Frenemies tied at the hip: Eritrea & Sudan

Sudan’s army (SAF) chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who also serves as chair of the Sovereignty Council, paid a one-day visit to Eritrea on 26 November 2024. Photos released by Eritrea’s press agency showed Burhan being warmly received by Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and paraded around Asmara with a large entourage. The visit is the latest indication of a growing alignment between Asmara and Khartoum. In a press statement issued after the meeting, Burhan expressed his gratitude, stating: “We thank the Eritrean government and people for their noble and generous support, which reflects the genuine character and solidarity of the Eritrean people. The people of Sudan will always remember these acts of brotherhood.”

Prior to the visit, Afwerki warned that Eritrea would intervene in the Sudanese civil war on the side of the army if the fighting approached four states near Eritrea: al-Qadarif, Kassala, the Red Sea, and the Blue Nile. The inclusion of the Blue Nile state was peculiar, as it does not share a border with Eritrea. In comments reported by the Sudanese newspaper Al-Tayar, Afwerki said: “If the war reaches these states, Eritrea will not stand idly by and will become a party to the war with all its military and logistical capabilities, because its national security will be at stake.”

On 30 November, Isaias shared his broader perspective on the situation in Sudan in an interview with Eritrean press, providing interesting insights into how he views both the country today and how it reached this point. President Isaias said that the secession of South Sudan in 2011 was a mistake, emphasising that John Garang himself had advocated for unity and a new Sudan founded on equal citizenship. Isaias also criticised the Forces of Freedom and Change, a civilian alliance opposed to the military, questioning their identity and objectives. He remarked that Sudan occupies a significant geopolitical position, influencing the entire region and played a critical role in Eritrea’s independence struggle. He noted that Eritrea had submitted a research report to Sudan in 2022, highlighting that the Sovereignty Council has taken on the responsibility of guiding Sudan to safety. President Isaias claimed that the ongoing conflict is the result of external interference, notably omitting any mention of his own involvement.

It is no secret that Eritrea, in agreement with the Sudanese army, has trained and armed various tribal groups in eastern Sudan. Among those trained in Eritrea is a Beni Amer group known as “The Eastern Corps,” the military wing of the United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice (UPFLJ), led by Amin Daoud.  

It is no secret that Eritrea, in agreement with the Sudanese army, has trained and armed various tribal groups in eastern Sudan.

The group announced it’s deployment in the eastern region on 28 October, in accordance with instructions from the army. “We note the popular support and satisfaction that your forces have received from our resilient people,” a statement by its spokesperson said. This move sparked an uproar among Hadendoa elites who are members of the broader Beja group who inhabit the same region, which was eventually subdued after Amin Daoud met with the Hadendoa chief, Alamin Tirk, and Sudanese army chiefs provided explanations for the deployment.

Colonial era

Eritrea and Sudan share a 605-kilometre border. There is much in common between eastern Sudan, particularly Kassala and Red Sea states, and western and northern Eritrea — historically, socially, economically, and politically. The people on both sides of the border — including the Beni Amer, Hadendoa, Habab, and other smaller tribes — consider themselves one people, separated by an artificial boundary. They primarily speak Tigre and To-Bedawi.

Among these groups, the Hadendoa are the most marginalised. Their tribal leaders are often accused of perpetuating this marginalisation because it provides them opportunities to reinforce their positions. In parts of Eritrea, some Hadendoa villages are inhabited only by elders, with no children, due to a history of promiscuity and the rampant spread of venereal diseases.  

The people on both sides of the border also share the Khatmiyya tariqa (Sufi order). The Khatmiyya tariqa was founded by Sayyid Hashim al-Mirghani, a Mecca born saintly figure, who is held in high regard across parts of northeast Africa. Historically, the Mirghani family wielded significant religious influence in both Sudan and Eritrea through the Khatmiyya. The Italian colonial authorities in Eritrea initially engaged with Sayyid Hashim al-Mirghani, who had relocated to Massawa after the rise of the Mahdist movement in Sudan. Following his death in 1902, the Italians sought another prominent figure from the family to maintain their influence, eventually settling on Sayyid Ga’far b. Bakri al-Mirghani, who moved to Keren, Eritrea.

