes, aimed at key IS leaders and training camps, have dealt significant blows to IS’s operational capabilities and have helped considerably in limiting IS movement, but they have not proven sufficient to dismantle the group’s entrenched presence entirely.

Puntland’s grievances underscore broader tensions about Somalia’s fragmented governance and the federal government's limited authority beyond Mogadishu.

This conflict not only shapes Puntland’s internal security but also deeply impacts Somalia’s federal dynamics. Puntland’s grievances underscore broader tensions about Somalia’s fragmented governance and the federal government's limited authority beyond Mogadishu. Elections are due soon, and this new row between Puntland and the Federal Government of Somalia has added a new layer of complexity to their strained relationship. Moreover, the ascendance of IS-Somalia as a crucial node within IS's global structure, hosting key leaders like Mumin and critical financial infrastructure, demonstrates Somalia's increasing centrality to global terrorism discussions.

Despite IS being dealt a massive blow, the strategic picture remains unsettled. IS-Somalia’s emir, Abdulkadir Mumin, whom US officials increasingly treat as the movement’s de-facto global leader, is still at large and the Bari mountains continue to house an IS office that launders funds to affiliates from Mozambique to Afghanistan. Without sustained logistics, stabilization money and intelligence sharing, the militants could melt back into cave networks and simply re-emerge once the current pressure eases.  

Airstrikes and hard-won ground gains have put Puntland on the front foot, but the real test is turning battlefield successes into a better life for Somalis. That means clearing mined tracks, funding basic services, tightening coastal patrols to choke the smuggling routes that bankroll Mumin’s fighters, and giving youth a reason to choose wages over jihad, not just swelling troop numbers. If Garowe and its partners deliver, IS-Somalia’s foothold will fade. If they don’t, the caves will still be there when the drones fly home, ready for the next insurgency.