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Opinion

How fake news and information blackouts are shaping the war in Sudan

7 March, 2024
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The circulation of fake news makes it difficult to discern battlefield dynamics; the total blackouts hamper attempts to connect with endangered loved ones.  

 

On April 15, 2023, a war erupted between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and its paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), culminating in the disastrous dissolution of their longstanding alliance. Earlier, in October 2021, the two forces orchestrated a coup d'état, overthrowing the civilian bloc of the transitional government formed in the aftermath of the 2018-2019 popular uprising. “In just five years,” the Guardianobserves, “Sudan has transitioned from dictatorship to revolution to coup – and then to civil war.” “The International Crisis Group warns that what comes next could be de facto partition if not state disintegration,” the British daily continues.  

General Abdulfattah Al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s military, presided over the post-coup Sovereignty Council, naming RSF commander Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, as his deputy. Almost eighteen months later, a conflict of interests, fueled by disagreement over several political issues, ended the fragile alliance of SAF and RSF with the chilling staccato of gunfire and explosions of mortar shells. Central to this dispute was the RSF’s developing alignment with the ousted civilian bloc and its resistance to being assimilated into the army.  

The outbreak of violence introduced the already plagued country into a new and ominous chapter in its modern history. According to recent estimations, at least 12,000 people have died since fighting broke out. A Situation Report published by the OCHA, the UN’s humanitarian wing, reported that Sudan has “the world’s largest displacement crisis, uprooting the lives of more than 7 million people, some 1.4 million of whom have crossed into neighbouring countries already hosting large refugee populations.”  

Of particular significance to this article is the fact that confrontations between the SAF and RSF were carried out beyond traditional military battlegrounds, extending to the realm of information warfare. Both sides have vigorously attempted to monopolise the narrative on the ongoing war, for the great influence it has on directing local, regional, and international responses. In this context, disinformation and misinformation are viewed by the combatants as legitimate tools through which sovereignty over war zones can be attained and represented.  

In a widely circulating allegation, many have claimed that general Dagalo of the RSF was assassinated in the early days of the war. Distributors of the false claim utilized the prolonged absence of the RSF leader from public appearance to fuel speculations about his death, even among high-level Sudanese diplomats and politicians. In a televised statement, Sudan’s ambassador in Libya, Ibrahim Mohamed Ahmed, confidently alleged the death of Hemedti, citing what he described as “viable personal information”. Similarly, speaking to Al Jazeera Mubasher, Mubarak al-Fadel, leader of the Umma party, declared Hemedti’s death on several occasions. He was intransigent when evidence was given indicating overwise, including audio clips and videos which he dismissed as an “AI fabrications.”  

The allegations continued to spread on social media, particularly after a blue-tick account on X, formerly Twitter, labelled Rapid Support Forces (RSF) falsely announced the death of the RSF leader. The tweet received over 1.7 million views before it was taken down. A fabricated screenshot of the Guardian newspaper cover on 15 May 2023, with the headline: “The commander of the Rapid Support Force Muhammed Hamdan Dagalo, was killed early this morning in Sharq Al-Nil by an air strike” also circulated.  

These bizarre assertions about Hemedti’s alleged demise highlight how actors can manipulate public perceptions in politicised and polarised information environments. In his book about the strategic use of false news titled Subversion, Andreas Krieg, a professor at King’s College London, writes: “As an attack on the integrity of the public sphere, weaponised narratives undermine the relationships between individual members of civil society as well as the relationship between civil society and the governing authority.”  

A survey of Sudanese media during the past six months demonstrates a concerted attempt to deploy this weaponised narrative. Most of the accounts promoting the rumour of Hemedti’s death belong to SAF supporters, whereas the task of debunking their allegations was carried out by individuals and platforms associated with the RSF.  

Almost eight months into the war, Hemedti finally appeared on video, instantly rubbishing speculation about his death. The RSF leader was depicted touring across several African countries, including Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, attempting to rebrand himself as an international statesman. His tour was crowned by his attendance of the IGAD 42nd Extraordinary summit held on January 18, 2024, in Entebbe, Uganda. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan boycotted the meeting due to Hemedti’s presence. The tour represented an informational and diplomatic victory for Hemedti, who was able to expand his regional legitimacy.  

Another notable example of deploying misinformation as a political tool in the ongoing conflict was evident in the dissemination of contradictory statements reporting battle outcomes. Military bases constituted a key strategic target over which both factions sought control, recognising their significance in shaping the overall trajectory of the war. Therefore, a recurring pattern emerged in the aftermath of each encounter, wherein each side declared victory and claimed to have assumed full control over the target base; this was evident in the case of Al-Mudaraat military base, Jabel Awliaa military base and even the Sudan army’s HQ in the capital, Khartoum. 

The information warfare reached its peak in early February 2024 when a complete blockage in internet and cell phone networks was forced on the entire country. Numerous reports have indicated that the RSF was responsible for the outage. Al-Fatih Arwa, director of Zain Sudan's telecommunications network, the largest network in the country, said that the RSF had severed the company's services by cutting off power generators to its main data hub in the Jabrah area of the capital. The RSF, on the other hand, denied responsibility, predictably blaming the army. A spokesperson from the RSF attributed the outage to ‘’the army’s bombing of a major power generator in Khartoum’’. No substantial evidence was provided to support the RSF claim.  

As these complex situations continue to unfold, the capacity to discern information from deliberate misinformation becomes increasingly crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the situation on the ground. It emphasises the importance of critical engagement with information, using tools through which one can verify the accuracy of circulating news, especially when produced from supposedly reliable sources such as government institutions.  

On the other hand, the recent nationwide blackout imposed on the country indicates the escalation of information warfare to an entirely new level. It transcends mere conflicting reports, serving instead as a punitive measure that disrupts communication among Sudanese citizens, leaving them largely uninformed amidst the turmoil. Sky News’ Africa correspondent, Yousra Elbagir, described the situation in a post on X: “Ongoing comms blackout across Sudan - entrenching the already extreme suffering. No mobile funds, no coordination, no distraction and no connectivity with loved ones.” 

Sudanese nationals residing abroad also find themselves unable to send money to their families back home, upon whom they heavily rely to cover their daily expenses. We have come to learn, perhaps the hard way, how war continuously blurs the line between the political, military, and civil domains. Civilian life is increasingly subject to a high degree of militarisation; in the sense that even the most personal aspects of one’s life, namely the intimate communication between family members, is now shaped and blocked by the dynamics of the military conflict.  

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