A just cause, a troubling recognition

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on 26 December 2025 marked a decisive turning point in Hargeisa’s more than three-decade quest for international recognition. By becoming the first United Nations member state to recognise Somaliland as an “independent and sovereign state,” Israel transformed an issue long treated primarily as a domestic issue for Somalis to resolve among themselves into a new geopolitical quagmire. Somaliland’s ruling Waddani party and the wider public celebrated the decision as an unprecedented diplomatic breakthrough, following years of engagement with international and regional powers whose cooperation had consistently fallen short of formal recognition.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the decision had been made in the “spirit of the Abraham Accords” and announced plans for immediate cooperation in agriculture, health, technology and the economy. Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro also expressed his government’s intention to join the Abraham Accords. From the outset, therefore, the relationship placed Somaliland’s campaign for recognition within the broader architecture of Arab–Israeli normalisation and Israel’s evolving strategic calculations in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Relations subsequently moved rapidly from symbolic recognition towards the institutionalisation of a broader bilateral partnership. On 6 January 2026, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar visited Hargeisa, where the two sides discussed diplomatic representation and expanded cooperation. Both governments later appointed ambassadors. During an official visit to Israel on 15 June, President Irro opened Somaliland’s embassy in Jerusalem and met Netanyahu. The two leaders also signed a “Strategic Joint Declaration of Cooperation” intended to establish a long-term framework for collaboration in security, investment, technology, agriculture, water management, infrastructure and economic development, while strengthening diplomatic and commercial engagement.

The significance of these developments lies partly in how they have reframed the Somaliland question. Since declaring the restoration of its independence in 1991, Hargeisa has grounded its international case in its historical experience as the former British Somaliland protectorate, its brief period of independence in June 1960, the existence of functioning governing institutions, its record of relative stability and elections, and its political trajectory following the collapse of Somalia’s central government. Its relationship with Israel, however, has placed that argument within a substantially different geopolitical context -- one shaped by the Abraham Accords, the security of Red Sea shipping, the confrontation with the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen, and intensifying competition over ports, military access and maritime corridors. Somaliland’s Gulf of Aden coastline, the Port of Berbera and its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have consequently acquired greater significance as potential assets within a regional security architecture extending far beyond Somaliland’s original demand for diplomatic recognition.

Yet beneath the Somaliland government’s celebratory account of the relationship lie sizeable and sometimes contradictory political dynamics. For Hargeisa, cooperation with Israel offers diplomatic breakthrough and the possibility that other states may eventually follow Israel’s lead. At the same time, it risks tying Somaliland’s recognition campaign to divisive Middle Eastern conflicts and has intensified opposition from Somalia, the African Union and numerous Arab, African and Muslim-majority states. For Israel, Somaliland offers a strategically positioned partner close to Yemen and some of the world’s most important maritime routes, but an Israeli presence could sharpen existing rivalries and expose Somaliland to new political and security pressures. The partnership must therefore be understood not simply as a diplomatic breakthrough, but as the product of converging yet unequal interests whose consequences may reshape Somaliland’s international position and the wider balance of power in the region.

Why does Somaliland seek recognition?

Somaliland occupies an ambiguous position within the international system. It performs most of the functions of a state within its borders but does not possess the legal standing conferred by international recognition. Since declaring the restoration of Somaliland’s independence in 1991, Hargeisa has established executive, legislative, and judicial institutions; held periodic elections; developed security and administrative bodies independent of Mogadishu; and maintained relative stability, in contrast to Mogadishu, which has struggled to recover since the collapse of the central state.

Over the following decades, Somaliland accumulated the foundations of domestic governance that gave its narrative a measure of credibility. It developed an electoral system that produced more than one transfer of power. Irro’s victory in the November 2024 elections and the subsequent transfer of power reinforced Hargeisa’s narrative regarding its ability to manage political competition peacefully. It also used its official relationship with Taiwan and its growing ties with Western circles to present itself as a relatively stable and democratic partner against Chinese influence in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, this experience continues to face challenges relating to the postponement of certain electoral processes, disparities in political representation, and the dispute over the eastern regions. These factors limit efforts to portray Somaliland as a fully developed model of democratic statehood.

