The Mogadishu–Hargeisa Airspace dispute

Tensions between Mogadishu and Hargeisa have flared once again, now manifesting in a “visa war” and an escalating confrontation over aviation control. Mogadishu is intensifying it is campaign to assert undisputed federal authority over Somalia’s airspace, which it views as a symbol of national sovereignty. Hargeisa, however, is refusing to yield, insisting on recognition of it is right to independently manage flights and air navigation across it is territories.

At the center of the dispute lies the question of who exercises authority over Somalia’s airspace — a long-standing and politically sensitive issue involving the federal government, federal member states (notably Puntland and Jubbaland), and Somaliland, which has operated as a self-declared independent state since 1991. Puntland and Jubbaland, have repeatedly accused Mogadishu of using it is reclaimed sovereign control over national airspace as a political instrument rather than a neutral administrative function. Over the years, documented incidents show federal aviation authorities redirecting, delaying, or outright blocking flights during moments of political tension with regional governments, reinforcing perceptions that airspace management is being wielded as leverage in center–periphery power struggles.

A notable example occurred under the previous administration of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. At the peak of a political standoff with Jubbaland President Ahmed Islam Ahmed Madobe in 2019, Mogadishu imposed a ban on flights to Kismayo, framed as an aviation security measure but widely seen as political pressure. That earlier episode foreshadowed later confrontations, including several recent skirmishes between the federal government and Jubbaland in which Mogadishu once again resorted to flight suspensions. Most recently, the federal government halted all flights to Kismayo. Jubbaland repeatedly denounced these suspensions as unconstitutional and politically motivated, arguing that the federal government routinely weaponizes airspace control to undermine regional autonomy. Puntland has voiced similar grievances, and in a recent joint statement the two states claimed to have filed formal complaints with the UN civil aviation body seeking intervention.

The dispute with Somaliland, however, is part of a broader struggle over sovereignty and international recognition, which makes the airspace issue even more contentious. For Hargeisa, control of it is airspace is inseparable from it is pursuit of de facto statehood. For Mogadishu, it represents a matter of protecting Somalia’s territorial integrity. What began as a technical disagreement has now escalated into open confrontation, exposing unresolved tensions at the heart of Somalia’s political crisis.

Historical background of the sovereignty dispute

For thirty years, the sovereignty dispute between Hargeisa and Mogadishu has remained unresolved — at times flaring up, at other times cooling down, and continually shifting in both form and substance. Since 1991, when Somaliland declared it is independence following the collapse of Somalia’s central government, Hargeisa has built the foundations of a separate political entity. It succeeded establishing governing institutions, creating a relatively democratic system that has held successive elections with peaceful transfers of power, opening pathways for societal reconciliation, and developing a national narrative to justify it is claim to statehood. Over time, observers have increasingly treated Somaliland as a de facto state, even though it has never received formal recognition from any UN member state or major international organization. This narrative has recently gained fresh momentum, particularly as influential figures in the United States — including Senator Ted Cruz, who is expected to seek national office again — have pushed for Somaliland’s recognition.

Meanwhile, Somalia, whose state collapsed in the early 1990s, has struggled to rebuild strong institutions despite extensive international support and expensive state-building project. The Federal government of Somalia spent two decades under transitional governments and interim charters until 2012, when the transitional period formally ended and a new roadmap for establishing permanent institutions was adopted. Yet after two decades of state-building, largely financed by the international community, Somalia’s federal institutions still struggle to project stable authority across southern and central Somalia. Much of this territory remains either under Al-Shabaab control or beyond the reach of consistent government services and institutions.

Somaliland maintains that Mogadishu, despite it is limited territorial control, continues to assert legal sovereignty over Somaliland and reinforces this claim through it is membership in the UN, the African Union, and other regional and international bodies. Yet Somalia has been unable to convert it is declared sovereignty into actual control over the territory it claims. Conversely, Somaliland — despite it is shortcomings in inclusive governance, persistent clan-based grievances, and unresolved disputes over power and resource sharing — has made notable progress in maintaining stable political order and building working relations with various governments and organizations. Still, these achievements have not translated into formal recognition within the UN system.

The two sides therefore face a persistent paradox: Mogadishu holds legal sovereignty without territorial control, while Hargeisa exercises territorial control without international recognition. This contradiction has kept the sovereignty dispute alive, recurring, and adaptable to new arenas. The latest expression of this contest is the escalating battle over visas and air travel, a dispute that has intensified over the past two years. It is origins trace back to the period after 2012, when Somalia exited it is transitional phase and discussions began over the federal government’s efforts to reclaim sovereign powers, particularly control over national airspace and civil aviation.

From the “special arrangement” to the struggle over airspace and ports

In 2013, Somaliland’s then–aviation minister, Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, announced that Hargeisa and Mogadishu had reached an agreement to co-manage Somali airspace. The deal established a joint technical committee, based in Hargeisa, to oversee airspace operations, with overflight fees to be shared equally. Following the announcement, Hargeisa rolled back an earlier escalatory move in which it had banned the UN from using Somaliland airports in protest of the federal government’s assumption of airspace management.

