Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions and the threat to regional order

In 2018, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power, he made one of the boldest diplomatic moves by an Ethiopian leader in decades. At the time, the young prime minister was still relatively unknown, yet he reached out to Asmara in an effort to end years of hostility and repair relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The rapprochement between the two countries quickly attracted worldwide attention. A major turning point came when Ethiopia accepted the 2002 ruling of the Ethiopia–Eritrea Boundary Commission, including the decision that the disputed border town of Badme would be recognized as part of Eritrean territory. This paved the way for the historic “peace deal” signed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

The war fought between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000 over their border claimed many lives. The signing of the Algiers Agreement ended the war, but the Boundary Commission’s ruling to award Badme to Eritrea was never welcomed by Ethiopia. Since then, Badme had been a point of contention between the two countries, keeping their relations hostile.

Ethiopia’s full and unequivocal acceptance of the commission’s ruling in 2018 marked a major diplomatic shift, and its positive effects were immediate. The reconciliation ushered in a new era of communication between the peoples of the two countries. Direct phone calls were restored, and travel between Addis Ababa and Asmara by air and road became possible.

Families that had been separated for decades were reunited, and the sense of hope it created was unexpected and unbelievable. The feeling transcended borders and echoed among the diaspora communities abroad.

As part of the rapprochement, it was said that Ethiopia would gain access to Eritrea’s Massawa and Assab ports, important gateways to international trade via the Red Sea. However, the technicalities of the peace agreement remained unclear and remain little understood to this day.

After the normalization of relations between the two countries, Abiy made his first visit to Eritrea at Assab port and later announced to Ethiopians on the eve of the Ethiopian New Year that Ethiopia had begun operating in the Massawa port. For reasons not disclosed by the two countries, such endeavors never materialized.

The Ethiopia–Eritrea rapprochement of 2018 proved short-lived. Rather than fostering increased political and economic cooperation, the peace deal spurred a military alliance between the two governments, aligned against the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the former dominant ruling party in Ethiopia, perceived as a “common threat” by both Addis Ababa and Asmara

Despite conflicting official accounts regarding how Eritrea became involved in the Tigray war, Eritrean military forces fought alongside the Ethiopian government and have been accused of committing atrocities, including genocide.

The rift between Ethiopia and Eritrea emerged shortly after the 2022 Pretoria Peace Accord, which brought an end to the devastating Tigray war, a conflict that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and silenced the fighting in Tigray. Although Eritrea played an active role in the war, it was excluded from the peace agreement. That exclusion fueled resentment within the Eritrean government and later contributed to rising tensions after Ethiopia expressed interest in securing access to the sea.

Some observers note that even though the conflict is regarded as a non-international armed conflict, they question why Eritrea was not included in the peace accord.

Since Abiy Ahmed revived the issue in a public lecture on October 13, 2023, arguing that Ethiopia’s lack of direct sea access could become a source of conflict in the Horn of Africa, the matter has come to dominate Ethiopian political discourse. Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive pursuit of maritime access has placed Addis Ababa at odds with almost all of its neighboring states.

In the broadcasted public lecture on state television, the prime minister emphasized the importance of water and said the Red Sea and the Blue Nile are interlinked resources that determine Ethiopia's future. He also stated that there was an agreement giving Ethiopia legitimate historical, geographical, economic, and ethnic rights over the Red Sea, without specifying which agreement or when it was signed.

The statement made relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea even more hostile, and escalation began to occur. Eritrea expressed its concern that Abiy’s statement undermines its sovereignty. As a consequence, direct phone calls that had been restored in 2018 were stopped, road transport was close, followed later by air transportation, and this ultimately led to the closure of the Eritrean Embassy in Addis Ababa.

Access to the sea is an existential matter for Ethiopia, as captured in Abiy's statement: "A population of 150 million can't live in a geographic prison." He also said Ethiopia is committed to giving away a percentage share of one of its resources—such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopian Airlines, or Ethio-telecom—in exchange for a port.

The push for sea access comes at a time of domestic crises and intensifying proxy wars in the Horn of Africa, casting doubt on the claim that Ethiopia’s ambitions are driven solely by economic necessity.

