A year has passed since the nationwide protests that erupted after Somaliland’s three major telecommunications providers, Telesom, Somtel and Soltelco, announced a doubling of the price of daily internet bundles. Within 24 hours, public anger had spread across social media and into the streets. Although young people, particularly those aged 18 to 35, were central to the mobilisation, the response extended across age groups, regions, clans and social strata. Religious leaders, journalists, legal commentators and ordinary citizens joined the outcry, making the episode a rare instance of collective mobilisation that temporarily cut across some of the allegiances and privileges that ordinarily shape political participation in Somaliland.
The response was neither centrally coordinated nor ideologically uniform. Social media personalities condemned the decision, religious leaders called for its reversal, and some sought to discourage further escalation. Others advocated street protests, during which telecommunications shops were attacked. Humour became another means of expressing public discontent, including ridicule of Soltelco’s perceived attempt to follow the two dominant operators. Lawyer and legal commentator Guleid Ahmed helped bring the question of legality into public debate, threatening legal action and arguing that suspected price-fixing required a legal response rather than an investigative committee. The government initially appointed a committee to examine the increase before President Abdirahman Irro announced its reversal as public pressure intensified.
Subsequent discussions on platforms including MMTV and Hargeysa debates examined the episode through familiar explanations: monopolistic business practices, weak regulation, limited government capacity and the economic frustrations of young people. These are necessary starting points, but they do not fully explain the significance of the protests. The more important question is what the episode revealed about the political conditions that preceded it, and why youth mobilisation in Somaliland took a different form from that witnessed in Kenya during the protests against the 2024 Finance Bill.
The comparison is not between two interchangeable generations of angry young people. Kenya and Somaliland have distinct political histories, institutional arrangements and traditions of collective action. These differences help explain why similar grievances about material conditions and political accountability have produced different possibilities for organisation. The critical distinction lies not simply in how young people protested, but in the political infrastructures available to them before mobilisation began and their capacity to sustain it afterwards.
In Somaliland, the telecommunications protests exposed the extent to which private economic power has become entangled with everyday political life. Internet access is no longer a discretionary consumer service. It is increasingly indispensable infrastructure for employment, education, communication, access to information and participation in public affairs. A sudden price increase therefore represented more than an additional household expense: it threatened access to one of the principal means through which people engage with contemporary social and political life.
The internet also provided a common point of reference across otherwise fragmented interests. The protests were not organised around a particular clan, political party or religious institution. Their immediate demand addressed a material concern readily understood by a broad section of the population. For a brief period, the usual categories through which political participation is organised became less decisive than a shared dependence on the same infrastructure. This produced a different form of lahaansho: not allegiance to a state, nation or sect, but a claim to participate in the conditions of modern life.
Yet the breadth of the response should not obscure the structural limitations of youth mobilisation in Somaliland. Public discourse often portrays young people in contradictory terms. They are depicted as a homogeneous constituency defined by unemployment, migration, political apathy and frustration with the status quo. At the same time, they are romanticised as the country’s future and recognised as a political constituency capable of swaying electoral outcomes, as demonstrated in the most recent election. This oscillation between depicting youth as a social problem and celebrating them as a source of political power obscures the substantial differences in class, education, ideological orientation and proximity to political institutions that shape their experiences. While some young people have access to political networks, international opportunities and decision-making spaces, others remain excluded from stable employment and meaningful participation in public life. To treat youth as a unified political actor is therefore to overlook the very inequalities that determine who can exercise political agency, under what conditions and to whose benefit.
These inequalities shape the capacity to organise. Collective action requires more than a shared grievance: it depends on access to spaces where people can acquire political knowledge, deliberate, build relationships and develop strategies that extend beyond an immediate dispute. In Somaliland, such spaces remain limited for much of the population. An education system dominated by private provision offers few widely accessible avenues for sustained political education, while many existing social spaces remain structured around clan, religious or political affiliations. Social media consequently serves as an important alternative space for political expression and mobilisation, but the ability to circulate grievances online does not automatically produce durable organisational capacity.
This distinction helps explain both the strength and the limitations of the telecommunications protests. They demonstrated that a material grievance could generate rapid mobilisation across established social divisions. What remains less developed is the infrastructure through which such mobilisation might accumulate political knowledge, preserve organisational memory and sustain collective pressure after the immediate dispute has been resolved.