The Mahdists fought against the Beni Amer, who were aligned with the Khatmiyya, in 1890 and 1893 when the Beni Amer refused to pledge allegiance to them. These conflicts were marked by atrocities, including the killing of the Beni Amer chief, Deglel, and the abduction of 500 women. Meanwhile, the Habab allied themselves with the Mahdi (Osman Digna). The Beni Amer fought alongside the Italians against the Mahdists, defeating those who entered Eritrea.

From 1941 to 1952, both Eritrea and Sudan were under British rule. The British proposed dividing Eritrea between Sudan and Ethiopia, with western and northern Eritrea intended to become part of Sudan. However, this proposal was rejected by Eritreans and also by the Sudanese Umma Party, led by the ancestors of the leaders of the Mahdist movement. The party viewed the proposal as a move that would bolster the Khatmiyya and strengthen their rivals in the Unionist Democratic Party, which was aligned with Egypt and led by the Mirghani family. The Umma Party generally opposed Eritrean political organisations and maintained close relations with Haile Selassie’s regime in Ethiopia. This antagonism may have been partly influenced by the party’s broader hostility towards Egypt.

During the period of British administration, a devastating war (1942–1948) broke out between the Beni Amer and the Hadendoa (Jimelab faction) over grazing rights in this region. This conflict was eventually resolved through a peace agreement, although it is likely that the war left lasting scars between the two groups.  

Although the Beja Congress was established in 1957 in Port Sudan to combat marginalisation, it was in western Eritrea that the first armed liberation movement began in 1961. This movement sparked similar armed insurgencies in Tigray and other regions of Ethiopia. It was also in this area that the serf emancipation movement originated. The British authorities ultimately yielded to these demands, leading to a process of social engineering that resulted in the creation of 20 new Eritrean tribes.

Economic dimension  

For Eritrea, Sudan has long been a source of trade for cereals, vegetables, and fruits, and the smuggling of alcohol to Sudan has been a lucrative business since Eritrea’s liberation. Before the current conflict, smuggling sugar from Sudan and re-exporting it was a common practice. The Eritrean Red Sea Corporation, which is sanctioned by the US, plays a significant role in cross-border trade and smuggling. It has been described as an “octopus” entity involved in various sectors that serve the interests of the ruling elite.

Eritreans, including women, migrated seasonally to Sudan to work on agricultural projects during the 1940s and 1960s. Following Ethiopia’s occupation of Eritrea, many Muslim Eritreans migrated to Sudan, some on foot, to pursue their studies in Arabic or to use Sudan as a transit route to Egypt.

Sudanese traders have also used Massawa to import goods to eastern Sudan. These goods arrive at the border area of Girmaika, where they are stored in containers, customs duties are paid, and they are then smuggled into Sudan. A few years ago, the delivery of these goods was banned for about two years on the Eritrean president’s orders for an unknown reason. Food items perished in storage, while non-food items were returned to Sudanese traders without any compensation.

The Eritrean government is also adept at exploiting regional currency differences, a practice it developed in the early 1990s when it siphoned millions of dollars from Ethiopia by using an exchange rate for the Ethiopian currency in Eritrea that differed from the official rate set by the Ethiopian National Bank (ENB).

During the Eritrean war of independence (1961–1991), eastern Sudan served as the strategic base and lifeline for the Eritrean Liberation Front. Without the substantial support of the Sudanese people and various governments, the liberation of Eritrea would have been difficult and prolonged, if not impossible. Sudan hosted over half a million refugees, providing critical assistance to the Eritrean cause.

During the Eritrean war of independence (1961–1991), eastern Sudan served as the strategic base and lifeline for the Eritrean Liberation Front. Without the substantial support of the Sudanese people and various governments, the liberation of Eritrea would have been difficult and prolonged, if not impossible.  

