Political pageantry masks public hardship in Hirshabelle

Marking nine years since its creation in 2016, Hirshabelle’s leaders gathered in Jowhar on October 5 to celebrate the state’s anniversary. The event, attended by former politicians, clan elders, performers, and social media loyalists, showcased not progress but patronage. Funds drawn from local taxes, foreign aid, and World Bank grants were poured into travel, accommodation and stipends. a spectacle financed by the very resources meant to serve the public.

Posts by the State media on Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube flooded timelines with exaggerated praise of the ceremony, turning it into political theater. Their orchestrated celebrations masked the grim reality facing most Hirshabelle residents; lives marked by poverty, unemployment, social injustice, recurrent floods, and the absence of basic political and social rights.

Recurrent intercommunal armed conflict over land, grazing rights, and access to water remains pervasive. In Hirshabelle society, deeply entrenched cycles of grievance perpetuate acts of revenge, including the violent killings of women, children, and Islamic scholars.

Residents of Adaan Yabaal, Mahas, and other villages in eastern Middle Shabelle have been forcibly displaced after terrorist groups took control of these areas. Al-Shabab's blockade has disrupted trade and isolated communities in all cities. The militants maintain control of major roadways across Hirshabelle, frequently staging brutal ambushes targeting civilians, government officials, Somali National Forces (SNF), and AMISOM troops.

Fear and violence have disrupted connectivity among cities. For example, Jowhar, the capital of Hirshabelle, lies just 90 kilometers north of Mogadishu, yet insecurity forces travelers to rely on expensive air transport. Most state travelers depend on costly flights, reflecting the failure of Hirshabelle as a functioning state.

Villages along the Shabelle River endure recurrent displacement caused by seasonal flooding and the river’s overflow between Hawadley district and Bayahaaw hamlet near Jowhar, as well as in the Hiran region. These floods destroy thousands of hectares of crops, leaving agricultural and pastoral communities vulnerable to poverty and frequent displacement, sustaining a prolonged humanitarian crisis.

The president’s term has already expired, and the state is divided. The people of the Hiran region have rejected President Ali Gudlawe’s authority. Political patronage, family-based politics, and clan loyalty dominate governance rather than meritocracy. Clan militias have set up illegal roadblocks, extorting truck drivers, minibus operators, and travelers.

The destruction of roads and public infrastructure has paralyzed movement across Hirshabelle, leaving many areas virtually cut off from transportation. Although Qatar pledged funding for the Mogadishu–Jowhar road, construction remains incomplete. The state has also failed to benefit from World Bank and other international infrastructure initiatives, largely due to persistent insecurity and pervasive rent-seeking that derail implementation.

Hirshabelle’s parliament consists of 98 legislators, appointed primarily to appease clan interests. The president has created 80 ministerial positions, including ministers, deputy ministers, and state ministers, further bloating the administration. Yet lawmakers go unpaid for months, and public administration is nearly nonexistent except for a few contract employees funded by international organizations.

Meanwhile, humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate. Children die from malnutrition, and pregnant women in Jowhar and nearby districts face acute shortages of healthcare services, particularly in rural areas. Patients perish due to the lack of oxygen supplies and intensive care units. The closure of Intersos Hospital and the suspension of International Medical Corps (IMC) operations, following the withdrawal of U.S. aid, have only deepened the crisis, leaving thousands without access to essential medical care.

President Ali Guudlawe’ failure to address clan- based conflict in the Middle Shabelle and Hiran regions reflects his weak leadership. This situation discourages the state’s intellectuals from participating in state elections and decision-making.

The president has reportedly used state police and clan militias to seize agricultural lands for his family associates, as seen recently in Mareerey village near Jowhar. He has also failed to defend Hirshabelle from terrorist attacks, including in his own constituency of Masajid Ali-Gadud in eastern Middle Shabelle.

The purpose of federalism is to bring decision-making and public services closer to the people. Power is meant to be distributed among the central government, states, and local authorities to enhance transparency and accountability, and to prevent the concentration and abuse of power in the hands of one person or city.

In Somalia, however, federalism has been undermined by predatory clan-based elites who exploit state resources — taxes, foreign aid, and natural wealth — for personal enrichment. They prioritize their families’ fortunes over the welfare of the majority, leaving citizens to suffer insecurity, poverty, terrorism, and the absence of basic public services.

Hirshabelle, in this context, exists in name only. The expired constitutional mandate of President Ali Guudlaawe, coupled with an inactive state legislature, has deepened political paralysis and prolonged humanitarian crises. This collapse stems partly from Federal President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s decision to extend the mandates of three Federal Member States (FMS), including Hirshabelle, in an attempt to justify a unified direct election. In contrast, Jubaland has rejected the extension and proceeded with its own regional election, challenging the credibility of the planned nationwide vote.

The young state’s leadership, ensnared in Mogadishu’s patronage network, spends much of its time in the capital rather than engaging with local constituencies. The state has become a platform for self-promotion and clan competition, effectively functioning as a family enterprise serving elite enrichment.

Kleptocratic elites in Hirshabelle view governance and development as extensions of their personal networks. In one striking example, officials and their beneficiaries stage qaaci ( musical session) on citizens’ farms in Jowhar, filming private orchards for the entertainment of the elite and sharing the footage on official state social media pages, a grotesque display of disconnect between leadership and reality.

With both the president and state legislature now ruling beyond their mandates, Somalia’s chronic instability is once again laid bare — fueled by prolonged tenures, elite intransigence, electoral manipulation, and rejection of legitimate outcomes.

What is needed now is genuine reconciliation and inclusive dialogue among Hiran and Middle Shabelle’s diverse groups: religious scholars, educators, traditional elders, youth, and women. Such engagement would protect communities from terrorism and hardship while laying a foundation for stability. Timely, free, and fair elections are essential to restoring public trust and government legitimacy.

The Federal Government must also correct past mistakes by refraining from using federal states as political tools to secure parliamentary support. Installing favored leaders based on clan affiliation has only deepened divisions. Instead, it should prioritize the real needs of citizens, particularly farmers and marginalized groups in Hiran and Middle Shabelle, to build a functional state capable of delivering stability and long-term development.