Kenya offers a contrasting example. The protests against the Finance Bill emerged from a different institutional and political environment, shaped by a longer history of mass mobilisation and a more established public vocabulary of constitutional rights and state accountability. Kenyan youth did not invent political protest from nothing; they drew on existing repertoires while developing new methods of coordination. Social media became organisational infrastructure through which protesters circulated information about demonstrations, explained the bill’s provisions, shared legal guidance and coordinated participation across locations. Lawyers, journalists, civil society actors and artists contributed to a broader political conversation that extended beyond the immediate demand to withdraw the bill.
The significance of Kenya’s mobilisation therefore lies not simply in its scale, but in the relationship between spontaneous action and the organisational resources available to sustain it. Digital communication interacted with legal literacy, political documentation, public education and a history of collective action. These resources did not eliminate internal disagreements or guarantee lasting institutional change, but they expanded the possibilities for turning individual grievances into a collective challenge to government policy.
The contrast is instructive. In Somaliland, the telecommunications protests revealed a capacity for spontaneous mass reaction; in Kenya, the Gen Z mobilisation demonstrated more visibly how such reactions can draw on organisational infrastructures to sustain political pressure. The distinction is not that Kenyan youth are inherently more politically conscious or that Somaliland’s youth are politically apathetic. It is that the conditions under which political consciousness can develop into organised action differ between the two contexts.
For Somaliland, this raises a set of practical questions. Who documents the actions of protesters and the responses of authorities? Who makes legal information accessible, verifies public claims and provides legal support? Who creates spaces for political education beyond social media? And what mechanisms allow people to retain the knowledge and relationships developed during a protest once the immediate grievance has been addressed? These are questions of institutional and organisational capacity, not merely of youth participation.
The reversal of the telecommunications price increase was a tangible achievement. But it did not, in itself, resolve the underlying problem of private actors exercising substantial control over essential infrastructure. The episode raised questions about regulatory capacity and the accountability of dominant companies, as well as the relationship between public authority and private economic power. Where competition is limited and regulatory institutions lack the capacity or independence to intervene effectively, commercial decisions can have consequences far beyond the marketplace.
This is where the language of regulatory capture and elite capture becomes relevant. Where political influence and commercial interests become intertwined, the boundary between public regulation and private advantage can blur. The result is not simply higher prices or fewer choices for consumers. It can also be the exclusion of smaller competitors, the concentration of economic opportunities and the erosion of public confidence in institutions expected to act in the collective interest. The telecommunications protests did not establish every dimension of this relationship, but they exposed a public concern that cannot be resolved through a price reversal alone.
These questions are particularly important as Somaliland becomes more deeply integrated into a global economy increasingly shaped by private technological infrastructure. Telecommunications is only one example. Artificial intelligence, data collection, surveillance and platform-based employment will introduce new forms of economic and political dependency. Without credible regulation and meaningful public participation, the infrastructures that expand access to information can also concentrate power in the hands of actors who are difficult to hold accountable.
Kenya’s experience suggests that political organisation is valuable not only for responding to immediate grievances, but also for developing the capacity to examine these changing forms of power. Legal knowledge, digital coordination, documentation and cultural production can help turn protest into a continuing process of political education. For Somaliland, the lesson is not to reproduce Kenya’s methods wholesale, but to develop organisational resources suited to its own political and social conditions.
The comparison reveals two related but distinct challenges. Somaliland’s telecommunications protests demonstrated the possibility of collective action across established divisions when a shared material interest becomes impossible to ignore. Kenya’s youth mobilisation showed how digital tools, legal knowledge and existing repertoires of protest can help sustain collective pressure beyond its initial eruption. Neither case offers a complete model, and neither should be romanticised. But together they demonstrate that the political consequences of protest depend not only on the grievance that triggers it, but also on the organisational conditions through which it develops.
For Somaliland, the task is therefore not simply to identify the next issue capable of bringing young people into the streets. It is to strengthen the conditions under which collective action can become informed, organised and sustained: accessible political education, spaces for deliberation, legal literacy, independent documentation and mechanisms for holding powerful public and private actors accountable. The telecommunications price increase was reversed, but the structural questions it exposed remain. Whether the protests become a turning point will depend less on how quickly the next grievance produces public anger than on the capacity to organise before it arrives.