Following the 1981 assault by the EPLF and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which drove the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) into Sudan, the EPLF gained control of the border with Kassala state. Eastern Sudan subsequently became a base for Eritreans opposed to the EPLF, primarily the Beni Amer, who were affiliated with the ELF. These groups became targets of the EPLF and later the Eritrean regime, which came to view eastern Sudan as a threat to its security. The Eritrean regime typically perceives borders as security risks and engages in cross-border interference as a preventive measure.

At the same time, Ethiopia backed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its armed wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which later became South Sudan’s regular army. In 1990, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) deployed forces to assist the Sudanese government in dislodging the SPLA from Kurmuk.

Despite Isaias Afwerki’s opposition to Sudan’s Islamist orientation, he maintained a cooperative relationship with Sudan’s former president Omar al-Bashir and the éminence grise Hassan al-Turabi, provided they did not support Eritrean opposition groups. That changed when they did.  

Political relations after Eritrea’s independence

Sudan was one of the first countries to recognise Eritrea’s independence in 1991, and the two nations maintained cordial relations in the immediate post-independence period of Eritrea. However, as noted by Manickam Venkataraman, an Indian professor who was based in Asmara in the early 1990s, frequent issues obstructed the two countries from consolidating their “age-old historical and cultural relations.”  

Sudan’s relations with Eritrea have been characterised by accusations and counteraccusations of meddling and malign interference. Since Eritrea’s independence, Sudan has avoided direct conflict with the Eritrean government, viewing it as a problematic entity skilled at using proxies. It frequently acquiesced to Eritrea’s demands.  

Initially, Sudan cooperated with Asmara, which requested Khartoum to close the offices of Eritrean opposition groups in 1991. The country had been liberated from Ethiopian rule and so for the new government the presence of these groups in Sudan was now a threat to the new order.

In 1992, when Eritrea launched an offensive against opposition forces in its western regions, Sudan deployed soldiers to support the Eritrean campaign. In 1993, after Eritrea officially declared independence, a senior Sudanese delegation, including Omar al-Bashir went to Asmara to mark the event. The brotherly spirit was perhaps best captured by Salahaddin Mohammed Karar, a Sudanese army officer who attended a celebration of the anniversary of Eritrea’s armed struggle where he said: “we shall share with our brothers in Eritrea every small morsel of food and every book and every dose of medicine and everything our dear people in Eritrea need in material, human and moral support.”  

The presence of rebel groups hostile to both governments on their respective territories, however, proved to be a decisive problem, souring relations between the governments by the mid-1990s. Of particular concern to Eritrea was the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EJIM), which Asmara believed was being backed by Khartoum as part of a broader agenda by the new Islamist government there to install similar regimes across Africa. In December 1993, an EJIM force crossed the border from Sudan into Eritrea, of which twenty were killed, including two Moroccan nationals. Isaias considered this an act of war, telling the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum that his government also knows “how to play with fire.” Tensions and distrust continued to escalate, and by late 1994, Eritrea published an aide-mémoire listing its grievances against Sudan, stating that it could not be held responsible for the consequences if what it deemed provocations did not cease.  

Jeffrey A. Lefebvre characterised the standoff between the countries as an example of the new “secularist-Islamist” cleavage dividing the Horn after the cold war. Isaias played into this during a trip to the US at the beginning of 1995, warning of the looming “Islamization of the Horn of Africa”.  

Jeffrey A. Lefebvre characterised the standoff between the countries as an example of the new “secularist-Islamist” cleavage dividing the Horn after the cold war. Isaias played into this during a trip to the US at the beginning of 1995, warning of the

For its part, Eritrea also provided support to Sudanese political and military groups that opposed the Islamist government. In early 1995, The Economist quoted Isaias as saying: “we are out to see that this government is not there anymore. We are not trying to pressure them to talk to us, or behave in a more constructive way. We will give weapons to any one committed to overthrowing them”. SPLA units from South Sudan were transported by air, enabling them to operate freely across the Sudan-Eritrea border. A who’s who of Sudanese opposition parties also gathered in Asmara, including the Democratic Unionist Party, the Umma Party, and the Sudanese Communist Party.

