“Multicountry polycrisis” could engulf the Horn, Scholars warn

Five leading famine, conflict and humanitarian specialists have warned that the Greater Horn of Africa could descend into a major regional emergency during the second half of 2026 and into 2027. They say a strengthening El Niño, disruptions to food and fertiliser markets, epidemic threats and persistent warfare are converging across countries already weakened by years of crisis. Rather than representing separate emergencies, the scholars argued that these pressures could interact across borders, producing consequences that “could be catastrophic.”

The climatic warning follows two disappointing rainy seasons in parts of Somalia, eastern Ethiopia and eastern Kenya, where poor rainfall has damaged crops, reduced pasture and strained water supplies. Below-average rainfall is also forecast across parts of Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan, while a powerful El Niño could bring drought to some areas and severe flooding to others. Alongside the climate threat, the scholars warn that an unpredictable Ebola variant in Congo and Uganda could further destabilise the region if it crosses into South Sudan, where conflict and a health system would make containment considerably more difficult.

Economic and security pressures are likely to deepen the danger. Protracted conflicts affect every country in the Greater Horn except Kenya. These shocks, the authors emphasise, are “not simply additive but multiplicative,” because each one makes the others more destructive.

The region’s ability to prevent mass suffering has also deteriorated following the closure of humanitarian programmes, staff dismissals, the loss of critical infrastructure and steep reductions in aid. Without urgent preventive action, they concluded, the converging threats have “all the hallmarks of the proverbial perfect storm,” with potentially devastating consequences for food security, health services, civilian protection, displacement and mortality.

The warning comes at a time when the Red Sea has entered a high-risk phase of escalation. Reuters reported, citing two senior Iranian sources, a regional source and a Houthi source, that Tehran had asked the Houthis to prepare to obstruct the waterway should the United States attack Iran’s electricity infrastructure. The Houthi-linked source claimed that missiles and drones had already been positioned.

The immediate maritime-security picture is further complicated by a simultaneous resurgence of suspected Somali piracy. On 17 July, armed assailants boarded and took control of the Asana tanker off southern Yemen. Initial maritime assessments pointed to piracy rather than a Houthi operation, while the vessel had listed Bosaso as its next destination.

The economic impact on the Horn of Africa is already substantial and uneven. The World Bank’s latest Djibouti Economic Monitor says sustained disruption in the Red Sea is affecting Djibouti’s trade flows, port activity and fiscal space, with likely spillovers through weaker trade-related employment, reduced investment and declining household purchasing power.

Ethiopia is highly exposed because its fuel-supply system depends entirely on Red Sea ports. The IMF reported that emergency spot purchases pushed total diesel costs to approximately $270 per barrel and jet-fuel costs to $300 per barrel in April. However, more than half of the country’s annual fertiliser requirement had already arrived, limiting the immediate impact on agriculture. Somalia’s National Bureau of Statistics recorded an even faster transmission of the shock to households: fuel prices in Mogadishu rose from approximately $0.60 to $1.50 per litre, while higher war-risk insurance premiums, freight charges and import-financing costs increased the landed prices of food and other essentials.

Humanitarian pressures are consequently intensifying alongside the growing strategic competition. The World Food Programme reports that Red Sea disruptions have delayed imports into Sudan and increased the costs of food, fertiliser and transport. Fuel prices have risen by more than 24 percent in a country where over 19 million people face acute hunger. Somalia is similarly vulnerable because drought and its heavy dependence on imported fuel and staple foods amplify the effects of every shipping or energy shock.

Meanwhile, tensions in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region have continued to escalate, raising fears of renewed conflict. The situation remains volatile, with both sides intensifying their rhetoric amid reports of drone strikes and increased troop mobilisation. These developments have further weakened confidence in the peace process and heightened concerns about a return to large-scale hostilities.

Somalia is also facing growing political and constitutional vacuum, particularly over the electoral process. The crisis has contributed to repeated clashes in Mogadishu and a severe deterioration in relations between the Federal Government and the federal member states of Jubaland and Puntland. At the same time, worsening insecurity, displacement and economic hardship are deepening the humanitarian crises in both Somalia and Ethiopia.

This latest warning of a “multicounty polycrisis” comes as the Horn of Africa is already experiencing the economic consequences of the broader conflict in the Middle East. Rising trade and transport costs, disrupted supply routes and growing pressure on food and fuel prices risk placing further strain on governments and communities across the region.