Wednesday 19 February 2025
Somalia’s federal government and Jubaland state have issued arrest warrants for each other’s leaders, turning their power struggle into a bizarre legal drama. The Banadir Regional Court in Mogadishu has charged Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe with treason and collusion with foreign entities, while Jubaland’s judiciary has countered by accusing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of corruption and constitutional violations.
These unprecedented legal manoeuvres underscore the deepening rift between Mogadishu and Kismayo, highlighting the challenges Somalia faces in balancing federal authority with regional autonomy amid persistent security threats and clan-based competition. Jubaland, strategically located in southern Somalia, borders Kenya and Ethiopia and encompasses the vital port city of Kismayo. Its geopolitical significance and status as a gateway for trade have made it a focal point in Somalia’s political landscape.
However, the region has also become a battleground for influence, with its leadership almost always at odds with whoever sits in Villa Somalia these days, whether former president Farmaajo or the incumbent, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Ahmed Madobe has traditionally manoeuvred to maximise his autonomy and has guarded this to the detriment of his relationship with the federal government, whilst federal leaders have sought to rein him in, along with the leaders of other federal states.
However, the region has also become a battleground for influence, with its leadership almost always at odds with whoever sits in Villa Somalia these days, whether former president Farmaajo or the incumbent, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
The current standoff arises from the design and conduct of Somalia’s 2026 regional, parliamentary, and presidential elections.
In what appears to be a departure from the previous clan-based indirect electoral system, President Mohamud has pledged to organise a universal suffrage vote, referred to as ‘one-person, one-vote’ (1P1V), which would be the first of its kind in Somalia since 1967 when Abdirashid Shermarke defeated Aden Abdulle Osman. When a motion was passed to change the voting system last summer, Farhan Jimale, a spokesperson for the federal government said [this] “will give the citizens the power to vote and elect for the first time after 55 years. It is a historic day”.
The task of arranging the new elections started with Provisional Constitution changes, with three election-related bills already passed by the federal parliament: the Elections Bill, the Political Parties and Organizations Bill, and the Independent National Electoral and Boundaries Commission (INEBC).
The amendments also extended the term of government bodies from four to five years and introduced a president-appointed prime minister, eliminating the requirement for parliamentary approval. This was done with a view to unify the electoral timelines of both the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS). Therefore, the mandates of some of the FMS leaders have been extended until 2025. The new timelines are June and September 2025 for local council elections and MPs and FMS leaders elections respectively.
The move has faced significant resistance. Abdi Ismail Samatar, a prominent Somali academic and senator, has blasted the changes calling them a “regressive historical milestone” for the country. Puntland has decided to go it alone, breaking with the federal government and accusing it of threatening “national unity” by concentrating power in Mogadishu.
Leading opposition figures, including Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former president and leader of the Himilo Qaran party; Hassan Ali Kheyre, former prime minister; and Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, leader of the Wadajir party, have rejected the proposed universal suffrage system and the term extension for FMS leaders. In a joint statement in October 2024, the leaders accused President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of “using the right term of ‘one person, one vote’, but instead seeking an extension of his own term, a tactic that failed his predecessor and which he himself had previously rejected.”
Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo also opposed the changes in a separate statement, saying: “The type and nature of the electoral commission nominated by the FGS demonstrates President Hassan Sheikh’s dangerous ambition to disregard the political situation in the country, the importance of political stability and a credible electoral system, and the participation of all political leaders.”
President Farmaajo faced similar pushback from Jubaland and Puntland when he attempted to extend his mandate to hold universal suffrage elections and later struggled to organise even an indirect vote, as the leaders in Garowe and Kismayo collaborated with senior opposition figures in Mogadishu, including Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in opposition to Farmaajo. Their alliance was instrumental in orchestrating Farmaajo’s ousting. The similarities to today are uncanny.
