On the fracturing of Somaliland’s internal security

In recent years, Somaliland’s internal security has been shaken in fundamental ways. Clashes, the formation of militias, and attendant human costs have become recurring features that challenge the country’s stability and social cohesion. Since December 2014, three anti-government armed groups have emerged and carried out operations that caused casualties and damage. Even though some were temporarily contained, new ones were announced this year. The 2022 violence in Las Anod, the 2024 clashes in Erigavo, and the current unrest in Borama and Zeila are the clearest signs of Somaliland’s growing internal security problem.

Although the root causes of these conflicts differ in timing, motivation, and actors, and while some interpret them as foreign conspiracies, opportunism, or legitimate grievances, a common thread links them all: dissatisfaction with Somaliland’s current system of resource and power-sharing. Despite their varied backgrounds, these groups and other anti-government confrontations have expressed similar demands — fair access to resources, development projects, more equitable allocation of government offices, and basic social services. Many of these grievances are legitimate, but they have repeatedly been pursued through violence.

Since its emergence in May 1991 from the ruin of Somalia's civil war, Somaliland seeks international recognition by proving itself a stable, democratic actor in the region. At the same time, expectations within the country have evolved. The population, especially the youth who form the majority and have no memory of the hardships of the early 1990s, now demands more than just stability. It asks for economic opportunities and improved living conditions as dividends of peace.

These pressures are intensified by many structural and ecological challenges. Somaliland faces climate shocks with limited access to climate finance or adaptation mechanisms. Government figures show that recent droughts in the eastern and coastal regions displaced entire communities and forced the closure of more than 150 schools, leaving 14,457 students out of class. Urban centers now host large numbers of climate-displaced families. Rural–urban migration is driven not by opportunity but by the collapse of rural livelihoods. Climate change has made farming, fishing, and pastoralism increasingly unsustainable due to dwindling pasture, water, and resources. These ecological challenges are laced with major structural failures that are eating out the trust and tolerance people have for the political system.

From the beginning, Somaliland's state building project relied on the twin pillars of peace and democracy. The first was the idea that peace was achievable by compromise, consensus, and tapping into the traditional elders for peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms. That notion has been materialised by the inclusion of clan elders during the 1993 Borama conference, later formalized in the 1997 Hargeisa conference, establishing the Guurti as the upper house of parliament with the mandate to safeguard peace, stability, culture, and Islamic values. At the time, when the scars of war were visible everywhere, elders played a vital role in mediation, trust-building, and resolving grievances. They were central to stabilizing a society emerging from devastation.

Today, however, the context has changed. The Guurti has largely become an outdated institution. The public’s concerns are no longer about demobilizing militias, removing illegal checkpoints, or settling post-war disputes — tasks for which government institutions have since been built. The challenges now come from demands for better living conditions and more equitable access to power and resources, issues that the aging council is poorly equipped to address. Record unemployment, rising living costs, and a fast-growing ecosystem of disinformation only deepen frustrations.

Speaking in Erigavo at the Sanaag National Peace Conference, Abdi Qadir Jirde, chairman of the newly formed National Peace Council, captured the severity of these issues when he said, paraphrased, that the challenges in Sanaag are the product of long-term neglect and underdevelopment dating back to colonial times and continuing under successive governments. A lack of infrastructure, social services, and investment has turned community grievances into more confrontational demands. Similar concerns were echoed by former Vice President Ahmed Yusuf Yasin regarding Awdal and Salel, where he noted that the same problems he witnessed in the 1970s during the Somali literacy campaign still persist — poor roads, lack of water systems, and the absence of basic tools for coastal communities remain unchanged after half a century.

The second pillar upon which Somaliland stands, democracy, was strengthened through the adoption of the multiparty system. Designed to return power to the people, it has enabled citizens to choose their leaders directly. While this is not the place to assess Somaliland’s two decades of multiparty politics, it is evident that political parties have increasingly become instruments for securing office rather than platforms for policy and reform, or creating agendas around the major concerns of the citizens. Weak intra-party democracy and the personalization of political parties have limited their ability to respond to community grievances or offer meaningful alternatives. Furthermore, the restriction of official political parties to three, along with the elimination of independent candidacy, has strengthened the perception that political change is impossible through elections.

These limitations of the Guurti and political parties are compounded by long-unaddressed development demands, a youthful population detached from the memory of past wars yet deeply embedded in digital networks, and a shifting geopolitical landscape in which Somaliland is tightly entangled. Emerging foreign partnerships, regional tensions, and renewed escalations with Somalia have further sharpened internal divisions at a moment when conflicts are increasingly interconnected.

Yet, all that said, sustainable peace and prosperity in Somaliland still remains within reach, but only if the country’s political elite confront the deeper realities shaping its current fragility. Addressing these factors of insecurity requires more than routine political fixes. The path forward lies in a sincere national dialogue, evidence-based policy decisions, and innovative approaches capable of meeting the demands of a rapidly evolving political landscape. Only through such a comprehensive effort can Somaliland reclaim and reinforce the foundations of lasting peace and democratic governance.