The Horn’s crisis club?

On Wednesday, Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed held a tripartite meeting. According to a post on Guelleh’s official page, the three leaders discussed “peace and security in the region,” and “issues concerning shared interests among the three countries, and the current situation in the region.”

The meeting cannot be read in isolation. It comes at a very critical time. Each of the three leaders is facing similar challenges, an electoral crisis.

President Guelleh amended Djibouti’s constitution late last year in what critics say is a move designed to consolidate his decades-long rule. Guelleh has been in power since 1999 and remains one of Africa’s longest-serving leaders.

The constitutional changes triggered criticism from opposition groups, who argue that the amendments further weaken democratic competition and make it difficult for credible challengers to emerge. Opposition leader and former Guelleh ally Alexis Mohamed described the move as a “constitutional coup,” accusing the president of reshaping the political system to maintain control.

In a recent interview, Guelleh himself appeared to acknowledge the limited political space for rivals, stating that he cannot “create competitors,” a remark widely interpreted as a signal that the political environment does not allow meaningful electoral competition.

Somalia is also facing a deep political crisis centered on constitutional changes pushed by President Mohamud. The government has moved forward with amendments to the country’s provisional constitution, a process that critics say has not followed proper legal and political procedures. Opposition leaders including the Somalia future council argue that the changes have effectively created an unprecedented constitutional vacuum.

Talks between the federal government and opposition groups aimed at resolving the dispute have collapsed, leaving the country without a clear roadmap for upcoming elections. The newly signed constitutional amendments this week include changes that directly affect presidential term limits and the broader electoral system.

Somalia’s provisional constitution provides for a four-year presidential term, but the new amendments raise concerns about potential term extensions and alterations to the electoral timetable. The Speaker of the House has stated that the new constitution will be adopted and implemented, a move that effectively extends the current administration’s mandate and further delays elections.

In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Ahmed is facing growing internal pressures. The political environment has been overshadowed by concerns raised by opposition groups, who accuse the government of restricting political space and delaying meaningful democratic reforms.

Security challenges remain particularly acute in northern Ethiopia. While the Tigray conflict formally ended with the 2022 peace agreement, tensions remain high in several contested areas, including disputed territories between the Tigray region and neighboring Amhara and Afar regions. Sporadic violence and unresolved territorial claims continue to threaten the fragile peace. At the same time, broader ethnic and regional tensions across Ethiopia have created a complex security landscape, complicating the government’s efforts to stabilize the country ahead of this year’s elections.

Beyond domestic political crises, the three leaders are also navigating a complicated regional power competition, particularly involving the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and its expanding influence in the Horn of Africa. The Gulf state has become one of the most active external actors in the region through investments in ports, security cooperation, and political partnerships. However, the relationship between the UAE and leaders in the Horn is far from uniform. Each of the three leaders stands in a different, and sometimes opposing, position in relation to Abu Dhabi’s influence.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed has maintained relatively strong ties with the UAE. Abu Dhabi played an important role during the early years of Abiy’s leadership, providing financial assistance and political backing during Ethiopia’s economic and political transition after 2018. The UAE also supported Ethiopia diplomatically during the Tigray conflict, and Emirati investments have continued in sectors such as infrastructure and logistics.

In contrast, Djibouti’s Guelleh has had a strained relationship with the UAE, largely stemming from a long-running dispute over port management and strategic infrastructure. The conflict dates back to the termination of the contract with Dubai-based port operator DP World, which had managed Djibouti’s Doraleh Container Terminal. Djibouti nationalized the facility in 2018, triggering international arbitration cases and diplomatic tensions with the UAE.

Since then, relations between Djibouti and Abu Dhabi have remained uneasy. Djibouti has instead strengthened partnerships with other actors, particularly China, which has invested heavily in ports, infrastructure, and military presence in the country.

Mohamud also faces a complicated relationship with the UAE. While the Gulf state has historically been involved in Somali politics through investments and security assistance, tensions have emerged over political influence and the management of regional administrations. The UAE has supported development projects and port operations in Somalia’s federal member states, sometimes bypassing the federal government in Mogadishu. This has been a source of friction between Somalia’s central authorities and Abu Dhabi.

Recent political tensions and disagreements over sovereignty and external partnerships have further complicated relations. Mohamud’s government has sought to reassert federal authority over foreign agreements and security partnerships, which has occasionally placed Mogadishu at odds with the UAE’s regional strategy. Earlier this year, Somalia scrapped all security agreements with the UAE.

Though the details of the meeting remain unclear, the domestic political pressures facing each of the three leaders, and the growing competition among external powers in the region, make the meeting particularly sensitive.