Ethiopia weighs a recognized Somaliland

On December 26, 2025, Israel announced its official recognition of Somaliland as an independent state, becoming the first country to take this step since Hargeisa reinstated its separation from Somalia in 1991. The announcement went beyond mere symbolism, it spoke of exchanging ambassadors, opening diplomatic missions in both capitals, and launching paths of cooperation in development, technology, health, and regional security in the Horn of Africa.

While this move did not come out of nowhere, given earlier contacts and quiet preparations, it nonetheless marked a qualitative shift whose geopolitical and strategic consequence extend well beyond Somalia and Somaliland, reshaping calculations across the Horn of Africa and into the wider Middle East.

It is within this expanding field of consequences that Ethiopia’s position becomes especially consequential. Addis Ababa has officially adopted a cautious posture toward recognizing Somaliland, with the Ethiopian ambassador to Somalia, Suleiman Daddafee, noting that the government is monitoring developments closely and deliberately, without committing to a fixed timetable or a specific date for a decision. The Ambassador further emphasized that stability remains Ethiopia’s top priority, noting that the transformations unfolding in the Horn directly touch Ethiopian strategic interests, particularly access to the Red Sea and the balance of regional security.

Ethiopian analyses echo this restraint. Horn Review, for instance, argues that Ethiopia’s approach to Somaliland has a direct impact on the wider dynamics of the Horn. From this perspective, patience is not hesitation but strategy, paired with active regional engagement through deeper security, economic, and port cooperation with Somaliland, while keeping dialogue with Somalia open to avoid escalation and preserve overall stability.

The same analysis suggests that Ethiopia can help consolidate the emerging order in Somaliland rather than destabilize it, through careful preparation, tight coordination, and securing wide international support for any final recognition. Rushing is unnecessary, but passivity is equally unjustified. Timing, more than anything else, will shape Somaliland’s future and the balance of power in the Red Sea.

According to Somalilander sources, Ethiopia is actively studying the path toward recognition as a possible step that would make it the second country to formally acknowledge Somaliland’s independence. This is unfolding within a delicate diplomatic choreography that goes beyond a simple bilateral decision. The Ethiopian state minister, Tarekegn Bululta Godana, reflected this thinking when he described Israel’s recognition as “a significant diplomatic move” that could alter the future trajectory of the Horn of Africa, hinting that any Ethiopian decision will be taken within a broad regional strategic calculus.

This logic has deep roots. Former Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi once remarked that Ethiopia “would not be the first to recognize Somaliland, but it would not be the third either” . The statement reveals a long-standing approach that was never about rejecting the idea of Somaliland as a state, but about waiting for the right moment and managing the political and strategic costs.

French daily Le Monde has similarly noted that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed treats the Somaliland file as a geopolitical pressure card within a wider strategy aimed at diversifying Ethiopia’s access to the sea. This approach is inseparable from Addis Ababa’s effort to reposition itself in Red Sea and Horn of Africa equations, using Somaliland as a negotiating option that widens its room for maneuver without rushing into final steps that could upset regional balances or trigger a direct clash with Somalia and its partners.

This careful Ethiopian positioning is not abstract or merely rhetorical. It has been shaped over time by concrete interactions and tested through practical arrangements that brought Somaliland into Ethiopia’s immediate strategic horizon. The most visible expression of this was the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland in January 2024, an agreement that did not suddenly create new interests but rather revealed how far Addis Ababa had already moved in recalibrating its approach.

Today, Addis Ababa faces the chance to revisit such an arrangement under different circumstances, potentially on more favorable terms, precisely because any new agreement would be concluded with a recognized state, offering stronger legal grounding and reducing the cost of regional objections.

By granting Ethiopia access to the port of Berbera in exchange for an implicit commitment to move toward recognizing Somaliland, the MoU marked a turning point. Even though it was later frozen under Somalia and Turkish pressure, it exposed a qualitative shift in Ethiopian thinking and moved Somaliland from the margins of international debate into the heart of Red Sea calculations. Today, Addis Ababa faces the chance to revisit such an arrangement under different circumstances, potentially on more favorable terms, precisely because any new agreement would now be concluded with a recognized state, offering stronger legal grounding and reducing the cost of regional objections.

For years, Addis Ababa has sought to break its geographic confinement and reach the Red Sea. Berbera port offers an alternative outlet, especially after its development by DP World with a capacity estimated at around half a million containers annually. With proposed railway lines linking the port deep into Ethiopian territory, this route could significantly reduce Ethiopia’s near total dependence on Djibouti for its foreign trade.

Consolidating Somaliland’s independence would also reshape the maritime map of the Red Sea, effectively dividing it into competing zones of influence. One axis could bring together Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Israel, while another would be led by Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia, with the Houthis emerging as a third force imposing their own equations on maritime security through coercive power.

The picture is not only about security alignments. The Times of Israel has reported on the emergence of a new international economic corridor stretching from India through Yemen, Somaliland, and Ethiopia toward Europe, with Hargeisa and Addis Ababa playing roles that bypass traditional choke points. This reading gains weight when seen alongside Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and the Indian prime minister’s visit to Ethiopia in mid December 2025, suggesting that recent diplomatic moves are not isolated events but part of a broader effort to reengineer economic and geopolitical positioning in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Regional power plays

Despite Ethiopia’s central and sensitive role in this equation, reactions from Somalia, Egypt, Turkey, and others to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland were swift and sharp, reflecting a clear awareness of the potential geopolitical repercussions. Egypt’s stance, in particular, goes beyond diplomatic solidarity with Somalia. Cairo is keen to safeguard its influence along the Red Sea and in the Horn, and by rejecting recognition it seeks to contain strategic shifts that could favor Ethiopia, Israel, or some Gulf states, shifts that would unsettle regional power balances and limit Egypt’s leverage over maritime security.

Djibouti follows a similar logic. Its refusal to recognize Somaliland stems from a desire to preserve its status as a key logistical hub at Bab al Mandab. Djibouti understands that formal recognition of Somaliland, coupled with Ethiopia’s drive to diversify its maritime outlets through Berbera, could redirect the regional center of gravity and gradually erode the influence Djibouti has accumulated as Ethiopia’s almost exclusive maritime gateway.

In conclusion, all signs suggest that Ethiopia’s readiness to recognize Somaliland has become a matter of timing rather than principle. Strategic logic points clearly in this direction. Turning that logic into an actual decision, however, will require Addis Ababa to withstand regional and international pressure by embedding its Somaliland policy within a clear and coherent national narrative. Any potential recognition would need to be framed not as support for secession, but as a pragmatic response to an existing historical and political reality, one that takes regional balances into account and seeks to reorganize relations with the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa on more realistic and stable foundations.