“Mogadishu elections mark a setback, not a breakthrough” Samira Gaid

On December 24, Mogadishu held its first local elections in decades, a vote the government presented as a “historic milestone.” However, the election took place amid opposition boycotts and deep political disagreements over the entire process. Opposition leaders had urged President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to suspend the elections until consensus was reached on electoral procedures, warning that proceeding unilaterally would undermine the vote’s legitimacy. Those calls were rejected, and the federal government pressed ahead.

The decision was the result of a prolonged electoral impasse. Persistent disputes over electoral procedures, constitutional authority, and political legitimacy had stalled agreement on how elections should be conducted. By holding the vote, the government argued it was breaking an impasse, even as opposition groups continued to reject the process and questioned its legal and political legitimacy.

The roots of the standoff date back to May 27, 2023, when Somalia’s National Consultative Council (NCC) agreed on a roadmap toward nationwide elections. The plan envisioned district-level elections beginning in June 2024, followed by state parliamentary and presidential elections in November 2024. Political parties were to contest district polls, with the two parties winning the most council seats gaining recognition as national parties. Implementing this framework, however, required substantial amendments to Somalia’s provisional constitution — reforms that were never materialized.

At the core of the dispute lies a fundamental tension: the push toward “one-person, one-vote” and party-based elections collides with Somalia’s unfinished constitutional framework and long-standing power struggles between the federal government and the Federal Member States (FMSs). By March 30, 2024, disagreements over constitutional amendments, electoral timelines, and federal–state authority escalated into a full-blown constitutional crisis. The administration led by President Mohamud pushed through constitutional changes that critics said lacked broad consensus. These amendments plunged the country into political turmoil. Puntland withdrew its recognition of the Federal Government.

The crisis soon spilled into armed conflict. Jubbaland proceeded with its regional elections, in which President Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe” was re-elected. The federal government rejected the outcome, declaring the elections unconstitutional and issued an arrest warrant for Madobe. Jubbaland authorities responded by issuing retaliatory warrants against federal officials. The standoff triggered armed clashes and military mobilizations across parts of Jubbaland. Fighting was reported in both the Lower Juba and Gedo regions, including Ras Kamboni as well as districts such as Beled Hawo and Dolow. Local residents in Dolow also reported the involvement of Ethiopian troops stationed in the area.

On June this year, opposition forces had consolidated their challenge to the president. Under the umbrella of the Somali Salvation Forum, opposition leaders entered talks with President Mohamud over electoral models and constitutional amendments. Those negotiations ultimately collapsed without agreement. While the president later secured controversial deal with some opposition factions led by former prime minister Omer Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and partially reversed certain constitutional changes, core opposition figures rejected the arrangement.

This month, a major opposition bloc — bringing together leaders from opposition groups, Puntland, and Jubbaland — held a “National Consultative Conference” in Kismayo. The group accused President Mohamud of constitutional violations and unilateral decision-making, warning that delayed elections and increased centralization risk creating uncertainty in the country’s political order.

What stood out was the breadth of actors aligning against the presidency. Opposition leaders framed the standoff as a test not only of Somalia’s domestic political settlement but also of the international state-building model that has underpinned governance in Mogadishu for more than two decade, particularly the fight against Al-Shabaab, which they accused the government of abandoning. They warned of a parallel political process emerging outside the federal framework.

Despite these divisions, the government has presented the Mogadishu elections as a historic breakthrough. The vote received international media attention and public backing from regional and international partners, including IGAD, the African Union, and the European Union. Yet the process remains overshadowed by serious concerns regarding its legitimacy, inclusivity, constitutionality, and the manner in which it was conducted.

Geeska spoke with Samira Gaid, regional security analyst and founding director of Balqis insights, about the contentious nature of the elections, the questions surrounding their legitimacy, and what the current standoff means for Somalia as it approaches the planned 2026 national elections.

Mahbub M. Abdillahi: Now that the Mogadishu local elections have taken place despite widespread opposition rejection, how should this moment be understood from a political legitimacy standpoint? Is it a historic breakthrough, or a deeply contested exercise that risks undermining the very symbolism it seeks to project?

Samira Gaid: The Mogadishu local elections were not in any way a historic breakthrough. Rather than marking incremental progress in Somalia’s state-building journey, these elections represent a setback for those who have long argued that the process, imperfect as it has been, has been gradually improving over the past decade.

No observer expected Somalia’s first attempt at municipal elections to be flawless. However, there are basic democratic fundamentals that must be met for any electoral process to be deemed legitimate. This are inclusivity, transparency, fairness, and broad political buy-in. In the case of the Mogadishu municipal elections, each of these fundamentals were not merely overlooked but deliberately bypassed. This led to majority of the opposition in Mogadishu boycotting the elections. And just to be clear, this was not a situation where opposition actors chose to obstruct the process. On the contrary, they have all in different ways sought inclusion and meaningful participation, but the FGS has bought time with these highly political dialogue sessions and eventually excluded any legitimate opposition from the election. This process appears to have been deliberate and intentionally designed to predetermine outcomes and to engineer a new political landscape.

So in conclusion, instead of consolidating democratic norms or strengthening local governance, the elections will only serve to deepen mistrust and further fracture an already polarized society.