President Farmaajo faced similar pushback from Jubaland and Puntland when he attempted to extend his mandate to hold universal suffrage elections and later struggled to organise even an indirect vote, as the leaders in Garowe and Kismayo collaborated with senior opposition figures in Mogadishu, including Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in opposition to Farmaajo.
Back then, like now, the federal government also rejected election results in Jubaland which handed Madobe another mandate to rule. Farmaajo declared it void in 2019 & HSM declared Madobe’s re-election for a third term illegal last year. Prime minister Hamza Abdi Barre who hails from Jubaland and once a political ally of Madobe, lambasted the region’s leader for “abducting the people of Jubaland politically, economically and security-wise” declaring that the FGS wanted to rescue them from the grip of Madobe.
Madobe had been on board for much of the process to change the election system, which began in May 2023, especially regarding the term extension. But he refused the oversight of the INEBC for regional and national elections, citing concerns that the body had nominated figures who would compromise its impartiality.
In October 2024, as a result, Madobe abandoned the National Consultative Council, a forum that unites the FGS and FMS leaders. Instead, Madobe insisted that: 1) FMS leaders whose terms have expired should not have their terms extended to align FGS-FMS election timelines; 2) direct elections remain impossible due to logistical and security issues; and 3) the semi-autonomous Puntland region should be included in the election decision-making process.
Citizens have expressed concerns that the changes could lead to increased violence and instability, particularly in regions already affected by the al-Shabaab insurgency. Diriye Ga’al Olad, a traditional clan elder in Mogadishu, stated: “We fear that these constitutional changes will only bring more violence to our streets.”
“Madobe has organised a one-man show election, which was neither fair nor free. He has been ruling us for many years and has now crowned himself as the king of Jubaland. That is not good at all,” remarked Guure Abdalla, a resident of Kismayo, the capital of Jubaland.
“Jubaland is not against the FGS, the national constitution, or the unity of the country. It rejects unconstitutional demands by the President and Prime Minister Hamza, such as excluding elections, and not involving Somaliland, Puntland, or SSC-Khaatumo. That is the source of the problem,” said Ali Hersi Roble, another clan elder in Garowe, the capital of Puntland.
In May 2022, the newly elected president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud had a meeting with Ahmed Madobe, a key supporter of his presidential bid when he went toe-to-toe with Farmaajo. Mohamud thanked Madobe and the other FMS leaders for helping to hold the election on time. The atmosphere was reportedly cordial, but it wouldn’t be long before their relationship broke down, as the structural issues that had long hampered Kismayo’s relationship with Mogadishu resurfaced once more.
Madobe, a former warlord, has been at the helm of Jubaland since 2013, when the state was established as a buffer zone to shield Kenya from the worst of al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia. In many respects, Madobe was an early Jolani: he rebranded himself from an Islamist militant into someone the international community could engage with. Le Monde described him as a “respectable jihadist.”
All of this occurred during Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s first presidency. In his inaugural speech following Madobe’s election in 2013, HSM appealed to the people of Jubaland to support the federal government as the sole legitimate representative of the Somali people. But he was attempting to rein in a man who was being praised for having driven al-Shabaab out of Kismayo with Kenya’s support and was enjoying considerable legitimacy as a result of that, as well as having established what appeared then to be a new administration. Jubaland went from having five leaders to one. Veronique Lorenzo, a former EU ambassador to Somalia, told Le Monde: “On a small scale, he showed that solutions could be found, that it was possible to break the cycle of hopelessness and attacks, and to rebuild a state. For us, he’s a real source of hope.”
But he was attempting to rein in a man who was being praised for having driven al-Shabaab out of Kismayo with Kenya’s support and was enjoying considerable legitimacy as a result of that, as well as having established what appeared then to be a new administration.
When asked about his connection to Somali jihadist movements, like Jolani, Madobe said he was young and had the added excuse that his brother-in-law, Hassan al-Turki, was one of the pioneers of Somali jihadism.
