Ethiopia and Sudan in the post-2018 era

For decades, the Horn of Africa has been understood through the lens of a “regional security complex” in which the domestic stability of one state is inseparable from the vulnerabilities of its neighbours. Few bilateral relationships illustrate this interdependence more clearly than that between Ethiopia and Sudan. Both are among the region’s most consequential states, and their relations since 2018 have oscillated between peaceful coexistence and mutual distrust.

The political transition in Ethiopia in 2018 marked a departure from the country’s earlier security posture. Following the rise of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian government articulated what it described as an “inside-out” foreign policy approach that prioritised regional engagement. Neighbouring states were framed not merely as strategic partners but as societies historically intertwined with Ethiopia through shared communities, cultures, and economic networks.

This rhetoric represented a break from the security orientation that had characterised much of the previous government’s external relations. For nearly two decades, Ethiopia’s regional policy had been shaped by a persistent perception of encirclement. Relations with neighbouring governments were often characterised by opacity and strategic distrust, and Addis Ababa frequently viewed instability beyond its borders as a direct threat to regime survival. Within this framework, Ethiopia at times supported armed opposition groups in neighbouring states while simultaneously pursuing an assertive military posture designed to deter perceived regional threats.

The new administration attempted to reframe this approach. Rather than treating borders primarily as defensive frontiers, Ethiopian officials presented them as potential zones of economic connectivity. Regional peace diplomacy and cross-border economic integration became central themes of the government’s diplomatic messaging.

Initially, this shift appeared to yield tangible results. Ethiopia played a visible mediating role during Sudan’s 2019 political transition following the removal of President Omar Al-Bashir. Working alongside the African Union, Ethiopian diplomats helped facilitate negotiations between Sudan’s military leadership and civilian protest movements, contributing to the formation of a transitional governing arrangement. For a brief period, this mediation reinforced the impression that a more cooperative regional order in the Horn might be emerging.

That period of optimism proved short-lived. By late 2020, the fragile equilibrium between Ethiopia and Sudan began to unravel. As Ethiopia became increasingly absorbed by the war in Tigray (2020–2022), Sudanese forces moved into the contested Al-Fashaga borderlands, an agriculturally fertile area cultivated for decades by Ethiopian farmers but claimed by Sudan under earlier colonial boundary agreements.

Although the immediate trigger was Ethiopia’s internal conflict, the Al-Fashaga dispute itself has deeper historical roots. The contested boundary traces back to agreements negotiated during the Anglo-Ethiopian boundary arrangements of the early twentieth century, particularly the 1902 treaty that attempted to delineate the frontier between imperial Ethiopia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Subsequent efforts to clarify the demarcation remained incomplete, leaving sections of the border effectively governed through informal arrangements rather than mutually recognised administrative control.

The dispute also became entangled in Sudan’s own domestic power struggles. Following Bashir’s removal, Sudan’s transitional authority was divided between civilian political actors and the military establishment. Control of Al-Fashaga provided an opportunity for the military leadership to project nationalist credentials and consolidate domestic legitimacy during a period of political uncertainty.

At the same time, mutual suspicion deepened between the two states. Ethiopian officials accused Sudan of allowing logistical support to reach Tigrayan forces during the conflict, including training and supply facilitation across the border. Reports also suggested that refugees in eastern Sudan were recruited or permitted to join Tigrayan armed units operating near the frontier. Sudanese authorities, for their part, framed their actions in Al-Fashaga as the restoration of sovereign territory rather than opportunistic expansion.

These developments revived patterns of indirect confrontation that have periodically characterised relations in the Horn. Allegations circulated within Ethiopian policy circles that Sudanese military actors tolerated and supported insurgent movements operating in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, where attacks on infrastructure connected to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) have occurred. Whether fully substantiated or not, such claims reinforced a growing perception in Addis Ababa that Sudan had returned to older practices of proxy competition.