The distinctiveness of Somaliland’s case also found resonance within the African Union. In 2005, an African Union fact-finding mission noted that Somaliland’s history and the circumstances of its union with Somalia distinguished it from other African separatist cases. It concluded that treating Somaliland as a special case would not necessarily open the door to the disintegration of the continent’s borders. That assessment, however, remained diagnostic and did not lead to an institutional review of the Union’s position or decisions. The principle of respecting the borders inherited from colonialism, as established in the 1964 Cairo Resolution and the Constitutive Act of the African Union, remained influential, together with the existing international recognition of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Consequently, Hargeisa continued to uphold the borders of the former British protectorate as the basis of its claim, while the same principle was used to affirm the unity of internationally recognised Somalia.

In this context, Somaliland represents a model of a de facto state. It possesses considerable administrative and security capacity, while its external sovereignty remains suspended. Robert Jackson’s concept of “quasi-states” illuminates this paradox in reverse. Jackson examined states that possess recognition and legal sovereignty despite their limited governing capacity, whereas Somaliland represents a case of domestic effectiveness without equivalent legal acceptance. Its situation demonstrates that statehood within the international system is produced through an interaction between institutional capacity and external recognition and is not derived from either one in isolation.

This gap has direct practical consequences. Hargeisa administers taxation, education, airports, security, and elections, yet it remains unable to join the United Nations or international financial institutions. It also faces restrictions on borrowing, attracting investment, concluding agreements, and protecting its interests abroad. All of this has made recognition a consistent objective of successive governments. It has given any offer to break Somaliland’s isolation a political value extending beyond the substance of the bilateral relationship itself. It has also fostered a local sense that the international community benefits from Somaliland’s stability and its security and economic cooperation without granting Hargeisa the sovereign recognition it demands in return.

The recognition dilemma arises from this disparity between what Somaliland possesses domestically and what it lacks internationally. Hargeisa views recognition as a settlement of a status that has remained unresolved for too long, while Mogadishu and the African Union approach it from the perspective of state unity and the potential precedent it would create within the regional order.

It is precisely from this perspective that the paradox of the Israeli step becomes apparent. It broke Somaliland’s isolation, but it came from outside the African process and within a context associated with normalisation and the securitisation of the Red Sea. Recognition thus returned the Somaliland question to the international agenda while simultaneously burdening it with political and security considerations that may complicate its transition from de facto statehood to recognised legitimacy.

The dichotomy between secession and self-determination

International recognition lies at the intersection of legal rules and political decision-making. Possessing a population, a territory and an authority capable of administering public affairs provides an entity with the practical attributes of statehood. Its full integration into the international system, however, depends on acceptance by states and regional organisations. Somaliland’s situation therefore reveals a gap between the domestic effectiveness it has accumulated since 1991 and the external legitimacy that remains governed by the positions of Mogadishu and the African Union, as well as by calculations concerning stability in the Horn of Africa.

The law of recognition reflects this duality. The declaratory approach considers recognition an acknowledgement that an entity has already fulfilled the factual requirements of statehood. The constitutive approach, by contrast, regards recognition as a gateway through which an entity acquires international legal standing and exercises the rights associated with it. International practice combines the two approaches. Institutional effectiveness gives an entity a foundation upon which to demand recognition, but its impact remains limited unless accompanied by broader political acceptance. James Crawford consequently links the emergence of statehood to territorial integrity, the effectiveness of governing authority, the legitimacy of an entity’s formation and the positions of international actors.