Back then, HSM wanted him out and was uncomfortable with Madobe’s close relationship with Addis Ababa and, more importantly, Nairobi. “There is a group in Kismayo who make unilateral decisions by their own, they are Somalis of course, they have views, we respect their views as they see it, but one thing that is very important in Somalia, today, there is only the federal Somali government, which is wholly owned by the Somali people,” HSM said in 2013. The New Statesman, a progressive British political magazine, went with the headline: Ethiopia and Kenya help dismember Somalia. Martin Plaut, the article’s author wrote: “In reality it is now outside Mogadishu’s control – just like those other fragments of Somalia, including Puntland, Galmadug and the self-declared independent state of Somaliland.” It has remained so since. Even the US was concerned, with Barack Obama’s most senior Africa official, Jonnie Carsons, reportedly saying Jubaland raised “more questions than it answers.”
HSM managed the issue pragmatically, in August 2013 he reconciled with Madobe and formalised Jubaland’s status as a federal state of Somalia in an attempt to draw toward Mogadishu rather than Nairobi. The so-called Addis Agreement, because it was brokered by Hailemariam Desalegn in the Ethiopian capital, paved the way forward. “After initial hesitation, the FGS demonstrated maturity and pragmatic political calculation. In signing the deal, it potentially averted a slow annexation of ‘Jubaland’ by Kenya,” wrote Abdirahman Yusuf Ali, the director of the Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies think tank.
By 2015, parliamentarians had been appointed in Kismayo, and the president of Somalia attended the inauguration ceremony. This was done without directly consulting the Jubaland public, despite more than 90% of those surveyed by the Saferworld NGO stating they wanted popular elections.
As early as 2013, scholars such as Ken Menkhaus were warning that Jubaland was not a neat administrative unit with the kind of homogeneity that would foster a cohesive central government like Puntland or Somaliland. The combination of inter-clan diversity and a lack of a popular mandate has sustained government weakness in Jubaland, but it has also provided an opportunity for the federal government to gain influence in regions where Kismayo’s grip is weak, such as the Gedo region. Farmaajo found support there against Madobe and HSM has followed the same route.
Despite Madobe supporting HSM in his bid to oust Farmaajo, it wasn’t long before the lack of a common opponent turned them against each other.
Once again, the federal government sought to enlist Jubaland, this time in its new electoral agenda but failed to find a supportive partner. HSM’s attempt to organise a nationwide universal suffrage election was viewed by Madobe as a challenge to his rule, and so he reverted to the old playbook of avoiding federal directives like the plague.
Tensions were exacerbated following Madobe’s hasty re-election as Jubaland president in November 2024. Madobe had amended the Jubaland constitution, removing the two-term limit and allowing him to stand for a third consecutive term. The central government rejected the move uncompromisingly.
Following his re-election, Madobe said: “President Hassan and his team say that Ahmed Madobe is a ‘Kenyan’ (working for Kenyan interests). I am Somali, not Kenyan. Jubaland is part of Somalia, not Kenya or Ethiopia. We are ready for talks to address our differences, and I call on the president to halt the deployment of the national army to areas in Jubaland.”
The issue further escalated when Somali army units were deployed to the state which led to clashes with Jubaland forces.
HSM has been harsh in his criticisms of Madobe’s moves and more broadly his record as Jubaland’s leader. The Somali president raised the fact that in over 13 years, parts of Madobe’s state remain under al-Shabaab control, and other communities in the state still haven’t accepted his administration. “By opposing the direct elections, he wants to maintain the status quo, which is no longer feasible because the people of Jubaland reject him,” said HSM during a Friday prayer speech. Another critic, Abdiwahab Abdisamad, accused Madobe of running a “briefcase administration with no institutions”. With tensions at fever pitch, the federal government also established a committee to investigate Madobe’s links with the militant group al-Shabaab.
Kismayo has responded by widening the gap between itself and Mogadishu. In a cabinet meeting last week, Jubaland announced that it wanted humanitarian aid organisations to deal directly with it, rather than with Mogadishu, and stated that the federal government could not be trusted to maintain national security.