However, the agreement — hailed at the time as a breakthrough for Somaliland — was, as Somaliland authorities repeatedly argued, never implemented as announced. It quickly became a source of political controversy within Somaliland. Critics accused the government of conceding too much to Mogadishu, contending that the arrangement reinforced the federal government’s legal authority over Somaliland’s airspace. These concerns were tied to a broader fear among Somaliland nationalists — that Somaliland’s position had been weakened after Somalia’s transitional period ended.

For the first time in it is history, Somaliland participated in an international conference on Somalia’s future — the 2012 London Conference. The meeting brought the transitional period to a close and explicitly acknowledged Somaliland’s presence, while calling for dialogue between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Although Somaliland’s delegation insisted it was not participating in any renewed “union” project, President Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo used the platform to present Somaliland’s case. Yet the conference and it is final communiqué aligned with an international agenda focused on rebuilding the Somali state and reinforcing it is unity — a vision Somaliland fundamentally rejects. According to many domestic critics, Somaliland’s participation diluted it is long-standing anti-union position and gave Mogadishu a renewed basis to assert legal claims, including over Somaliland’s territory and airspace.

As Somalia’s federal institutions slowly recovered and gained increasing international recognition, Mogadishu began expanding it is authority and exercising elements of sovereignty in areas that directly affected Somaliland. This gradually narrowed Hargeisa’s political space. Still, whenever confrontations emerged, the solutions tended to be temporary “fixes” aimed at easing tension — whether with international actors or with Mogadishu it iself. This was true of the “special arrangement” for Somaliland within the international aid architecture, and it was true of the preliminary airspace agreement — both of which, Somaliland later claimed, Mogadishu worked to undermine.

The conflict escalated in early 2024 when the FGS authorities, for the first time, blocked an Ethiopian Airlines aircraft bound for Hargeisa from entering Somalia’s airspace. The plane carried a high-level Ethiopian delegation. The incident formed part of a broader diplomatic crisis triggered by a controversial memorandum of understanding signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia in early 2024. The MoU granted Ethiopia access to the sea through the lease of coastal land in Somaliland, allowing Addis Ababa to build commercial and military facilities there, in exchange for Ethiopia moving toward future recognition of Somaliland. Mogadishu denounced the deal as a blatant violation of Somalia’s sovereignty, recalled it is ambassador from Addis Ababa, and launched a diplomatic campaign at the UN and the African Union to oppose it.

Although Ethiopia and Somalia eventually reached a settlement — after a year-long diplomatic standoff mediated by Türkiye’s president, a close ally of Mogadishu — the crisis pushed the airspace dispute to unprecedented levels. It also created dangerous conditions in the skies, with reports that civilian aircraft operated by Qatar Airways and Ethiopian Airlines narrowly avoided accidents after receiving conflicting instructions from rival control centers.

The new electronic visa system

In September of this year, Somalia introduced a new requirement obliging all travelers to Somalia, including passengers transiting through Somali airspace en route to Somaliland, to obtain an electronic visa before boarding their flights. Many observers viewed the move as financially driven, offering Mogadishu a new source of revenue while giving it practical control over who enters Somaliland via Mogadishu-controlled airspace.

As expected, the semi-autonomous federal member states of Jubbaland and Puntland rejected the new visa system outright. Puntland went even further by launching it is own e-visa platform. While Puntland’s and Jubbaland’s objections focused primarily on protecting their regional autonomy from federal overreach, Somaliland’s rejection carried a deeper political weight, the issue touched directly on it is claims to sovereignty and territorial independence.

From Somaliland’s perspective, the new requirement was yet another attempt by Mogadishu to assert authority over it is territory. Hargeisa responded swiftly, refusing to recognize the e-visa and insisting that it would continue it is long-standing visa-on-arrival policy at it is airports. It further instructed airlines to seek prior clearance for any flights passing through or landing in Somaliland, warning that carriers failing to comply would lose their commercial licenses.

In a startling development, Somalia’s electronic visa platform suffered a major security breach. The Immigration and Citizenship Agency confirmed that the system had been hacked, exposing the personal information of tens of thousands of applicants. Western governments, including the United States and the United Kingdom, issued travel warnings. The U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu estimated that the information of at least 35,000 applicants may have been compromised. For Somaliland, this was a political opportunity. Officials highlighted the breach as evidence of Mogadishu’s inability to handle critical national infrastructure or manage large-scale data systems.

Airports and air safety emerged as an additional concern. Commercial aircraft depend on reliable access to alternate airports for emergencies, repairs, or refueling. As tensions escalated between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, several airlines voiced serious alarm about operating in the disputed airspace, fearing it had become increasingly vulnerable to political and security disputes linked to sovereignty claims and, at times, economic interests.

In the end, the “visa war” and the related tensions over air travel mark a new chapter in the long-running sovereignty struggle between Hargeisa and Mogadishu — a conflict that shifts in form but remains constant at it is core. Control over the economy, foreign relations, airspace, ports, and airports has become part of a broader contest: Mogadishu’s effort to reinforce it is vision of a unified Somali state versus Somaliland’s attempt to consolidate it is de facto independence. As long as Somaliland remains committed to it is sovereignty, this confrontation is likely to persist.

What has become increasingly clear, however, is a pattern in which the federal government has politicized airspace management, using it as leverage for political objectives and invoking sovereignty to justify it is actions. Yet this approach carries consequences — political, and more importantly, economic — for the Somalia and Somaliland diasporas, who are often the most affected by these disruptions and who remain among the largest contributors to both economies.