The criteria set out in the Montevideo Convention demonstrate the limitations of relying solely on institutional reality. Somaliland has a permanent population, a governing authority, a practical capacity to conduct foreign relations and a territorial claim based on the former borders of the British protectorate. However, the dispute over the eastern regions, the Somalia government’s opposition and the absence of broad African acceptance mean that these elements remain matters of legal and political argument rather than components of a technical test that automatically produces statehood. Membership in the international community derives, to a considerable degree, from mutual recognition and the willingness of relevant actors to accept the territorial consequences arising from it.

This is connected to the principle of self-determination, which recognises the right of peoples to determine their political status without granting every group a general right to secede. Conventional legal doctrine has distinguished between internal self-determination, associated with participation, representation and the protection of rights within a state, and external self-determination, which may lead to independence under exceptional circumstances such as colonialism, occupation or the systematic denial of rights. In its 2010 advisory opinion on Kosovo, the International Court of Justice found that general international law did not prohibit a declaration of independence in itself. It did not, however, derive from this finding a general right to secession or impose an obligation on states to grant recognition.

Somaliland draws on this debate by invoking the violence committed during the final years of Siad Barre’s rule, the Somali union’s failure to produce an inclusive state and the uninterrupted existence of its independent institutions for more than three decades. Transforming these facts into a complete legal entitlement, however, requires convincing African states that Somaliland’s case is exceptional and that resolving it would not create a precedent that threatens the continent’s territorial order. The importance of the African Union becomes clear in this context. Recognition in a disputed case acquires stability through an entity’s ability to integrate into its regional environment, not merely through the number of individual recognitions it receives, which might, at best, place it on a trajectory comparable to Kosovo’s.

Somaliland’s claim consequently rests on three interconnected elements: its capacity to govern, the strength of its legal case, regional integration, and international recognition. It has made clear progress regarding the first and accumulated substantial material in support of the second, while the third remains its weakest link. Israeli recognition establishes an official diplomatic relationship with Hargeisa, but it does not resolve the dilemma of African acceptance. Instead, it has added considerations relating to the occupation of Palestine, the Red Sea and regional competition to the issue.

It is therefore important to examine the motives behind Israeli recognition and the context in which it occurred. Its consequences cannot be understood through its legal formulation alone but must also be assessed in relation to the political and security functions it serves.

The motives behind Israeli recognition and its regional context

Israeli recognition of Somaliland is difficult to interpret as a purely principled act. Israel, which denies the Palestinian people their right to self-determination, does not appear to be seeking to establish a general principle in this case. Rather, it seems driven by calculations relating to security, location and regional repositioning. Recognition should therefore not be understood as a legal response to Somaliland’s claim, but as an intersection between Hargeisa’s need to break its isolation and Israel’s desire to expand its presence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Domestic changes in Somaliland and Somalia, alongside an intensifying regional confrontation over Bab al-Mandab, ports and maritime influence, created the conditions for this convergence.

1. Leadership change in Hargeisa and the deadlock with Mogadishu

Israeli contacts with Somaliland had continued for years before recognition, but gained new momentum after Irro assumed the presidency. The new administration adopted an approach more willing to convert Somaliland’s geographical position and its security and economic cooperation into bargaining instruments in its pursuit of recognition. Reports concerning the negotiations indicate that Hargeisa approached a large number of states and offered strategic partnerships in exchange for recognition. Israel was the party most willing to convert this bargain into a formal decision.

This shift reflects the influence of leadership on the formulation of foreign policy. Former president Muse Bihi Abdi adopted a more cautious position towards Israel because of concerns about the domestic and regional cost. Irro, by contrast, treated recognition as a sovereign priority that justified rapid engagement with whichever party was prepared to provide it.

The change coincided with a persistent deadlock in relations between Hargeisa and Mogadishu. In the eyes of Somaliland’s leadership, this impasse weakened the value of dialogue and pushed it to seek an external breakthrough that bypassed Mogadishu. The Israeli step, meanwhile, came at a time when the federal government was confronting a complex political and security crisis involving disputes over the constitution and elections, a rupture in relations with Puntland and Jubaland, and the continuing threat posed by al-Shabaab.