An AI-generated video of HSM and Madobe went viral, depicting them in a catfight. The video highlighted the irony of their dispute.
HSM supported Madobe when Farmaajo, the former president, struggled to tame the Jubaland president, as he faced very similar issues with him. At that time, HSM rejected direct elections in 2022, but now, he suddenly advocates for them. Back then, Madobe was a democrat protecting power-sharing, yet now he is suddenly undermining the federal government. Garowe Online captured the bizarre contradiction: Hassan Sheikh Rejects Jubaland Election Model He Endorsed During Farmaajo-Era.
The greatest casualty in this dispute is the possibility of the Somali people having a say in who rules their country and what kind of country it should be. Somalia, once an “African democratic pacesetter,” as Abdi Ismail Samatar wrote in his book Africa’s First Democrats, hasn’t polled its public since 1967. These kinds of disputes only extend the democratic void, which drains the federal government of the legitimacy it needs to enact a strong forward-looking agenda.
Somali elites have attempted to vocalise their criticisms of the process. Dr. Mursal Khaliif, a Somali MP opposed to the move by the president said Somalia isn’t yet ready, advising more time: “Unilateral electoral model tailored for one party or one individual has never worked in Somalia. And it will not work now. Dialogue and compromise is the only way forward.”
According to Abdinor Dahir, Somalia expert and director of the Mogadishu-based Taloford Consulting, “the lack of voter registration, lack of consensus among political stakeholders, and logistical challenges, such as al-Shabaab insecurity and budgetary constraints, make 1P1V impractical in Somalia at the moment.” Instead, Abdinor argues that organising 1P1V elections in major government-controlled cities could be a middle ground, given that the process is inclusive and consensual.
For Abdirashid Hashi, an analyst and former minister, crucial elements for universal suffrage, such as voter registration, an agreed electoral model, a credible and independent electoral commission, and adequate resources, remain unaddressed. “Somalia faces two realistic paths forward,” he said. “First, the Federal Government could negotiate with national stakeholders (regions, key political actors aspiring for the presidency, and senior MPs) to improve and implement an augmented indirect election model within the 17 months remaining in its mandate. Alternatively, the FGS could form a government of national unity, including all key stakeholders, and request a technical extension of up to 12 to 18 months to organise a proper, fair, and internationally accepted one-person, one-vote election. Fairness and consensus remain critical, whether the election is direct or indirect. Without these, Somalia risks repeating past failures.”
It is to be recalled that universal suffrage and/or term extension attempts have led to violence, as seen in Somalia and Mogadishu during the 2021/2022 national elections, and more recently in Somaliland and Puntland.
Secondly, the dispute could unravel the federal project, a key component of Somalia’s post-conflict political settlement, in place since the mid-2000s. The model was intended to unite Somalia under a decentralised government that made clans the basis of political claims making. Clan divisions and competition for power and resources between the FMS notwithstanding, the system largely worked in bringing gradual stability to the country. For Afyare A. Elmi, a research professor at the City University of Mogadishu, the political settlement “had four key elements: federalism, clan power-sharing, regular elections, and a spirit of inclusiveness to build consensus. What the government is doing now is moving away from this settlement.” In his formula, the FGS-FMS clashes could be interpreted as federal overreach to centralise authority in Mogadishu, further deepening distrust towards the federal government and fostering centre-periphery divisions.
Despite the stalemate at the moment however, Somalia has been here before. As the Somali adage goes: “Waa garasho dheertoo guurtidaa ku badanoo, Soomaali waa gob e, way garwaaqsan doontaa arrimaha u gaarka ah” (Somalis are noble and wise; they will understand matters that affect them). The stakeholders in this dispute are likely to be eventually forced around a table to resolve their issues. The question, however, isn’t whether Somalia will overcome this hurdle, but rather whether it will find itself in the same position when the next electoral cycle rolls around.