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Politics

Making sense of Kenya’s diplomatic ambiguity in Sudan and the DRC

9 March, 2025
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Ruto
Kenya's President William Ruto attends the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council meeting, on the Situation in Sudan and DR Congo, at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa on February 14, 2025. (Photo by AMANUEL SILESHI/AFP via Getty Images)
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Kenya has sought to engage rebel groups and position itself as neutral in the conflicts between the DRC, Sudan, and their respective insurgencies. However, this strategy is increasingly frustrating its neighbours. 

Kenya has long established itself as a key player in regional diplomacy, leveraging its economic strength, military capabilities, and reputation for mediation to influence conflicts across Africa. Historically, Kenya has participated in United Nations missions in countries such as Croatia, Sierra Leone, a long-running AU mission in Somalia, and, most recently, Haiti. However, recent actions by Nairobi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan have raised concerns among its neighbours and international partners.  

Last week, Jim Risch, the chair of the US senate committee on foreign affairs, criticised Nairobi for hosting Sudanese rebels as they declared a “parallel government” in Sudan with their allies. In a post on X, the outspoken senator said Nairobi’s actions constituted an “unthinkable attempt to obscure the truth and will not end the massacre” in Sudan, despite Kenya claiming that it was aiding efforts to make peace and had no “ulterior motives”. 

Sudan’s foreign ministry reacted furiously, saying “this move promotes the dismembering of African states, violates their sovereignty and interferes in their internal affairs”. It added that hosting members of the RSF, who have been accused by the US of genocide in Darfur, “constitutes and endorsement of and complicity in these heinous crimes”. Sudan said that the conference was “tantamount to an act of hostility against the entire Sudanese people”. The move was also widely condemned by a range of actors, including several Middle Eastern, the US and its western allies and Uganda. 

The announcement of the parallel government by the RSF in Nairobi follows the establishment of the Congo River Alliance in the Kenyan capital at the end of 2023, a coalition of rebel groups, including the infamous Rwanda-backed M23 group, which has captured large parts of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in recent weeks. At the time Kenya similarly defended its decision, saying it is a democracy and therefore “cannot arrest anybody who has issued a statement,” even if that statement is an announcement by a group that seeks to endanger the national security of its neighbours.   

The two declarations have brought Kenya’s foreign policy into sharp focus, highlighting the country’s response—or lack thereof—as reflecting a controversial diplomatic stance. So, what drives Nairobi’s foreign policy decisions, and whose interests do they truly serve? 

Kenya has been actively engaged in the DRC crisis by deploying troops as part of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) ostensibly to stabilise the volatile eastern region. However, its involvement became more complicated when Nairobi appeared to disregard the regional consensus condemning the Congo River Alliance. While Congolese officials and other African nations called for a strong stance against the rebel group, Kenya has maintained an ambiguous position, favouring diplomatic engagement over outright condemnation.  

A senior Kenyan diplomat, who requested anonymity, suggests that this approach is motivated by economic and security interests. “Kenya has increasing investments in the DRC,” the source told Geeska, “and stability remains a priority, even when negotiated with non-state actors. We are not taking sides but are ensuring that our businesses and trade routes remain secure.” Indeed, Kenyan banks, telecom firms, and logistics companies have actively expanded into the Congolese market, establishing Kenya as a key stakeholder in the country’s future. 

Critics argue that this stance undermines multilateral efforts to stabilise the DRC. Congolese political leaders accuse Kenya of legitimising armed factions by engaging diplomatically with them instead of providing unequivocal support to Kinshasa, a fellow country in the East African Community, an eight-country regional bloc.  

A Congolese legislator, who requested anonymity to speak candidly about Nairobi’s decisions, blasted the Kenyan stance, saying: “This is not neutrality; this is opportunism”. 

Kenya’s stance is also shaped by its historical approach to conflict resolution. Unlike Rwanda and Uganda, which have faced accusations of direct military involvement in the DRC, Kenya has traditionally preferred mediation and diplomatic engagement. However, by not explicitly denouncing the CRA, Nairobi risks appearing to endorse the group tacitly, as its leaders frequently threaten to overthrow the government in Kinshasa, commit war crimes, including rape and displace hundreds of thousands of people.  

Unlike Rwanda and Uganda, which have faced accusations of direct military involvement in the DRC, Kenya has traditionally preferred mediation and diplomatic engagement. 

So, can all this be explained as Kenya simply hedging its bets, or is Nairobi systematically pursuing a foreign policy at odds with its neighbours? The outcome for officials in the DRC is the same either way.  