The weakness of the centre supplied further material for Hargeisa’s narrative about the failure of the union. At the same time, it gave Mogadishu an opportunity to reframe the dispute as a defence of national sovereignty against foreign intervention. The fragility of the Somalia’s state therefore operated in two opposing directions. On the one hand, it reinforced Somaliland’s arguments. On the other, it heightened regional concerns about deepening fragmentation in the region.

2. An Israeli attempt to encircle the Houthis

Irro’s visit to Israel marked a transition from diplomatic recognition to a broader partnership. He opened Somaliland’s embassy in Jerusalem. The choice of Jerusalem gave the visit significance extending beyond diplomatic representation, placing Somaliland at the centre of one of the most sensitive aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Although the decision has sparked domestic uproar, some opposition parties -- including the Kaah Party -- have come forward to oppose the opening of an embassy in Jerusalem. The Irro administration, however, has defended its decision.

However, the security dimension was clearly reflected in the composition of the delegation, which included military and security officials, as well as in the visit’s outcomes. Somaliland’s defence minister confirmed that Israel had begun training members of the military and police. The failure to publish the full text of the strategic declaration makes it difficult to assess the parties’ reciprocal commitments. The publicly announced areas of cooperation are broad, but there is insufficient clarity regarding implementation mechanisms, the guarantees obtained by Hargeisa, the extent of parliamentary oversight or the nature of the security obligations.

The relationship also reveals a structural imbalance in negotiating power. Israel enters the partnership as an advanced state possessing technology, financing and security expertise, while Somaliland depends on it as the only state that has formally broken its isolation. This disparity gives Israel greater scope to determine the priorities and conditions of cooperation.

Somaliland’s value to Israel becomes clear when Berbera’s location is considered. The city overlooks the Gulf of Aden, opposite Yemen and near Bab al-Mandab, which connects the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Since the Houthis linked their maritime attacks to the war on Gaza in late 2023, activity at the Port of Eilat has declined, shipping and insurance costs have risen, and the vulnerability of Israel’s southern maritime outlet has been exposed. As the confrontation with Iran and its allies expanded, the African shore opposite Yemen gained increasing importance for surveillance, and logistical support.

These developments could transform Berbera into a surveillance location within Israel’s strategic calculations and regional security architecture. Reports point to a visit by an Israeli security team before recognition, the training of members of Somaliland’s special forces, military-related development work at the airport, and inspections of coastal sites west of the city that could be used for surveillance or forward operations. These indications do not provide definitive evidence that an Israeli base is being established, but they demonstrate that the security dimension has been present since the early stages of the relationship.

The threats issued by the Houthis and al-Shabaab increase the potential cost of this shift. The Houthis announced that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be treated as a military target, while al-Shabaab threatened to resist the use of Somaliland’s territory by Israel. Even if such statements remain primarily political deterrence, they affect the broader risk environment, particularly given Somaliland’s limited air-defence capabilities. They may also affect insurance, shipping and investment, transforming Berbera from a development asset into an exposed point within a conflict whose scope and timing Hargeisa cannot control.

Irro’s visit consequently revealed a change in the nature of the bargain. Somaliland obtained recognition, training and promises of investment, while Israel gains a new regional partner, a location near Yemen and Bab al-Mandab, and a security entry point into the Horn of Africa. This arrangement gives Hargeisa greater prominence in regional calculations, but simultaneously links it to Israel’s conflicts with the Houthis and Iran without guaranteeing that international recognition of Somaliland will expand.

3. Regional competition in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland occurred within a space in which several powers compete over ports, influence and maritime sovereignty. Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland in January 2024 that would provide it with access to the sea, and Hargeisa linked the agreement to the possibility of recognition. The Ankara Declaration between Ethiopia and Somalia subsequently reduced the level of tension without resolving Addis Ababa’s need for maritime access or the future of its relationship with Berbera.

Israeli recognition placed Ethiopia in a delicate position. It understands Somaliland’s strategic value, but, unlike Israel, must take into account the direct cost of granting recognition outside the African Union framework and the effect this would have on its relationship with Mogadishu. It has therefore maintained official silence thus far.