The Beja Congress, established in eastern Sudan in 1957 by Beja intellectuals to address issues of marginalisation, was primarily a Hadandoa-based organisation. Following the breakdown of relations between Eritrea and Sudan, the Eritrean regime fully trained and supported the Beja Congress’s armed resistance exploiting divisions in Sudan. Since 1956, Sudan’s central government has been dominated by northern and riverine elites, who have marginalised eastern Sudan. They have treated the region as a resource for minerals, particularly gold, Sudan’s sea access, horticultural assets, and business opportunities. In 1993, the Beja Congress became a member of the Sudan National Democratic Alliance (SNDA), an umbrella organisation for political groups opposing Omar al-Bashir’s regime, which was formed in Asmara. In an unprecedented diplomatic move, the SNDA was granted the premises of the Sudanese embassy in Asmara. In January 1997, the SNDA opened a military front along the Eritrea-Sudan border. The two countries resumed diplomatic relations in 1999 following mediation by the emir of Qatar.

However, the attempt to reset relations did not last long. Eritrea accused Sudan of permitting Ethiopian troops to launch attacks during the 1998–2000 border war. In response, Eritrea intensified its support for the SPLA and various rebel groups opposing the Sudanese regime. On 7 October 2002, Sudan accused Eritrea of attacking eastern Sudan and lodged a formal complaint against Eritrea with the Arab League–the same year the two countries closed their mutual border.

Eritrea didn’t sit idly, and with the backing of the Eritrean army, the Beja Congress took control of eastern Sudan along the Eritrean border. They attempted to sabotage the oil pipeline to Port Sudan and the Kassala-Port Sudan road, although with limited success. In 2002, they also launched an attack on Kassala in coordination with the SPLA.  

Throughout the mid-2000s, relations did not improve, and mutual blame continued. Khartoum accused Asmara of undermining its domestic peace process and lodged a complaint with the UN security council. Muammar Gaddafi attempted to mediate the dispute in Tripoli, seeking a resolution for both parties, but was largely unsuccessful. Once again, Sudan brought the issue before the UN security council. In 2005, Eritrea’s then information minister, Ali Abdu, dismissed Sudan’s allegations. “We have never allowed ourselves to be dragged into that Tom and Jerry game. We never support them [the Sudanese rebels] militarily,” said Abdu.  

During the early years of the so-called War on Terror, Eritrea found itself in a region with no friends, but several large and powerful foes, especially following its border war with Ethiopia (1998-2000). In 2003, Yemen, Ethiopia and Sudan even formed a “counter-terrorism” alliance, which Eritrea’s then-foreign minister, Ali Sayyid Abdullah, called a “conspiracy” against his country, born of a “caesarean”. Abdullah added: “The spearhead of the mentioned gathering is Ethiopia, which managed to lure Sudan and obtain its support in the current conflict between Khartoum and Eritrea.”  

By the mid-2000s, both Eritrea and Sudan had compelling reasons to improve their relations. Sudan aimed to stabilise its borders and curtail Eritrean support for opposition groups, while Eritrea sought to extricate itself from regional and international efforts to “asphyxiate” it, according to its foreign minister, Ali Sayyid Abdullah, and to stabilise its western border. Both countries were also under increasing pressure from the US to cooperate in its War on Terror across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

By the mid-2000s, both Eritrea and Sudan had compelling reasons to improve their relations. Sudan aimed to stabilise its borders and curtail Eritrean support for opposition groups, while Eritrea sought to extricate itself from regional and international efforts to “asphyxiate” it, according to its foreign minister

In January 2005, the Sudanese government and the SPLM, a South Sudanese rebel group signed a peace agreement, which Eritrea played a small role in mediating. In December 2005, the countries reopened their mutual border which had been closed for three years. Maintaining its form, Eritrea was instrumental a year later in facilitating the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) in 2006 between Sudan and the Eastern Front which was comprised of two armed groups with members drawn from communities populating the Eritrea-Sudan border, which Asmara more openly backed materially and morally.  

