Guelleh blasts UAE as “factor of discord”

In a wide-ranging interview with Jeune Afrique ahead of the April 10 presidential election, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh outlined the political and economic challenges facing Djibouti and set out his priorities for the coming years.

Guelleh addressed domestic political dynamics, including questions over democracy and succession, as well as plans to accelerate economic transformation in a country confronting migration pressures and persistent social inequality. He said his administration aims to reinforce national cohesion and advance Djibouti’s ambitions to develop green industries. The president also turned to regional issues, commenting on tensions in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti’s dispute with Dubai-based ports operator DP World, and instability in Somalia and Sudan. He discussed the implications of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, framing it as a development with potential repercussions for regional stability.

Guelleh, in power since 1999, is expected to face little meaningful competition at the polls. Critics argue that the dominance of the ruling coalition has hollowed out Djibouti’s political space. The president conceded that a near-uncontested election “is a problem,” but rejected the notion that he bears responsibility for the weakness of the opposition.

“Should I create competitors for myself?” he asked, framing his continued candidacy as a response to popular demand rather than political exclusion. His adversaries, he said, share “only one common point: my departure,” while “the immense majority of the population… believes that it still needs me.”

Guelleh portrayed the absence of viable challengers not as repression but as political reality. He said he would not “close my eyes and cover my ears” simply to satisfy “a handful of individuals who do not dare to stand against me for fear of a foretold failure.”

International observers and rights groups have periodically raised concerns about political freedoms in Djibouti, a strategically located state of roughly 1.2 million people at the entrance to the Red Sea. Guelleh dismissed characterizations of his rule as heavy-handed.

“Djibouti is a country ruled,” he said, “but the iron hand is not in our traditions.” If citizens felt oppressed, he argued, the country would be marked by outward migration rather than serving as “a pole of attraction.” There are “neither fear, nor threats, nor constraints, nor political prisoners here,” he insisted, adding that “the only limit is that defined by the law.”

Djibouti hosts foreign military bases from major powers and is a key logistics hub for the region, factors the government often cites as evidence of stability.

The president’s most forceful comments were reserved for Israel’s December 26 recognition of Somaliland. For Guelleh, the move is not symbolic diplomacy but a strategic maneuver. “Israel’s objective is to use this territory for purposes that have nothing peaceful about them,” he said, expressing concern that Somaliland’s leadership might concede too much in exchange for recognition. “I fear that the Somaliland government is ready to give Mr. Netanyahu everything he asks for,” he warned.

Asked directly whether that could include an Israeli military base in the port of Berbera, a critical site along global shipping lanes, Guelleh did not hesitate: “That is what I fear.”

Such a development would carry significant implications for Djibouti, which lies just across the Gulf of Aden and already hosts military installations from France, the United States and China. The Red Sea corridor has become one of the world’s most militarized and strategically contested waterways.

Guelleh also accused the United Arab Emirates of orchestrating Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. “The Emirates are Israel’s vanguard in our region,” he said, asserting that Abu Dhabi had effectively “initiated and in a way ‘sold’ this recognition to the Israelis, who rushed at the opportunity.”

The UAE has significantly expanded its influence in the Horn of Africa over the past decade through port investments, security cooperation and political engagement. Guelleh contrasted Emirati activism with Saudi Arabia’s posture in the region.

Describing Riyadh as “a factor of rationality,” he said the Emirates have become “a factor of discord in Yemen, in Sudan, in Somalia, in Chad, in Libya and everywhere they operate.” Djibouti, he added pointedly, “has always been close to Saudi Arabia.” The remarks underline friction between Djibouti and Abu Dhabi, already strained by a protracted legal dispute with Emirati port operator DP World.

Relations with Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Abdullahi, are now openly frosty. “We are on cold terms,” Guelleh said, revealing that he had refused to receive him or take his calls. Although the land border remains open, air links between Djibouti and Hargeisa have been suspended. He characterized Somaliland’s long-standing diplomatic posture as transactional to the point of recklessness. For more than three decades, he said, its guiding philosophy has been: “No matter the hand extended to us, even if it is the devil’s.” Djibouti, he made clear, does not intend to be that hand.

Djibouti has consistently supported Somalia’s territorial integrity, aligning itself with Mogadishu’s opposition to “unilateral recognition of Somaliland.”

Despite hosting the largest U.S. military base in Africa, Guelleh did not spare Washington from criticism. Referring to intensified U.S. airstrikes against militant groups in Somalia, he argued that such operations risk being counterproductive if conducted without regional coordination.

“The Americans do not understand that carrying out strikes without consulting or informing the Somali government and the concerned neighboring countries, such as Djibouti, is useless,” he said. Strikes launched “practically blindly” and without regard for civilian casualties, he warned, are “not a solution.” Instead, he urged greater reliance on local knowledge rather than “networks of paid informants who tell them what they want to hear.”

Djibouti maintains a strategically significant dual posture in the Horn of Africa, contributing troops to the African Union mission in Somalia while simultaneously serving as a critical security partner to the United States. Through its participation in the African Union stabilization framework, Djibouti has positioned itself as a frontline contributor to regional security efforts aimed at countering Al-Shabaab and supporting the federal government in Mogadishu. At the same time, by hosting multiple foreign military installations, including a major U.S. base, Djibouti has entrenched its role as a “pivotal” Western security partner in a geopolitically contested corridor linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s remarks regarding the expanding regional influence of the UAE reflect an undercurrent of diplomatic strain between Djibouti and Abu Dhabi, rooted in longstanding political and commercial disputes. Nevertheless, Guelleh underlined that Djibouti continues to value its strategic relationship with the Saudi Arabia, signaling a calibrated approach that distinguishes Riyadh from Abu Dhabi despite broader Gulf rivalries playing out across the Horn of Africa. This differentiation illustrates Djibouti’s discontent with Abu Dhabi.

Guelleh’s comments on the issue of recognition involving Somaliland are consistent with Djibouti’s longstanding position in “defense of Somalia’s territorial integrity.” Djibouti was among the first countries to condemn moves toward formal recognition of Somaliland, framing such steps as “destabilizing to regional cohesion” and contrary to the principles upheld by the African Union. In this context, Djibouti’s diplomatic posture aligns with its broader security calculus: preserving Somalia’s unity is viewed not only as a normative commitment but also as a strategic imperative tied to its own foreign policy towards the wider region.