Turkey, meanwhile, has built a model of influence in Somalia that combines military and economic engagement. Its presence includes a training base in Mogadishu, support for Somali’s armed forces, the management of projects and facilities involving ports and airports, and expanded offshore oil and gas exploration. From this perspective, Somalia’s unity provides the legal and political foundation for Ankara’s influence, while Israel’s entry into Somaliland is interpreted as direct competition within an area Turkey considers part of its vital African sphere.

The United Arab Emirates is also present through DP World’s investments in Berbera and a broader network of ports across the Horn of Africa. Disagreements between the UAE and the federal government have revealed the limits of Mogadishu’s ability to impose a unified foreign policy, as Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland have maintained their relations with Abu Dhabi. The Emirati role connects Berbera to broader competition over ports and maritime corridors, as well as to influence networks extending into the Red Sea and the war in Sudan. Within this context, Israeli rapprochement with Hargeisa benefits from an existing regional structure in which the interests of Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv intersect around ports and maritime security.

This regional map demonstrates that Israeli recognition has renewed attention to the Somaliland question. Berbera has become a point of intersection between Ethiopia’s need for access to the sea, Emirati influence over ports, Turkey’s commitment to Somalia’s unity, the calculations of the United States and Britain, and Israel’s attempt to monitor the shore opposite Yemen.

Consequently, the legal question of self-determination has become less central than another question concerning Somaliland’s function within regional security and influence arrangements. This transformation partly explains the intensity of the regional opposition that followed recognition, as the decision was interpreted as altering the balance of power in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Regional rejection and its consequences

Israeli recognition has not, thus far, produced the wave of international recognitions that Hargeisa had hoped for. On the contrary, it provoked a countervailing regional and international response that exposed the limits of its practical impact. The chairperson of the African Union Commission rejected the decision, affirming that Somaliland remained part of the Federal Republic of Somalia and that any infringement upon Somalia’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity was incompatible with the principles of the African Union.

The United Nations Security Council also reaffirmed this framework. During the meeting held following recognition, numerous parties emphasised Somalia’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. Britain reiterated its support for Somalia’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Israeli recognition therefore appeared to be an isolated event without the capacity to transform the prevailing international position. Even the United States, despite its close alliance with Israel and the existence of domestic voices supportive of Somaliland, clarified that its “One Somalia” policy had not changed.

The positions adopted by European states involved in Somalia reflected the same logic. The European group acknowledged the importance of continuing development, humanitarian and security cooperation with Somaliland, but confirmed its preference for maintaining relations at a level below recognition. This approach enables these states to benefit from cooperation with Hargeisa without bearing the legal and political cost in their relations with Mogadishu and the African Union. It is therefore clear that Israel’s decision failed to transform recognition from an individual act into an expandable international dynamic.

Opposition broadened following the announcement that Somaliland would open an embassy in Jerusalem. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League and a number of Arab and Muslim states condemned the step, describing it as illegal and a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and relevant resolutions It allowed Mogadishu to combine the language of national sovereignty with regional mobilisation, a capacity demonstrated by protests in the capital and other cities.

Mogadishu benefited diplomatically from this transformation by reframing the dispute as a matter of sovereignty and foreign intervention. This reduced pressure on it to discuss the failure of dialogue with Hargeisa or address the historical grievances upon which Somaliland bases its claim.

Nevertheless, the federal government remains constrained by its internal crises, its strained relations with some federal member states and its limited security capacity. This fragility does not necessarily push international powers to support Somaliland’s separation. Instead, it may reinforce their commitment to Somalia’s unity out of concern that fragmentation in the Horn of Africa could deepen.