A similar pattern is evident in Sudan. While the international community has broadly condemned the RSF’s declaration of a parallel government, Kenya has refrained from adopting a hardline stance. President William Ruto has been vocal about pursuing peace talks but has avoided directly criticising the RSF's actions, which puts him among a very small group of countries now, including the RSF’s alleged backer, the United Arab Emirates.  

Kenya’s reluctance to condemn the RSF has been explained in much the same way, as being linked to its aim of maintaining neutrality so that it can aid peace talks. Nairobi does have a track record on this front, having hosted talks between the government of Omar al-Bashir and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in July 2002, which eventually laid the groundwork for South Sudan’s independence and ended 19 years of fighting. A senior security official noted: “Kenya sees itself as the primary peace broker. If it alienates any faction, it risks losing its influence over the process.” 

Kenya’s reluctance to condemn the RSF has been explained in much the same way, as being linked to its aim of maintaining neutrality so that it can aid peace talks. 

However, this strategy risks isolating Kenya from its regional allies and has actually made Kenya look like it has favoured the RSF, in the face of a growing consensus. Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Egypt have all taken a firmer stance against the RSF, and even Chad, which has been accused of tacitly supporting the RSF, is seeking ways to mend fences with Port Sudan. Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo, surprise visit to Kenya at the start of 2024 after attending the Kigali genocide memorial in Rwanda, might perhaps be viewed in a different light. “South Africa, Uganda, Djibouti, Rwanda and Ethiopia all greeted Hemedti warmly”, Al Jazeera journalist Mat Nashed, noted, “rolled out a red carpet for him.” 

While analyses of Kenya’s foreign policy often focus on regional aspects, the impact of global powers remains significant. In both the DRC and Sudan, major international actors have increased their involvement, sometimes in ways that contradict Kenya’s strategy. 

In the DRC, the United States and the European Union have largely supported President Félix Tshisekedi by providing military aid and diplomatic backing against rebel groups. Tshisekedi has even reportedly begun talks for a Ukraine style minerals deal with the Trump administration. However, countries like China and Russia have adopted a more complex strategy, engaging both Kinshasa and various armed factions to secure mineral concessions. For instance, China has made substantial investments in Congolese mining operations, while Russia has reportedly supplied private military contractors to multiple parties involved in the conflict. Kenya’s reluctance to take a firm stance on the CRA may be a strategy to navigate these competing global interests while maintaining its economic presence in the country. 

Meanwhile, the power struggle in Sudan involves a more intricate network of foreign actors. The RSF has reportedly received support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and, to some extent, Russia’s Wagner Group in the past, both of which have vested interests in Sudan’s gold reserves. In contrast, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have historically been backed by Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The United States and European powers have called for a ceasefire but have struggled to exert meaningful influence over the warring factions. 

Kenya’s neutrality—or strategic ambiguity—may arise from the understanding that openly supporting one side risks alienating essential international partners. By keeping lines of communication open with the RSF, Kenya avoids antagonising players like the UAE and Russia, which are gaining influence in Africa. Similarly, by not fully endorsing Kinshasa’s crackdown on rebel movements, Nairobi maintains its relationships with powers that perceive the DRC’s conflicts as opportunities rather than crises. 

This balancing act, however, is fraught with risks. If Kenya chooses to cater to external powers instead of aligning with the African consensus, it may encounter diplomatic backlash. Furthermore, if global rivalries escalate into proxy conflicts in the DRC and Sudan, Kenya’s capacity to remain a neutral broker could be considerably tested. Sometimes not picking a side can be viewed as picking a side.  

If Kenya chooses to cater to external powers instead of aligning with the African consensus, it may encounter diplomatic backlash. 

Kenya's apparent indifference to the concerns of its African neighbours poses significant risks. If Nairobi persists in engaging with controversial factions while other African nations push for unified action, it may find itself diplomatically isolated. The cost of not paying close enough attention to its African partners was seen at the AU commission chair election, where Kenya’s candidate, Raila Odinga, was defeated by Djibouti’s foreign minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf.  

If Kenya seeks to maintain its status as a key regional power, it must navigate these challenges carefully. A more transparent foreign policy that reassures its neighbours while protecting its strategic interests may be vital in preventing diplomatic isolation. As regional conflicts evolve and global powers ramp up their involvement, Kenya’s capacity to adapt its position will determine whether it continues to be a credible peace broker or risks alienating itself from the very alliances it seeks to be part of. 

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