Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s constitutional gamble

On March 8, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed into law a controversial constitutional amendment package that his administration has pursued for nearly two years.

Speaking at the signing ceremony, President Mohamud described the moment as the culmination of a long process of constitutional review. “Today marks the conclusion of the extensive process of reviewing the Constitution of Somalia,” he said, adding that “from this day forward, the task that lies before us is the implementation of its provisions.”

The signing follows a contentious parliamentary vote in which Somalia’s federal parliament approved the amendments. Shortly afterward, the Speaker of the House, Adan Mohamed Nur Madobe, widely known as Adan Madobe, declared that the country’s provisional constitution had effectively come to an end. Madobe also indicated that parliament would henceforth operate under the newly approved constitutional framework rather than the previous provisional order.

For the federal government, the move represents the closure of a 14-year provisional era. The incumbent administration argue that Somalia cannot remain indefinitely in a transitional constitutional phase, where each electoral cycle requires ad hoc political settlements rather than functioning within a finalized legal framework.

Yet the constitutional adoption has unfolded amid overlapping political crises. Critics do not see the development as a clean institutional transition. Instead, they view it as a constitutional act undertaken in a fractured political environment, under disputed procedures, and without the participation or recognition of key Somali political actors. Major stakeholders, including regional administrations and opposition blocs, either boycotted the process, rejected its legitimacy, or refused to recognize its outcome.

Two of Somalia’s major federal member states, Puntland and Jubbaland, have been explicit in their opposition.

Representatives from Jubbaland issued a statement one day before the parliamentary vote declaring that the current parliament “has no legal mandate to make any substantial amendments” to the constitution. Puntland authorities have taken a similar stance. When several federal lawmakers attempted to travel to a consultation meeting convened by the Puntland president, they reported that federal authorities blocked their flights, an action the MPs described as being “held hostage.”

Both regional administrations, along with opposition figures organized under the Somalia Future Council umbrella, argue that any constitutional changes adopted under these circumstances are illegal and that the provisional constitution remains the country’s only legitimate governing constitution.

Puntland’s stance is particularly consequential. The region had already broken with Mogadishu following earlier constitutional amendments in 2024, declaring it would not recognize changes made without broad based consensus. In the current round, Puntland again rejected what it called unilateral federal constitutional revisions. For Puntland leaders, the dispute is not limited to technical issues such as term length. At stake is a broader claim that Mogadishu is attempting to convert a contested federal system into a centrally interpreted constitutional order without the consent of the federal member states.

In this sense, Puntland frames its opposition around two principles. First, constitutional completion must be consensus based, especially on questions that define the federal settlement. Second, federal member states are not passive observers in the constitutional process but co-owners of the federal arrangement. In Puntland’s interpretation, a constitution imposed by the center cannot truly function as a federal constitution, rather, it becomes an instrument of centralization.

Jubbaland’s position leads to a similar outcome, though its emphasis differs slightly. Legislators and political figures from the region have said they will not recognize the results of the constitutional process, arguing that the amendments violate federal principles, lack a legitimate public mandate, and were adopted without national consensus. The message from Jubbaland is clear: attempts by Mogadishu to enforce the revised constitution in the region may not produce constitutional order but rather deepen FGS-FMS fragmentation.

Meanwhile, the opposition, particularly the Somalia Future Council, occupies a middle ground between regional autonomy concerns and elite political rivalry. Opposition leaders have labeled the approval process “illegal and destabilizing,” arguing that a foundational document such as the constitution requires broad national consensus.

Their concern is that President Mohamud’s administration is using constitutional completion to settle unresolved political questions, particularly those related to the electoral framework, that should instead have been negotiated among Somalia’s major political actors.

Another crisis may now be emerging around the timelines of political mandates. The current president’s mandate is set to expire in May, while the federal parliament’s term ends in April.

Speaker Madobe has indicated that the new constitution “will be applied,” a statement widely interpreted as opening the door to a technical extension of current mandates. The revised constitution establishes five-year terms for federal offices and applies immediately; consequently, officeholders elected under the previous four-year framework now fall under the new constitutional timetable. The political outcome is clear: elections expected in 2026 could be delayed, allowing incumbents to remain in office beyond the previously anticipated timeline.

Because Puntland, Jubbaland, and major opposition groups reject the validity of the amendments, Somalia now risks operating under two competing constitutional frameworks. This unprecedented constitutional vacuum could push the country into a serious constitutional crisis.

This new crisis also comes as the country continues to face security pressure from Al-Shabaab, which has been accelerating its offensive and has recaptured much of the territory it lost in early 2024. Counterinsurgency operations rely heavily on coordination between the federal government and regional states, making the current political fragmentation particularly dangerous. More worryingly, the electoral process now remains in limbo.

Despite these tensions, some observers believe a return to negotiated constitutional politics remains possible. Pressure from domestic actors and international partners could push the federal government toward talks with key stakeholders. This path carries the greatest potential to reduce immediate risk, but it would require the government to acknowledge that legal promulgation alone does not automatically produce political settlement.

For now, however, Somalia appears to be entering uncharted territory. While President Mohamud insists that his administration has taken a historic step toward ending the country’s long constitutional transition, the political environment surrounding the new document suggests the transition may instead be entering a far more uncertain phase.