In the midst of Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive pursuit of sea access, Addis Ababa signed a deal in 2024 with Somaliland, the self-declared breakaway region of Somalia that has long sought international recognition. According to Ethiopian officials, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) would provide Ethiopia with access to the Red Sea and allow it to pursue commercial and infrastructure development through the Port of Berbera in return for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence.

According the analysis published in Eurasia view, Ethiopia’s quest for sea access, is not solely a strategic necessity but a hegemonic strategy aimed at keeping Eritrea weak and maintaining a fractured, decentralized Somalia as a client state.

Ethiopia’s perception of Somalia’s progress (debt relief, arms embargo lift, East African Community accession) as a threat to its regional dominance led to the signing of the MOU. Concurrently, Houthi attacks disrupting Red Sea trade have increased the geostrategic importance of Somalia’s coastline, leading Western and Gulf states to erroneously seek Ethiopia as a hegemonic proxy to counter the threats, overlooking its domestic crises.

This dynamic was further exacerbated by proxy competition involving Gulf states, particularly the UAE, which has remained one of Abiy’s closest allies. The UAE’s ruler, Mohammed bin Zayed (commonly known as MBZ), has played a key role in supporting Ethiopia politically and economically. In contrast, Abu Dhabi’s relations with several of Ethiopia’s neighbors have often been tense or openly hostile. Djibouti, for example, has been locked in a prolonged legal dispute with DP World, a company closely linked to Abu Dhabi, and Djibouti’s president recently accused the UAE of acting as a destabilizing force in the region. Somalia’s relations with the UAE have also been rocky. Mogadishu previously annulled several agreements with the UAE, leading to a deterioration in diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The deal signed between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa undermined Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and, as a result, faced serious condemnation from Somalia as an act of aggression. The move stirred controversy and animosity between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The details of the MoU remain unclear on how Ethiopia will gain access to a port, even after the Ankara Declaration in late 2024, which abrogated the MoU implicitly. The signing of the declaration has de-escalated tension and normalization of relations among Somalia and Ethiopia.

Somalia’s effective diplomacy in the international arena, combined with intensified regional backlashes and rival alignments against Ethiopia, pushed Addis Ababa to reconsider alternatives, including accessing the Red Sea through Eritrea. This shift has also been interpreted as a mechanism used by the Ethiopian government to unify a divided society by invoking Ethiopia’s historic greatness, as well as a method of survival for the incumbent party.

Regarding the means by which Ethiopia will pursue the Red Sea agenda, things remain unclear when we consider statements made by the country's leader and various high government officials.

In his address to parliament on October, 2024 , Abiy said that Ethiopia aspires to pursue the Red Sea access quest through peaceful means and that the country does not need war with its neighbors. In contrary, On March, 2025 , a high-ranking military official in the country, during Adwa Victory Day, stated that Ethiopia's demand to be a member of the Red Sea community is inevitable. In his speech, the military official echoed the music of war and made similar repetitive comments on different occasions, violating the rights of sovereign nations and triggering acts of war.

On October, 2025, in the prime minister's first address to parliament in the Ethiopian fiscal year, Abiy reiterated what he had stated in his public lecture: that Ethiopia's Red Sea issue is a legal, historical, geographical, and economic matter.

In discussing the legality of Ethiopia's claim, it is imperative to identify what kind of sea access Ethiopia is seeking. From the outset, exactly what kind of sea access Ethiopia seeks has not been clear, at least to the public. Conflicting narratives and discourses have since become common regarding Ethiopia’s ambitions.

In his October, 2025 parliamentary address, Abiy called on the international community to intervene as mediators and bring a solution to Ethiopia's sea access conundrum through peaceful means. This kind of statement suggests that Ethiopia is interested in give-and-take diplomacy rather than unilaterally owning a port.

Nevertheless, in a piece written by an Ethiopian ambassador on a platform that claims to be an "independent research and publication think tank," it was clearly stated that the decision that made Ethiopia lose sea access is not destiny but rather a political settlement. The ambassador explains that Ethiopia's pursuit of sovereign maritime access is neither a revisionist project nor a destabilizing ambition, but a claim legitimately rooted in historical justice, economic necessity, and regional stability.

Most of the discourses disseminated from government-owned media and affiliated institutions concerning what kind of access Ethiopia is advocating for align with “sovereign sea access.”