Overlaying these tensions is the continuing geopolitical significance of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Ethiopia presents the GERD primarily as a developmental necessity. With millions of citizens lacking reliable electricity access, the dam has been framed domestically as a cornerstone of economic transformation and justified under international water law through the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation of transboundary rivers.

Egypt, by contrast, approaches the project through a markedly different historical and strategic framework. Egyptian policymakers have long treated the Nile as a matter of existential national security. Because the country depends almost entirely on the river for freshwater supply, Cairo has historically defended colonial-era water agreements that allocated the majority of Nile flows to Egypt and Sudan. Within this perspective, any upstream project capable of regulating river discharge raises concerns about long-term water security.

By the time the GERD reached full operational capacity in 2025, the central question had shifted from whether the dam would be built to how its reservoir and water releases would be managed. While Sudan initially expressed cautious support for the project, recognising potential benefits such as regulated flood control and access to relatively inexpensive electricity, its position gradually became more ambivalent. Sudanese policymakers increasingly emphasised the need for detailed operational agreements governing data sharing, reservoir filling, and drought-period water releases.

External diplomatic pressures also shaped this shift. Egypt has historically maintained significant political and security ties with Sudan, often viewing the country as a strategic buffer within the broader Nile basin. From Cairo’s perspective, alignment with Khartoum offers leverage in negotiations with Ethiopia over basin governance.

As a result, the GERD dispute has become embedded in wider regional calculations involving alliances, economic access, and strategic positioning. Egyptian diplomacy has sought to mobilise international pressure, including appeals to external mediators and major powers, to encourage Ethiopia to accept a binding framework governing dam operations. Ethiopian officials, meanwhile, remain wary that such arrangements could constrain their control over a project that has become central to national development planning.

Sudan’s fragile political transition collapsed on 15 April 2023 when a brutal civil war erupted in Khartoum between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. What began as a power struggle within the transitional security apparatus quickly evolved into a protracted civil war that has produced one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world.

The conflict has also drawn in a wide array of regional and international actors whose interests intersect in Sudan. This external involvement has complicated mediation efforts and reshaped Sudan’s relations with neighbouring states, particularly Ethiopia.

Part of the reason for this heightened external engagement lies in the broader geopolitical moment in which the conflict erupted. Several Middle Eastern states were simultaneously consolidating domestic economic reforms while seeking to expand their strategic presence along the Red Sea corridor. Sudan’s location at the intersection of the Nile Basin, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea makes it a particularly significant arena for such competition.

Within this wider contest, different actors have aligned with the two rival Sudanese factions. Egypt, Eritrea, and several regional security actors have been widely associated with the SAF, while the United Arab Emirates has been frequently linked to the RSF. Other states in the region, including South Sudan and Kenya, have at times engaged with RSF representatives as part of diplomatic and logistical channels. Meanwhile, non-state actors, including rebel movements and private military networks, have further blurred the boundaries between internal and external conflict dynamics.

Given this context, the position of Sudan’s two large neighbours, Egypt to the north and Ethiopia to the southeast, has been particularly consequential. Each country possesses significant strategic interests in Sudan, ranging from Nile Basin politics to border security and regional influence.

Ethiopia’s contested neutrality

Since the outbreak of the war, Ethiopia has consistently called for a negotiated political settlement. Addis Ababa has emphasised that Sudan’s stability is directly linked to its own security and economic interests. The conflict has disrupted long-standing cross-border ties: Ethiopian communities living in Sudan have been displaced, commercial routes have collapsed, and formal economic exchanges have largely stalled. Ethiopian Airlines, which previously operated multiple daily flights to Khartoum, suspended its services, and Sudanese airspace has effectively closed to Ethiopian traffic. In the absence of formal economic channels, informal networks — including contraband trade, arms smuggling, and cross-border criminal activity — have expanded.

