Nabaddoon: the art of war and peace among Somali clans

The intensity and variety of wars that clans conduct show that their art of warmaking relies on an institutional apparatus rather than random practices. Consider how different in type, intensity, and scale these three conflicts are. The most common and recurring of these are clan-on-clan conflicts. These disputes, centered around land, pasture, or water, often involve only two clans. They occur between neighboring clans, often with long-standing disagreements, and are low-intensity conflicts in terms of the number of forces involved and the duration of battles.

The second type involves wars between clans and non-state actors, such as Islamist groups and insurgent fronts. These conflicts have a long history in Somalia, with some clans fighting against liberation movements. However, such conflicts increased after the collapse of the central government, as many clans had to defend their properties against various warring factions. Also, many clans organized themselves to resist Islamist movements, with Ma'awisley Militia being a notable example. These are often sporadic clashes that range from moderate to high intensity.

The third type of conflict that clans engage in is clan-state wars. These conflicts also predate the modern Somali state, as clans fought against European colonial powers and regional nations. Additionally, Somali governments depended on clans in their territorial disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya. For instance, they played a key role in the 1977 Somalia-Ethiopia war. Even though the state declared the end of the clan system with a symbolic burial ceremony six years earlier, it still needed to rely on the clans for new recruits. It was also clans that helped opposition fronts overthrow the Barre regime in 1991.

A clan, besides sharing a common lineage, is also a system of reciprocity. That is, I trust that you will die for me; and you trust that I will die for you; and I trust that you trust that I will die for you—ad infinitum

Clan-state wars are the most intense and challenging for clans because of their disproportionate nature, as states possess advanced weapons and warfare expertise that clans lack. Additionally, the duration of these wars does not match the tactical wars clans are accustomed to.

Despite the complex layers of these conflicts, the clans’ management of them seems just as smooth. They are handled by an institution whose role in peaceseeking is better known than in warmaking—nabaddoon. A nabaddoon—a peace-seeker—is an elder who, as part of others, forms the middle level of the clan.

The Somali clan has three tiers. The top level is held by the leader, the Sultan, whose role is often symbolic and represents the entire clan. If you think of the clan as a company, the Sultan would be the chairman of the board. The second tier consists of a group of elders who, for their daily executive functions, serve as the driving force of the clan. They are the CEOs of the clan, by the company analogy. This group of elders was given a political role and renamed clan chiefs by the colonial powers. However, the Barre regime, as part of its revolutionary policies to dismantle the clan system, rebranded them as peace-seekers.

Each chief represents a specific sub-clan that, together, forms a larger clan under the leadership of a Sultan. The chiefs act as the link between the Sultan and the ordinary members—the third level of the clan. For this vital role, the chiefs are the soul of the clan, without whom it would be nothing more than a ghost.

The reciprocal code, embodied in the chiefs, is the hidden hand that enables clans to carry out operations as complex as war

The chief, unlike the Sultan, holds a position based on merit. To be nominated as a chief, an elder must meet two criteria. First, the elder must have extensive knowledge of his clan members. Most importantly, he must know the number of men in his sub-clan. Second, he must demonstrate a thorough understanding of the clan's history. Specifically, he must keep a record of the war cycles the clan has experienced with others. He should also be familiar with the history of conflicts and how they have been resolved both within the clan and with other clans.

These requirements are indispensable for a chief to effectively perform his duties. The main responsibilities include four key tasks. The first and most important is collecting money. Clans gather funds for various reasons, but the most significant is blood money. This is required when a clan member kills another clan member. Blood money is only collected from men through a rule called testes-count. For example, if a family has two sons and three daughters, the father is expected to pay the blood money for three men—himself and his two sons. The more sons a father has, the more money he pays. This is because, per the clan norms, only men are expected to kill or be killed for vendetta. Therefore, every additional son carries an insurance risk of killing someone or being defended from being killed. The chief is responsible for knowing the total amount of money needed, how many sons each family has, and collecting the money on time.

The second role chiefs take on is mediation and conflict resolution. The conflicts they manage can occur among clan members or with other clans. In the first case, they often issue orders, while in the second, they act as envoys for their clan. They sometimes also mediate between conflicting clans. In these cases, the chief functions as a judge, lawyer, and mediator.

The third and most complex task is warmaking. This is especially true because chiefs' decisions in this area involve life-and-death issues on a large scale. Additionally, it is a task that goes beyond their usual scope and skills. Although chiefs effectively oversee the recruitment and funding of war by leveraging their skills in collecting blood money, they face challenges with equipment. For clans, unlike states, do not have a license to legally acquire weapons. They must rely on underground networks to purchase weapons, which is more financially risky. Due to the lack of a permit and limited financial resources, the guns they carry are mostly lightweight and outdated. Their wars with states, though costly to them, remain their only source of heavy weapons.

For clans, unlike states, do not have a license to legally acquire weapons. They must rely on underground networks to purchase weapons, which is more financially risky

The last and most recent of the four tasks is their electoral role. Since 2000, Somalia has implemented a power-sharing system based on clan identity. This system distributes political positions, such as members of parliament and cabinet roles, according to a formula that allocates a specific share of these positions to each clan. The Chiefs' role in this process is to decide who will represent them and from which sub-clans. They create and enforce electoral rules and perform roles similar to those of political parties in non-consociational democratic regimes.

The fact that chiefs can perform all these functions comes from the nature of the clans. A clan, besides sharing a common lineage, is also a system of reciprocity. That is, I trust that you will die for me; and you trust that I will die for you; and I trust that you trust that I will die for you—ad infinitum. If this reciprocal code ever breaks, the clan ceases to exist. This is where the role of the chiefs is crucial—to maintain the code. In that sense, chiefs are to the clan what banks are to modern societies. Banks support our shared faith in currency, which is the belief that everyone believes that everyone else values it. By issuing banknotes with fixed values, banks turn that shared belief into something tangible. Without this common belief and its symbols, modern societies could descend into chaos.

Another similarity is the fungible nature of reciprocal codes, much like banknotes. Just as money can be used for many different purposes, individuals with reciprocal codes can also perform various roles. This quality allows chiefs to take on diverse functions—from seeking peace to waging war.

The reciprocal code, embodied in the chiefs, is the hidden hand that enables clans to carry out operations as complex as war. It ensures each clan member pays their fair share of the money on time. It compels everyone to follow the chiefs' decisions. Most importantly, it gives fathers confidence to entrust their sons’ lives to the chiefs.

However, Somali clans differ in how strictly they enforce reciprocal codes. Clans with more relaxed reciprocal codes have weaker bonds and, as a result, a more fragile institution of chiefs. For example, the closer you get to riverbanks and coastal areas, the weaker these reciprocal bonds become. Conversely, the further inland you go, the stronger the bonds are. This aligns with Luling’s observation that the political alliances of the agricultural communities in southern Somalia are not based on clanship, even though they share one common ancestor in theory, but rather on the sense of living in the same area. In contrast, in the north, clanship—as Lewis pointed out—is the political principle guiding competition for scarce resources.

Although I agree with these scholars’ observations, the focus should be on chiefs rather than clans. To understand this social structure, which raises funds, maintains peace, and wages wars, we need to analyze its key elements in action. By focusing on chiefs, we can compare how the presence or absence of this institution influences peacebuilding, warmaking, and even state formation among the clans.