Internationally, various legal frameworks have been developed to protect the rights of landlocked states. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) provides a framework that enables nations with no sea access to access maritime routes based on negotiated arrangements with coastal nations. Under Article 125 of the convention, landlocked states have the right of access to and from the sea, including the use of ports and transportation infrastructure for trade and economic activities.

Article 127 grants freedom of transit, prohibiting coastal states from imposing unnecessary restrictions or excessive tariffs. Moreover, Article 131 maintains that ships flying the flag of a landlocked state receive equal treatment in transit-state ports.

The legal provisions explained under UNCLOS basically refer to access through a lease, which is based on a temporary and contractual arrangement dependent on agreement terms, whereas sovereign access is a permanent and inherent right recognized by international law.

The key difference between the two is that leasing is a commercial arrangement with specific terms and temporal limits, providing economic opportunities without full control. In contrast, sovereign access is a permanent right of coastal states and involves full control.

Ethiopia became a state party to UNCLOS in 1982 and ratified it in 2012, though it has not yet deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN Secretary-General. As a result, the provisions of the Convention do not formally apply to Ethiopia. However, many of its provisions are binding on every nation because they have become part of customary law.

Ethiopia's claim for sovereign sea access holds no weight because it contradicts this treaty. Ethiopia willingly and voluntarily recognized Eritrea as an independent sovereign state in 1993. Ethiopia also agreed in the Algiers Agreement after the bloody war—a decision that limited the border between the two countries based on colonial treaties, which allowed Eritrea to possess the territories it now has. The international community's recognition of Eritrea is also worth noting.

The UNCLOS framework has inherent limitations and difficulties regarding Ethiopia's quest. It does not provide clear mechanisms for forcing non-cooperative coastal states to grant transit rights, leaving disputes to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

Ethiopia might argue that UNGA Resolution 390A from 1950 can replace the old colonial treaties, so those treaties no longer define the border.

Lex posterior (later treaty supersedes earlier one) applies only if the later instrument is a binding treaty. Resolution 390A is a non-binding UNGA recommendation (only UN Security Council resolutions can bind states under the UN Charter). Even if it were binding, Ethiopia's acceptance of the colonial arrangement invalidates the resolution, so lex posterior would actually work against Ethiopia.

In this regard, Ethiopia's claim is a clear breach of the treaty that landlocked countries have no right to own coastal areas of sovereign states, and it undermines international law.

Ethiopia’s quest for sovereign access to the sea is driven not only by it is own strategic and economic interests, but also by a broader historical revisionism that challenges the territorial settlement of the Horn of Africa, including the sovereignty of neighboring states such as Eritrea. On October, 2025, Abiy publicly questioned the legality of Eritrea’s control over the port of Assab. He asked, “Who made the decision that caused Ethiopia to lose access to the Red Sea?” and claimed that no official documentation has been found explaining how Ethiopia lost its maritime access, implying that the process itself may have lacked legal legitimacy.

The transitional government in Ethiopia in 1993, which recognized the independence of Eritrea, had a mandate emanating from the transitional charter. The authority was empowered to pass such decisions. International law does not require governments to be democratically elected to give recognition to entities as sovereign nations.

Whether a government is democratically elected or not, the decision to recognize an entity as an independent sovereign state is generally considered irreversible under international law. State recognition reflects the formal political will of nations and the broader international community. For more than three decades, Eritrea has existed as a sovereign state that is internationally recognized without any legal ambiguity. Its sovereignty has rarely been seriously questioned on the regional and international stage.

Moreover, even if it lacked authority internally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which is considered a reflection of customary international law, states in Article 27 that a state cannot invoke its own internal law to avoid treaty obligations. The argument advanced by Ethiopia is problematic for this reason.

Historical and legal claims are interrelated and intertwined. The claim that Eritrea has been part of Ethiopia based on history is highly contested. One argument Ethiopia makes is that it had used the Red Sea in its long history as a major outlet to engage in diplomatic and commercial relationships with the rest of the world. During the Axumite kingdom, ports such as Adulis and Massawa gave access to Red Sea trade routes.

