No neutral ground: The AU’s shifting position on Sudan

In mid-August, supporters of the Sudanese army's military operation to reclaim land and control from rebel General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as "Hemedti," celebrated a statement from the African Union's Peace and Security Council rejecting the recognition of Hemedti's parallel government.

The statement not only refused to acknowledge the government in Nyala, a city in Sudan's Darfur region chosen as the capital for the self-declared new government, but it also welcomed Kamal Idris as the Prime Minister and leader of the civilian government in Khartoum.

The celebration was significant because the African Union (AU), Africa's most important political body, had suspended Sudan's membership since the events of October 25, 2021. Those events, announced by the head of the Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, were seen as a coup after they removed the government backed by the "Forces of Freedom and Change" (FFC) coalition, which had represented civilians in the system that was formed after the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir.

The statement was understood as a positive sign, a step toward regaining membership that the country badly needs as it wages a battle not only militarily but also diplomatically and politically, where the struggle over legitimacy has become one of its central features.

Yet no further rapprochement followed. Instead, the African Union quickly reverted to its usual position of maintaining equal distance from all sides of the Sudanese conflict. This stance, though outwardly neutral, carried a clear message, even if left unsaid: no single actor possesses full legitimacy, and no one can claim an exclusive right to represent the Sudanese people.

This position was evident, even when the AU issued its statement – one some read as African support for Khartoum’s authority or open backing against the rebels and defectors who continue to try to impose an alternative narrative, one that casts the perpetrator as the victim.

In essence, the AU’s statement reiterated a few core principles that the organization cannot move beyond, including upholding African unity and rejecting partition, as well as refusing to accept the politics of fait accompli, which, if tolerated, could encourage further rebellions elsewhere.

Following the statement, AU officials met with stakeholders from Sudan and with regional and international actors involved in the Sudanese crisis. The AU appeared open to engaging with all parties, including those Khartoum considers rebels and outlaws, seemingly to correct the impression that it had tilted toward one side, and to emphasize its full neutrality.

The AU’s latest move was to call political forces to a “Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue” set for October 6. The “Sumud” group, a splinter of the FFC, will play a central role in it. While Sumud’s representatives deny siding with Hemedti, their stance is clearly one of opposition to the ruling authority and the army.

The national strategy since the AU suspended Sudan’s membership has been to argue that the October 2021 events were not a coup. Civilian partners, the argument goes, had derived their legitimacy not from elections or referenda but from the army’s decision to select and empower them at the start of the transition, before later dissolving their government on grounds of failure and monopolization of power.

Yet this logic overlooked the fact that the AU leadership knew all this; it had been a key partner in shaping the transition from the outset. At the same time, it was also aware that the FFC, now divided between those aligned with Hemedti and those opposing the army, enjoyed significant backing from Western powers, making them a bloc worth courting.

Most African leaders view Sudan not through emotional appeals to justice but through calculations of interest and return. Hence, the question becomes: is it more advantageous to back the Sudanese army, whose leadership is met with international suspicion, or to support the vision of a Western-backed group that insists no party in Sudan deserves unconditional support or legitimacy?

Western interests and influence remain the key drivers behind AU decisions. This is evident not only in Sudan but also in the AU’s double standards toward other coups and constitutional changes across Africa in recent years

In this context, the most likely answer to that question can be seen in the respect and attention afforded to former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, whose movements are closely followed and whose views are widely sought, despite accusations at home that he and his allies colluded with the rebels – charges that few in the region seem to take seriously.

Western interests and influence remain the key drivers behind AU decisions. This is evident not only in Sudan but also in the AU’s double standards toward other coups and constitutional changes across Africa in recent years. Western approval, and the ability to align with Western priorities, have become the decisive factor in whether a regime is granted legitimacy.

There two key points must be kept in mind when discussing this issue. First, there is no independent body called the “African Union.” It is essentially a gathering of the continent’s heads of state. This means that if the most influential member countries adopt a stance of open hostility toward the Khartoum government, or at least maintain a cold neutrality tinged with complicity, it would be naïve to expect the AU to take a contrary position or issue strong, unequivocal support for Khartoum’s military campaign and its ruling authority.

The second point is that it is difficult to speak of an autonomous AU position at all. The organization cannot separate itself from the outlook of the “international community,” which in practice reflects the U.S. vision for a settlement in Sudan.

That vision was summed up by U.S. diplomat Tibor Nagy, a close observer of the Sudan file. Asked in an Al Jazeera interview to assess the conflict, he replied that it is like being forced to choose between a greater and a lesser devil. Both generals, he said, have committed atrocities, and both are needed to stop the fighting.

This unfair equivalence echoed in the recent statement of the “Quad” - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States issued last week as the army made significant gains in Kordofan.

Regional institutions, led by the African Union and IGAD, were quick to welcome the statement. It lays out in detail the approach already described: imposing a ceasefire, reviving the civilian political track (the Forces of Freedom and Change), and excluding Islamists and their allies from the public sphere under the pretext of severing ties with the former regime.

In conclusion, taking all of this into account, the African Union’s stance is neither openly hostile nor entirely negative. Rather, it is constrained by conditions and pressures and therefore liable to shift if those conditions change.