Houthis and Al-Shabaab have a “functional strategic partnership,” Hussein Sheikh-Ali

The Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui once called the Red Sea Africa’s “most pernicious”, arguing that it artificially marks where the continent ends while ignoring the deep trade, political, and human ties binding both shores of the narrow waterway.

Somalia’s state minister for foreign affairs, Ali Omar, echoed that line of reasoning in a recent Al Jazeera interview, from a security standpoint when he said “a stable Yemen helps stabilise Somalia and vice versa”.

But neither Yemen nor Somalia is stable, and their separate and previously disconnected conflict dynamics are increasingly bleeding into each other as Ansar Allah — better known as the Houthis — finds common cause with Al-Shabaab. Both groups staunchly oppose Western interests in the region and, following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, have found new grounds for convergence.

A new report by Somalia’s former national security adviser, Hussein Sheikh-Ali at his newly inaugurated Saldhig Institute, outlines what he calls a “strategic relationship” between the groups, including the transfer of funds, expertise, and weapons.

This connection has been reported previously by UN investigators and western intelligence agencies concerned about what this could augur. After all, the Red Sea is a vital global trade artery, and instability there could send shockwaves far beyond the Horn of Africa. But no report that is publicly available has dug as deep as Sheikh-Ali’s into the issue.

Hussein Sheikh-Ali speaks to Geeska about the emerging nexus between the groups, what it reveals about their shifting ideological posture, and the wider security stakes.

Faisal Ali: For much of 2024, reports of Al-Shabaab-Houthi cooperation were met with scepticism due to limited evidence. Your report now documents what you call a “strategic partnership” between the two groups. How have these relations evolved and intensified over time?

Hussein Sheikh-Ali: The relationship progressed through three distinct phases. Initially (late 2015–2018), Somali traders connected to Al-Shabaab established commercial ties with Yemeni merchants linked to the Houthis, focused on fuel and small arms. The second phase (2019–2022) saw covert intelligence sharing, including maritime surveillance data and information on Western military movements in the Gulf of Aden.

The current phase (2023–present) involves political-military coordination: Al-Shabaab members have received training in Yemen on drones and explosives; Houthi personnel have visited al-Shabaab’s Galgala stronghold for exchanges on asymmetric warfare; and joint financial ventures in Somali extractive industries are now documented in the Saldhig Institute’s findings. This is no longer ad hoc, it is a functional strategic partnership governed by mutual utility rather than formal treaties.

FA: Al-Shabaab has openly condemned Shiites as non-Muslims. Yet your report documents a formal alliance with the Zaydi Shiite Houthis. How do we reconcile this? Does ideology take a back seat to strategic interests?

HSA: Al-Shabaab’s 2011 condemnation of Shiites remains its official doctrine, and internal religious hardliners remain uncomfortable. But the leadership under Ahmed Diriye has adopted a pragmatic exception: the Houthis are treated not as co-religionists but as operational partners in a shared anti-Western, anti-Gulf agenda. They frame this partnership as mu’amalah—transactional dealings permitted under necessity—not aqidah (creedal affinity). This is the same logic that allows Al-Shabaab to tax Christians and other non-muslims in its territory while maintaining anti-Christian rhetoric. Doctrine provides the vocabulary; interest dictates the behaviour.

FA: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is Al-Shabaab’s closest partner within al-Qaida, yet AQAP and the Houthis are rivals who’ve been fighting since 2010. Your report suggests Al-Shabaab positions itself as an “informal intermediary” between these antagonistic factions. How does Al-Shabaab manage these competing commitments without fracturing its relationship with AQAP?

HSA: Al-Shabaab manages this through strict compartmentalisation. AQAP is not informed of the full scope of Houthi engagement. Al-Shabaab presents itself to AQAP as a bridge that can extract resources from the Houthis without compromising Sunni jihadist principles. Essentially, it treats the Houthis as a source of arms and maritime access, not as allies in creed. AQAP tolerates this because it remains financially dependent on Al-Shabaab, Saldhig Institute's report confirms that roughly 30 per cent of AQAP’s funding came from Al-Shabaab during peak pressure years, and because Al-Shabaab has not pressured AQAP to moderate its anti-Houthi military operations. The relationship is asymmetrical: Al-Shabaab needs AQAP’s ideological legitimacy; AQAP needs Al-Shabaab's money. So far, neither has chosen to rupture the arrangement.

FA: Your report describes a multi-layered structure: commercial networks, intelligence sharing, and political-military coordination, with Al-Qaida leadership playing a facilitation role. What does this relationship look like on the more granular level to the extent we understand it?

HSA: At the commercial level: Somali and Yemeni front companies—fishing firms, fuel traders, commodity brokers—move weapons and cash across the Gulf of Aden. Payments move through informal hawala corridors linking Bossaso, Berbera, Djibouti, and Sana’a.

At the intelligence level: Houthi naval operatives receive coastal surveillance data from Al-Shabaab's maritime unit; Al-Shabaab receives targeting information on Western vessels.

At the facilitation level: Saldhig Institute’s report identifies specific Houthi intelligence officials—Abu Raas, Abu Khalil, Al-Ma'khadl—who oversee African affairs and liaise directly with Al-Shabaab's designated coordination committee, led by Abukar Ali Adan and Yasin Osman Kiwe. The central leadership of Al-Qaida is aware and has not objected, but the initiative is Al-Shabaab’s.

FA: What specific conditions in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea have made this alliance necessary for both groups? What problems does it solve for each side?

HSA: For Al-Shabaab, Yemen is the only accessible external source of advanced weaponry—drones, IED technology, naval mines—and a rear base for training when pressure in Somalia intensifies. It also provides alternative financial channels to evade sanctions.

For the Houthis, Somalia offers a low-governance coastline to bypass the blockade, establish alternative smuggling routes, and project influence into the Horn of Africa. It also provides operational testing grounds for new tactics before deploying them in Yemen. This is not ideological solidarity; it is capability swapping between two sanction-hit actors seeking survival and regional leverage.

FA: Both groups have condemned Somaliland’s recognition of Israel. Does this shared opponent provide ideological cover for their collaboration, or does it represent a deeper strategic convergence?

HSA: The shared condemnation of Israel, and specifically Somaliland’s reported engagement with Tel Aviv, provides useful ideological scaffolding but is not the driver. It allows both groups to frame their collaboration as resistance to a common enemy rather than a cynical transactional arrangement. It also helps Al-Shabaab deflect internal criticism: cooperating with Shiites can be justified as a tactical necessity in a wider war against Zionism and Western hegemony. That said, the Gaza war has accelerated the partnership—it increased Houthi maritime attacks, and Saldhig Institute’s findings indicate Al-Shabaab quietly provided intelligence support for some of those operations. For them, the enemy is real, but the alliance would exist with or without it.