Ethiopia's claim from this historical standpoint is simply nonsensical. The Axumite kingdom in its era of prominence controlled not only what is now Eritrean territory but also other countries as far as Yemen. The idea that Ethiopia can claim the Red Sea based on Axumite control would mean it could claim other territories now under sovereign nations.

In addition, what is now the Eritrean coastline was controlled for centuries by external empires, including the Ottoman Empire, before coming under Egyptian influence, which maintained a presence in key ports such as Massawa from 1865 through the mid-1880s. If pre-colonial or ancient historical ties were considered sufficient legal grounds for modern territorial claims, then virtually every former empire could assert claims over present-day sovereign states. By that logic, invoking the Axumite Kingdom as the basis for Ethiopia’s contemporary territorial claims would create an untenable precedent in international relations. Moreover, Eritrea has not been part of Ethiopia throughout most of modern history, except during the brief period following the 1952 federation arrangement.

The periodization of the "modern history of Ethiopia" begins with Kassa Hailu—or his coronation name, Emperor Tewodros II—in 1855. The modern state in its true sense began after the battle of Adwa and the territorial conquests under Emperor Menelik II. Menelik agreed that Eritrea would remain an Italian colony, and that is where the colonial agreement emerged.

Another extension of this argument is the Afar ethnic claim. It argues that because the majority of the Afar people reside in Ethiopia, the Afar-inhabited Red Sea coastal areas of Eritrea (including Assab) should belong to Ethiopia.

The proposal to annex Assab by invoking Afar self-determination fails because Russia's annexation of Crimea—the analogy offered—was itself illegal under the UN Charter, and any Ethiopian attempt to annex Assab by force would violate the jus cogens norm prohibiting aggression. Furthermore, the Afar sultanates were historically independent from Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Eritrean Afars fought for and voted overwhelmingly for Eritrean independence, and annexation would violate African Union principles upholding colonial borders and territorial integrity. Thus, the Afar in Assab possess only a right to internal self-determination within Eritrea, not a right to secede and join Ethiopia.

The economic necessity argument advanced by Ethiopia relates to the country's developmental ambitions. It is argued that access to the sea is vital for sustainable development.

This argument is also highly questionable. In the past, Ethiopia itself demonstrated one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, if not the world, without direct sea access.

Several other countries have grown their economies without direct sea access. Blaming the lack of sea access may also not reflect reality. Ethiopia has one of the most inefficient logistics sectors. Without addressing the real challenges in that sector, having direct access to the Red Sea would not bring meaningful change.

Security concerns across the country also have their own negative impact. Security issues are major hurdles for society and for investors. Before trying to secure sea access, ensuring peace in the country would be far more beneficial.

Based on these grounds, Eritrea has maintained the position that Ethiopia is advancing expansionist tendencies and has firmly rejected Ethiopia's quest on numerous instances to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Eritrea has framed Ethiopia's question as a tactic by the Ethiopian government to divert attention from its lack of legitimacy and domestic crises.

Ethiopia’s ambition to regain access to the Red Sea is fraught with significant geopolitical challenges. One of the primary obstacles lies in the complex and unstable relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The absence of a clear and durable framework governing relations between the two states continues to undermine the possibility of Ethiopian maritime access through Eritrean territory. This reflects the deep historical hostility and mistrust that have long defined relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara.

Geopolitical rivalries in the Horn of Africa further complicate Ethiopia’s ambitions. Competition among regional and external powers has intensified tensions, fueled proxy conflicts, and increased military and political involvement in the region. Gulf states, in particular, have become deeply invested in the Horn due to its strategic maritime location and proximity to major global shipping routes. As a result, the question of Red Sea access cannot be separated from the broader struggle for regional influence among these emerging actors.

Ethiopia’s recent shift in discourse, from framing Red Sea access as an economic necessity to increasingly securitizing the issue, has heightened the risk of conflict in the Horn of Africa. One could argue that Ethiopia’s pursuit is less about correcting a perceived historical injustice and more about securing regional hegemony, even at the potential cost of redrawing the geopolitical map of the Horn. Whether such an assertive ambition can ultimately materialize remains uncertain. What is beyond dispute, however, is that any regional project that undermines the territorial sovereignty of states in the region risks pushing the Horn back toward hostility and instability at a time when international law and the rules-based order are already under significant strain.