Despite Ethiopia’s official neutrality, its position has been repeatedly questioned. Sudan has alleged that Ethiopia maintains direct links with the RSF. These suspicions are partly shaped by the broader alignment of regional actors. Media reports, most notably a Reuters investigation, have also alleged that RSF training activities occurred on Ethiopian territory with financial backing from the United Arab Emirates.

Part of the controversy emerged during 2023–2024, when RSF leader Hemetti made several visits to Addis Ababa. During these visits he publicly criticised the Sudanese army’s military advance into the disputed Al-Fashaga borderlands and called for a negotiated settlement of the territorial dispute. For some observers in Khartoum, these engagements reinforced the perception that Ethiopia was politically sympathetic to the RSF.

Ethiopian officials, however, have rejected this interpretation. They argue that Addis Ababa, as the seat of the African Union and a frequent venue for diplomatic mediation, regularly hosts political actors from across the continent. According to Ethiopian policymakers, engaging both sides in Sudan’s civil war is consistent with efforts to facilitate dialogue rather than evidence of political alignment with either faction.

The civil war has also altered the military dynamics along the contested Ethio–Sudan border. As the SAF redeployed large portions of its forces from eastern Sudan toward the central battlefronts, the previously militarised Al-Fashaga frontier became comparatively less active. Despite this shift, Ethiopia has refrained from deploying forces to reoccupy the contested farmland. Instead, Addis Ababa has maintained its earlier position that the territorial dispute should be addressed through bilateral negotiations once a stable Sudanese government emerges after the war.

The Sudan war has unfolded at a time when Ethiopia itself has been redefining key elements of its regional strategy. Since the political reforms of 2018, Ethiopian policymakers have increasingly emphasised the country’s structural vulnerability as the world’s most populous landlocked state. Nearly all of Ethiopia’s external trade currently passes through the port of Djibouti, creating a level of economic dependence that many officials in Addis Ababa consider “strategically unsustainable.”

This concern has contributed to a shift in Ethiopia’s strategic doctrine toward securing more diversified access to maritime outlets. Ethiopian leaders have publicly argued that the heavy concentration of global military bases in Djibouti, belonging to several competing powers, poses potential risks to Ethiopia’s economic security. In response, Addis Ababa has explored various arrangements with neighbouring littoral states that could provide long-term access to port infrastructure. These ambitions, however, have generated anxiety across the region. Governments in Somalia and Eritrea have interpreted Ethiopia’s rhetoric on maritime access as potentially challenging existing territorial arrangements, while Sudanese policymakers have remained cautious about any proposals that might alter Red Sea power balances.

Breaking the cycle

Since 2018, relations between Ethiopia and Sudan have moved between cooperation and confrontation. Border disputes, internal political crises, Nile Basin politics, and the interventions of external actors, from Egypt to the Gulf states, have all contributed to a persistent climate of strategic mistrust.

Breaking this pattern requires addressing the domestic vulnerabilities that often spill across borders in the Horn of Africa. Both states face politically marginalised regions along their shared frontier, areas where weak governance and economic exclusion have enabled armed movements and informal economies to flourish. Unless these structural grievances are addressed, the borderlands will continue to serve as spaces where local conflicts intersect with regional rivalries.

A more durable relationship would require Ethiopia and Sudan to disentangle their security policies from cycles of proxy competition. Earlier periods of mutual destabilisation ultimately weakened both states: Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation culminated in the secession of Eritrea in the early 1990s, while Sudan’s prolonged civil wars contributed to the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

A different trajectory is still possible. The two countries share extensive cross-border communities, interconnected economies, and transboundary resources, most notably the Nile Basin. These linkages could form the basis for pragmatic cooperation in areas such as energy interconnection, cross-border trade corridors, and infrastructure integration.

Whether such cooperation can emerge will depend largely on the ability of both states to stabilise their domestic political orders. Without that foundation, regional diplomacy will remain vulnerable to the same cycles of suspicion and proxy competition that have repeatedly shaped relations in the Horn.