MA: President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud has stated that he remains open to dialogue, yet his administration proceeded with elections rejected by major opposition actors and two federal member states. Is the government using the Mogadishu elections as leverage to force negotiations on its own terms, or does this approach ultimately weaken the prospects for a genuine negotiated settlement?

SG: It remains unclear what the President ultimately intends, but the governing pattern of the past nearly four years offers important clues. His leadership style has been marked by a consistently bullish approach; pressing ahead with unilateral decisions even when cautioned by close advisers and a broad range of Somali stakeholders. This was most evident in the security offensives of 2023, that were ill-prepared for and ultimately unsuccessful, where strategic warnings were sidelined in favor of political momentum.

Also there is a deeply entrenched perception that has taken hold that the President speaks out of both sides of his mouth. Repeated calls for dialogue, followed by actions that effectively foreclose it through unilateral decision-making, have significantly eroded trust. This contradiction was on full display most recently, following calls for a national dialogue by the opposition and two Federal Member State leaders. The President publicly signaled openness to talks while simultaneously pushing ahead with the Mogadishu electoral process. These elections are widely understood as political leverage, his attempt to create faits accomplis that reshape the political terrain.

I expect the President will continue advancing his agenda regardless of opposition, and in the case presenting the Municipal “election” as a “success” to justify the next phase of his plans. We anticipate that this “success” is to be invoked as a precedent to seek an extension of his mandate, ostensibly to replicate this across other Federal Member States.

So yes, rather than strengthening the prospects for a genuine negotiated settlement, this approach will actively weaken prospects. Chances of a genuine negotiated settlement continue to narrow slim, especially with time running out on the current mandate.

MA: Somalia has repeatedly seen unilateral electoral initiatives descend into prolonged political stalemates, most notably in 2016–17 and 2020–22. Given President Mohamud’s experience with these electoral crises, what does pressing ahead under current conditions suggest about whether the administration has internalized the lessons of those past failures?

SG: In my view, the administration has internalized the wrong lessons from Somalia’s past electoral crises. Rather than drawing the lesson that unilateralism leads to paralysis, mistrust, and eventual breakdown as has been clearly demonstrated in previous electoral crises, the current leadership appears to have learned that it can push the envelope so long as it operates within the formal bounds of its mandate and retains international recognition.

They believe that political crises can be weathered, international partners can be reassured, and time can be bought until the next crisis. For me this is a fundamental misreading of Somalia’s political reality. International legitimacy and legal authority may provide short-term cover, but can never replace local legitimacy. Especially for a fragile state with unresolved grievances stretching back decades.

Pressing ahead to me suggests institutional hardening. Instead of correcting course, the administration is repeating a familiar cycle unilateral action, followed by polarization then erosion of trust. This approach has already lead to a further weakening of the already fragile norms around consensus-building, norms that have been essential in holding Somalia’s political system together.

MA: Despite the opposition’s rejection of the electoral process, registered political parties have participated. Does this participation confer legitimacy, or does it mask a fundamentally flawed and increasingly authoritarian process?

SG: Similar to what was witnessed in Tanzania, the main and official opposition were effectively locked out, and carefully selected and acceptable opposition were allowed in to simulate a competitive race. This needs partners and analysts to look beyond the surface. As increasingly many states are beginning to use democratic tools such as elections, party registration, and parliamentary procedures to entrench incumbent power. This deeper contextual understanding of the dynamics will be crucial if you are to assess the credibility and resilience of any electoral processes.

MA: During previous electoral deadlocks, international actors played a prominent, often decisive, role, sometimes accused of interference and at other times of imposing settlements. Why do we now see far less overt international pressure, despite what many describe as a deepening political crisis?

SG: Several factors explain this; things have changed globally and in the region. Globally internal matters seem to merit more attention, such as migration and rising living costs, and ongoing conflicts like the crisis in Ukraine. The Trump presidency and subsequent changes in defense priorities among Western actors have also diverted focus from conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Regionally, we also know of multipole crises, most recently in Ethiopia and now Sudan. Sudan represents the world worst humanitarian crisis, and yet international and regional actors are unable to garner unified approach and critical support. We can therefore no longer say, some countries are too large to fail or will automatically demand immediate attention. This global disorder is clearly evident in the Horn and is also being demonstrated by the international community’s restrained approach in Somalia. However, there is still time in this governments mandate and that also contributes to this restrained approach. This may change though if any unilateral extension is taken or if the governments mandate expires without political agreement on next steps.

MA: If the administration continues on its current trajectory, what are the most plausible political scenarios over the next 6 months? Is there still a viable political “off-ramp” that would allow Somalia to return to consensus-based politics, or are we approaching a point where institutional fragmentation becomes increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to reverse?

SG: To me it is more likely the latter. The most plausible scenario over the next six months points toward increasing institutional fragmentation rather than a return to consensus-based politics. Within the Somali political elite, divergent leadership styles and entrenched positions have made compromise unlikely. Many actors appear more inclined to dig in than to yield for the greater good. Further there are the persistent security challenges, particularly the al-Shabaab insurgency, contentious issues surrounding Somaliland recognition, and a shrinking global aid environment. All this doesn’t not bode well for Somalia as together these dynamics suggest a precarious outlook.