Erdoğan in Addis as Turkey seeks bigger role in horn of Africa

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arrived in Addis Ababa on Tuesday, for an official visit, his first to Ethiopia in more than a decade, at the invitation of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The trip coincides with the 100th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries, giving the visit both political and symbolic weight.

Ankara has framed the visit as a milestone aimed at “elevating bilateral ties to a higher level.” Turkish officials previously indicated that “several agreements and documents,” whose negotiations have already been completed, are expected to be signed.

In a series of posts on his X account, Abiy welcomed the visit as a reflection of deepening ties. “It is my greatest pleasure to warmly welcome H.E. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the Republic of Türkiye to the Land of Origins on his official visit,” he wrote. “Our exchange of visits reflects the strength of the deep partnership between Türkiye and Ethiopia. From Ankara to Addis Ababa, I look forward to productive discussions that will further deepen cooperation and strengthen the enduring bonds between our two ancient nations.”

In a subsequent post, Abiy said he had held “substantive discussions” with Erdoğan, adding that the talks reinforced “the enduring friendship and robust cooperation that underpin Ethiopia–Türkiye relations.” He noted that both sides exchanged views on strategic areas of collaboration and “reaffirmed their commitment to advancing partnerships that serve the interests of both countries.”

Following their talks, the two leaders held a joint press briefing. Erdoğan emphasized regional ownership of regional problems. “We believe that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves, and the Horn of Africa should not be turned into an arena of struggle for foreign powers,” he said. He also reiterated Turkey’s opposition to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, stating: “In this context, I would like to reiterate once again that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland benefits neither Somaliland nor the Horn of Africa.”

Abiy, for his part, again raised Ethiopia’s long-standing concerns over access to the sea. “Ethiopia has become a geographical prisoner,” he said, adding that “this is not right,” underscoring Addis Ababa’s continued push to secure sea access arrangements.

Over the past two decades, Turkey has steadily deepened its engagement in the Horn of Africa under its “Opening to Africa” policy launched in the early 2000s. What began as diplomatic outreach has evolved into a multidimensional strategy encompassing political ties, trade expansion, development assistance, and military cooperation.

Ankara has increased the number of its embassies across the continent and expanded direct flight routes through Turkish Airlines, signaling both political intent and economic ambition. In the Horn, Turkey’s presence is especially pronounced in Somalia, where it has funded major infrastructure projects. Humanitarian assistance during periods of famine and instability helped cement Turkey’s image as a “reliable partner.”

This engagement culminated in the establishment of Turkey’s largest overseas military training base in Mogadishu and major hydrocarbon deals with Somalia, where Turkey has secured favorable terms, underscoring Ankara’s long-term ambition to expand its influence in the region.

Turkey’s rise in the region has coincided with intensified involvement by Gulf states — notably Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar — particularly since around 2015. Their engagement has been driven by strategic considerations. The Horn sits astride critical maritime routes linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, making it central to the security of energy shipments and global trade flows.

For Gulf monarchies heavily dependent on secure sea lanes, influence along these corridors is a strategic imperative. Investments in ports, and logistics infrastructure have also provided opportunities to secure influences across the region. Although the Horn is not always at the top of Gulf foreign policy priorities, it is often viewed as their “near abroad” due to geographic proximity and intertwined security concerns.

However, the involvement of multiple Gulf actors, at times backing competing local factions, has produced overlapping and occasionally conflicting agendas. Their rivalries have intersected with Turkey’s ambitions, resulting in fluctuating balances of influence across the region.

More recently, Israel has expanded its footprint in the Horn of Africa. In late 2025, Israel formally recognized Somaliland, presenting the move as part of a broader effort to expand the Abraham Accords framework and strengthen its strategic position along the Red Sea corridor. The decision signaled an intent to secure maritime interests and build alliances near key shipping routes, while also fitting into Israel’s wider strategy of countering Iran and its regional network of allies.

Israel’s growing involvement places it in more direct competition with Turkey, whose influence in Somalia and the wider Horn has expanded significantly. What was once a rivalry centered primarily on the Eastern Mediterranean has increasingly extended into East Africa, adding another layer of geopolitical competition to an already crowded regional space.

The Addis Ababa visit comes as part of a broader Turkish diplomatic push toward Africa and the Middle East. Days earlier, the Turkish presidency announced that Erdoğan would also visit the United Arab Emirates, with agreements expected at both stops. Turkish media later reported that the Abu Dhabi leg had been postponed.

Beyond its practical objectives, the trip carries symbolic weight. Turkish coverage has linked it to the centennial of diplomatic ties, presenting it as a signal of both sides’ desire to transform a historical relationship into measurable partnerships in trade, investment, and infrastructure. In Turkish discourse, Ethiopia is portrayed as a pivotal state in East Africa, a large market and an influential political actor in Horn affairs.

Economically, both sides are seeking to expand trade and deepen the presence of Turkish companies in infrastructure, construction, energy, and services. While official announcements have not detailed the signed agreements, repeated references to “documents whose negotiations have been completed” suggest Ankara aims to make the visit a launchpad for ready-to-implement arrangements rather than a purely ceremonial engagement.

Another factor adding momentum to the visit is Ankara’s role as a mediator in tensions that have emerged over the past two years between Ethiopia and Somalia, particularly regarding sea access and port arrangements. Turkish coverage has linked the trip to efforts to reinforce Ankara’s image as a facilitator of de-escalation, at a time when Addis Ababa remains central to East Africa’s security and trade dynamics.

Domestically, Erdoğan’s visit comes as Ethiopia’s government works to consolidate economic and security priorities in the post-Tigray war phase, amid ongoing internal security challenges in several regions including loaming another round of conflict in Tigray. For its part, Turkey continues to expand its African footprint by combining trade, investment, and diplomacy — an approach that has characterized many of its engagements across the continent in recent years.