Michael DeAngelo: “Eritrea and the TPLF are likely strategically aligned”

In the days immediately preceding the outbreak of the Tigray war in November 2020, Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia’s long-serving foreign minister and a senior figure within the Tigrayan political establishment, uttered a sentence that trembled with foreboding. He lamented that “Isaias is now the mentor of Abiy.” Not long after, he would be dead, felled in the convulsions he had sensed approaching.

Among the more arresting accusations Mesfin voiced, later recounted by Tom Gardner in The Abiy Project, was that Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki opposed Ethiopia’s federal system and sought its undoing through alignment with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The remark distilled the dread of Tigrayan leaders who believed that a formidable axis had congealed against them, an axis bent on the remaking of the Ethiopian state itself. The subsequent course of the war appeared, in Tigrayan eyes, to validate those concerns.

Time, that most ironic of chroniclers, has since inverted the accusation. Today it is the government in Addis Ababa that charges Asmara with arming the very TPLF it once sought to annihilate. Yesterday’s accomplice is recast as today’s saboteur. Thus, do alliances in the Horn resemble desert rivers: they appear, they vanish, and they leave behind a changed terrain.

The fragile hush that settled over northern Ethiopia after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022 now frays at the edges. Since early February 2026, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has redeployed substantial forces from the Amhara and Oromia regions toward Tigray. This movement follows late-January reported clashes by the Tigray Forces (TDF) against ENDF units. These clashes represent the most significant escalation since the signing of the peace accord.

At the heart of this recrudescence lies the stillborn implementation of the accord. The TPLF and Tigrayan authorities contend that Addis Ababa has violated the agreement by permitting “hostile and invading armed forces” to remain on lands they deem constitutionally Tigrayan. The reference is to Amhara militias and, by persistent allegation, to Eritrean units whose shadow has never wholly withdrawn.

Meanwhile, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have grown increasingly strained. Once comrades against a common foe, Addis Ababa and Asmara now regard one another across a widening chasm. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of sustaining forces within Tigray and of fashioning a covert entente with the TPLF, an alliance of convenience stitched together by intelligence sharing and discreet materiel. Eritrea, for its part, dismisses these charges as fabrication and counters with its own indictment: that Ethiopia harbors designs upon Eritrean sovereignty and nurses ambitions along the Red Sea littoral.

Should conflict ignite anew, TPLF against federal center, Eritrea drawn openly into the mêlée, its trajectory would be perilously difficult to foresee, and its scale potentially calamitous. The crisis is no longer a domestic quarrel. It bears the aspect of a gathering proxy struggle, its vectors stretching from Addis Ababa to Asmara, from Cairo to Abu Dhabi.

Egypt, regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as an existential peril, has deepened ties with Eritrea and is rumored to seek strategic footholds along the coast. The Emirates maintain their partnership with Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia maneuvers to balance and hedge. In neighboring Sudan, these same constellations reappear in altered form, with external patrons backing rival forces in a war that has triggered one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

All this unfolds beneath the long shadow of the first Tigray war (2020–2022), a conflict of staggering human cost. Hundreds of thousands perished. Massacres scarred villages; hunger was wielded as an instrument; bodies and memories alike were broken. The world’s response was widely derided as a failure of vigilance and of will, blunted in part by a communication blackout that rendered suffering spectral, known, yet unseen.

Now the semblance of peace splinters. And history, which seldom repeats itself in identical measure, may yet return in more terrible guise.

Geeska speaks with Michael DeAngelo, Africa analyst at the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, on the developments in northern Ethiopia, the cracks in the Pretoria Peace Agreement, the prospect of interstate war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the yawning security vacuums in Amhara and Oromia, and the question of whether Ethiopia can endure conflict on multiple fronts at once

Mahbub M. Abdillahi: Reports indicate that the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) has redeployed significant forces from Amhara and Oromia toward Tigray. From both a military and political perspective, does this suggest the possibility of a renewed and potentially prolonged conflict in Tigray?

Michael DeAngelo: Yes, the scale of the ENDF’s buildup indicates that it will likely launch an offensive in Tigray. The ENDF has massed forces at multiple points across the Tigray border and deployed armored vehicles and heavy weaponry, which has come at a cost to the federal government due to advances by Fano militias in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia. The federal government may be tolerating these advances because it is planning on a short-term offensive to neutralize the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), although the Tigray Defense Forces’ (TDF’s) capabilities and Eritrea’s likely backing of the TPLF could lead to a prolonged conflict.