Israeli recognition has ultimately raised the political cost for states that might otherwise view Somaliland’s experience favourably. Any future recognition will be interpreted in light of the African Union’s position and competition over the Red Sea. A state considering recognition is therefore no longer making a decision solely about the particularities of Somaliland’s case, but about a broader package of regional and diplomatic consequences. Israeli recognition has consequently remained an isolated breakthrough with limited ability to generate cumulative regional or international acceptance.

The cost to Somaliland of aligning with an occupying power

The most sensitive aspect of Israel’s recognition lies in the moral contradiction it creates for Somaliland’s case. Hargeisa grounds its claim to recognition in the right to self-determination, the memory of violence inflicted by the central state, and the failure of the post-independence Somali state. Yet recognition has come from a state whose continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was found by the International Court of Justice, in its 2024 advisory opinion, to be unlawful, and whose presence the Court linked to the violation of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.

This contradiction is intensified by the war in Gaza and the growing body of accusations concerning Israel’s conduct of the conflict. South Africa’s case before the International Court of Justice, the provisional measures ordered by the Court, and the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court for Israeli officials have made relations between Israel and Arab or Muslim actors subject to heightened moral and political costs. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland therefore came at a time when the Palestinian question had become central to a broader global debate over the right to self-determination and Israel’s status as an occupying power.

This has also generated domestic debate within Somaliland. Some voices have argued that celebrating Israeli recognition in the context of the genocide in Gaza undermines the moral consistency of Somaliland’s quest for self-determination. Somaliland’s case rests on the argument that its population was subjected to violence by the central state, that the Somali union lost its political and moral foundations, and that Hargeisa has built functioning institutions of government and developed an independent political will since 1991.

The strength of this argument, however, depends on its consistency. If self-determination forms the basis of Somaliland’s claim to recognition, disregarding the same principle in the Palestinian case weakens Somaliland’s ability to present its cause as one of universal significance rather than as a selective claim pursued primarily for unilateral benefit.

Military cooperation with Israel, should it expand, would make the cost more tangible. The presence of experts, surveillance arrangements or logistical facilities associated with Israel would increase the risk of Houthi attacks, affect the calculations of insurance, shipping and investment companies, and allow armed groups such as al-Shabaab to exploit anti-Israel rhetoric in their propaganda against Hargeisa. Somaliland could therefore move from seeking recognition and investment into a dangerous security environment because it has become involved in conflicts beyond the requirements of its own national security.

Three possible scenarios emerge. The first is that Israeli recognition remains isolated and becomes a limited symbolic achievement that does not change Somaliland’s legal status. This is highly likely, given that no other state followed Israel within seven months, indicating that the cost of recognition has risen for states that had previously remained undecided.

The second possibility is that recognition develops into a deeper security relationship that provides Hargeisa with certain technical or security benefits but draws it into Red Sea conflicts involving actors hostile to Israel.

The third possibility would be the least costly, but also the most difficult. It would require Hargeisa to recenter its African and legal arguments and demonstrate that its claim rests neither on securitisation nor on geopolitical bargaining, but on a distinct historical and political case that merits resolution on its own terms. If Israeli recognition becomes Somaliland’s principal route to international legitimacy, the path toward broader recognition may narrow, imposing costs that outweigh the benefits.

Somaliland may have succeeded in breaking its isolation from formal recognition and returning its case to international debate after decades of being treated as an unresolved de facto reality. Nevertheless, this remains a largely symbolic and limited achievement. It neither alters Somaliland’s position within international institutions nor persuades other states to recognise it. The process also carries significant political, moral, and security costs. It has increasingly framed Somaliland as a potential component of Israel’s Red Sea strategy, while diminishing the prominence of Somaliland’s historical and legal distinctiveness in regional debate. It has also deepened reservations among the African Union and Arab and Muslim states, while generating domestic debate over Palestine’s place in local political consciousness as a question of occupation and self-determination.

Any expansion of security cooperation would also risk turning Berbera and Somaliland’s coastline into exposed arenas in the wider conflict involving the Houthis, Iran, and Israel. Such a development could burden Hargeisa with adversaries and confrontations far beyond its political and military capabilities.