Khartoum was initially hesitant about Isaias’s mediation but eventually accepted it. Unlike the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), no peacekeeping troops were deployed to the east, and several of the Eastern Front’s self-determination and cultural demands went unmet. However, concessions involving government posts and the integration of fighters into the regular Sudanese army ultimately secured the agreement. The Sudanese government appointed Dr Mubarak Salim of the Rashaida as vice minister of transport and a Beja Congress leader as an advisor, putting friends of Isaias in high office. One Eastern Front member, almost regretfully, remarked: “By making this agreement, we will probably extend the life of the government by a few years.” The presidents of both countries, Isaias Afwerki and Omar al-Bashir, attended the ceremony for the peace deal.  

Sudan’s president visited Eritrea on 24 March 2009, in defiance of the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant. Eritrea, itself under UN sanctions, expressed sympathy for Sudan and opposition to the arrest order. On 19 October 2011, the two countries agreed to open their borders to facilitate the movement of people and goods between them. 

Relations then appeared to stabilise until twin revolutions erupted in the east African region, initiating a process that would lead to the overthrow of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 2018, as well as the removal of Omar al-Bashir in 2019. The regional picture was now different from the one Asmara would have been looking at for the last three decades.  

Old suspicions began to emerge once more in 2018 when Sudan accused Eritrea of gathering soldiers at its border for an invasion. Sudan Tribune reported that Khartoum deployed parts of its army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces to Kassala state which borders Eritrea. The border was closed until months before the collapse of al-Bashir’s regime in April 2019. In January that year, speaking in Kassala state, al-Bashir said: “I announce here, from Kassala, that we are opening the border with Eritrea because they are our brothers and our people. Politics will not divide us.” In the same speech, the beleaguered president, now facing dogged protests, said his government wouldn’t be changed “through Facebook or WhatsApp; the only way to political change in Sudan is through voting.” But three months later he was gone, and the task fell to the incoming leader, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who removed al-Bashir through a coup at the height of the demonstrations.  

Relations improved suddenly keeping with a regional trend set by Abiy Ahmed who sought to reset ties both with rebel groups in Ethiopia and his neighbours. In July 2019, Yemane Gebreab, a senior Eritrean official close to Isaias, visited Khartoum to finalise the “procedural aspects of opening the common border,” and in September, a military cooperation agreement was signed between Sudan and Eritrea. When Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known more commonly as Hemedti, launched a coup in October 2021, Isaias also supported the move against the civilian leaders.  

However, the brief honeymoon period with the new regime in Khartoum was short-lived when Eritrea took a side in Sudan’s civil war in April 2023, lining up behind the army, its old foe. Eritrea has yet to formally engage in the conflict, either militarily or otherwise, despite it having continued for a year and a half. However, Isaias’ statement supporting intervention if the conflict were to reach Eritrea’s border is his strongest to date.  

Burhan has increasingly viewed Isaias as a potential ally against the RSF, valuing his capacity to train and deploy proxies to strengthen the army’s position in its fight against the paramilitary forces. The Egypt-based website Mada Masr reported that after Burhan’s visit to Asmara and the decision to allow Eritrea to train forces on behalf of Sudan, Burhan provided assurances that “all armed groups would be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces and other regular forces once the war ends”, according to an anonymous Sudanese military intelligence source. In many ways, relations have gone back in time except the civil war has led the army to use Asmara’s proxy training skills for its own benefit.  

Burhan has increasingly viewed Isaias as a potential ally against the RSF, valuing his capacity to train and deploy proxies to strengthen the army’s position in its fight against the paramilitary forces.

Eritrea’s president bases his calculations on his regime’s survival strategies rather than on the interests of the Eritrean people or neighbouring countries. His positions are liable to change at any time, depending on the outcome of the war in Sudan or the support he might receive from other countries. He has consistently shifted alliances, aligning with one side or another as circumstances evolve. This time it just happens to be the army.