MA: Tigrayan authorities argue that the federal government has failed to fully implement key provisions of the Pretoria Agreement, particularly regarding displaced populations and disputed territories. There have also been reports of recent drone strikes and clashes in Tigray. To what extent does the renewed fear of conflict reflect shortcomings by both sides in implementing the Cessation of Hostilities agreement?

MD: Shortcomings from both the federal government and Tigrayan authorities in implementing the Pretoria peace agreement are driving the potential for renewed conflict. The federal government has not enforced a withdrawal of Amhara ethno-nationalist militias from disputed areas of Tigray, which the TPLF has cited as preventing the return of hundreds of thousands displaced Tigrayans, a key stipulation of the Pretoria agreement. The TDF has responded by slowing its mandated demobilization, and TDF and Tigray Interim Administration head Tadesse Worede stated that these outstanding issues led to the TDF’s offensive against the ENDF and Amhara militias in Tigray in late January 2026.

MA: Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has recently traced the deterioration in relations with Eritrea to alleged actions by Eritrean troops in Shire during the early phase of the Tigray war. Why is this acknowledgment emerging now, several years after the events in question?

MD: Acknowledging Eritrean atrocities gives the Ethiopian federal government a public justification to call for the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Tigray amid growing ties between Eritrea and the TPLF. Eritrea would likely support the TPLF in a conflict against the Ethiopian federal government in Tigray. The acknowledgement also takes attention off Ethiopia’s claim to sea access via Eritrea, which is controversial and a key source of tension between the two countries.

MA: Prime Minister Abiy has dismissed claims that rising tensions with Eritrea stem from Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. Yet Ethiopian officials continue to describe Red Sea access as “existential,” a characterization that Asmara views as provocative. How credible is the distinction between security tensions and Ethiopia’s stated ambitions for sea access?

MD: While Ethiopia’s exclusion of Eritrea from the Pretoria peace process ended the Eritrea-Ethiopia détente from 2018 to 2022, Ethiopian officials’ frequent claims to sea access via Eritrea substantially increased tensions in 2025. Eritrea ordered a nationwide military mobilization in February 2025, causing Ethiopia to mass forces in Afar, which borders the Eritrean region where the port of Assab is located. Inflammatory rhetoric between the two sides has continued over the sea access issue, and both have affirmed their military readiness in the case of an ensuing conflict.

MA: Historically, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean Defense Forces have been bitter adversaries. How plausible is the reported strategic alignment between them today? If Eritrea is indeed coordinating with or supporting the TPLF, what strategic advantages might President Isaias Afwerki seek to gain?

MD: Eritrea and the TPLF are likely strategically aligned. Eritrea’s and the TPLF’s deteriorating relations with the federal government have caused them to seek rapprochement with each other, and they have conducted high-level outreach since at least early 2025. Numerous reports have indicated that Eritrean security forces are supporting the TPLF in several capacities. Tigray could serve as a buffer zone for Eritrea, with Eritrea also wanting to keep Ethiopia fragmented and, therefore, less of a threat, particularly due to the Ethiopia’s desire for sea access via Eritrea.

MA: With Fano militias reportedly taking advantage of federal redeployments, can Ethiopia realistically sustain a multi-front conflict — involving tensions in Tigray, insurgency in Amhara, and potential confrontation with Eritrea? How does the expanding internal insurgency shape the federal government’s strategic calculations?

MD: The federal government would face serious constraints sustaining a multi-front conflict for a prolonged period. Ethiopian security forces are already struggling to manage the situations in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray, and conflict with the TPLF and potentially Eritrea would force the federal government to deprioritize other areas, creating security gaps. Thus, the federal government may view an offensive in Tigray as a short-term undertaking, which could explain why it is willing to sacrifice territory to Fano right now.

MA: Given previous allegations of mass atrocities by multiple parties during the Tigray war, what risks would renewed conflict pose to civilian populations? Is there still meaningful space for African Union–led mediation, or has the diplomatic window significantly narrowed?

MD: Renewed conflict would pose similar risks to civilians as the last Tigray war: ethnically-motivated atrocities, indiscriminate or even purposeful civilian targeting, mass displacement, and widespread acute food insecurity. The diplomatic window has significantly narrowed, as the federal government has not publicly taken up the African Union’s offer to mediate ongoing disputes. International pressure, including from key federal government backers Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, is likely the most effective way to prevent a conflict in the short-term.