“The Emirates is supplying the RSF”: Sudan’s ambassador in Djibouti   

As Sudan’s brutal civil war grinds into its third year, the humanitarian catastrophe it has spawned continues to deepen. What began as a power struggle between the Sudanese armed forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has morphed into a conflict marked by massacres, systematic rape, and ethnic cleansing, particularly targeting communities in Darfur. The United Nations now ranks Sudan among the worst displacement and hunger crises on the planet. 
 
Against this backdrop, the Sudanese government has taken the unprecedented step of filing a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, accusing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of complicity in genocide. In what observers have described as a rare legal confrontation between two Arab League member states, the Sudanese government alleges that the UAE provided direct military assistance to the RSF, including drones, armoured vehicles, and weapons that were smuggled through Chad under the guise of humanitarian aid. These arms, Sudan contends, enabled the RSF to carry out atrocities in West Darfur and beyond, particularly against the Masalit ethnic group. 
 
The case, formally submitted in March, invokes the Genocide Convention, to which both Sudan and the UAE are signatories. During preliminary hearings in April, Sudanese representatives urged the court to impose emergency measures to prevent further military support from reaching the RSF and to protect civilians. According to reporting by The Guardian, the Sudanese delegation presented documented evidence, satellite imagery, and eyewitness testimony—some of it from tribal leaders and UN personnel—linking the UAE to the flow of weapons that fuelled RSF attacks. The UAE, in its defence, has rejected the allegations as “false, defamatory, and politically motivated”, and has questioned the ICJ’s jurisdiction. 
 
“Despite warnings and efforts from Sudan and friendly governments,” says Mohamed Saeed Hassan, Sudan’s ambassador to Djibouti, “the Emirati leadership persisted in supplying weapons and equipment to the RSF.” 
 
Sudan’s legal strategy at the ICJ marks a notable shift in how states in the Global South are using international law—not merely as a post-conflict tool, but as a real-time mechanism to challenge foreign interference and seek justice. Whether the case will lead to binding rulings or reshape regional politics remains uncertain. 
 
In this exclusive interview with Geeska, ambassador Hassan reflects on Sudan’s legal arguments, military strategy, and diplomatic outreach as the war rages on. He also offers his view on the potential for peace, the humanitarian toll, and the future of Sudan’s sovereignty amid shifting regional dynamics. 
 
Abdullah Al-Fateh: Let us begin with developments on the domestic front. The war broke out after the RSF’s mutiny in mid-April 2023, and the conflict is now entering its third year. How do you assess the current political and humanitarian situation in Sudan?  
Mohamed Saeed Hassan: First, I would like to express my appreciation to Geeska for offering this important media space and for your attention to Sudanese affairs at this critical time. Regarding your question, the war began with an RSF attack outside the capital, starting with the assault on Merowe Airport on 13 April 2023, followed by a full-blown mutiny in the capital on 15 April. 
Since then, there have been many political, economic, military, and social developments. First among them is the failure of the RSF’s goal to seize power through an armed coup, thanks to the resilience of the Sudanese Armed Forces, which shifted from defence to taking the initiative and launching offensives. This included reopening the route between Wadi Seidna and the Engineering Corps in Omdurman, reclaiming the radio station, and crossing bridges linking Omdurman with Khartoum and Khartoum North. The RSF has been expelled from Sennar, Gezira, and Khartoum states, and now remnants are being pursued in Kordofan, with plans to advance into Darfur and retake areas held by the rebel militia.  
 
AF: It seems the crisis response has largely focused on military solutions, while political and humanitarian efforts remain less visible. How do you evaluate this balance in terms of reaching a comprehensive solution?  
 
MSH: There are meaningful initiatives emerging from civil society. Community leaders have played a role in raising awareness, especially in response to some communities aligning with the rebel militia. These efforts have yielded positive results, with many RSF fighters laying down their arms and abandoning the rebellion. In South Kordofan, factions have even defected from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, denouncing its alliance with the RSF and their political partner “Sumud.” Many have realised that this war has foreign fingerprints, and that these militias and their allies are merely tools in the hands of external forces seeking to divide and weaken Sudan through destructive agendas. 
 
AF: Speaking of foreign actors, Sudan has filed a complaint at the International Court of Justice against the United Arab Emirates. What are the main accusations? 
 
MSH: Yes, in March, Sudan lodged a formal complaint at The Hague against the UAE, which has unfortunately played a disruptive role in clear violation of the principles of the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the UN Charter. Despite warnings and efforts from Sudan and friendly governments, the Emirati leadership persisted in supplying weapons and equipment to the RSF. These were used to terrorise civilians through looting, kidnappings, detentions, killings, displacement, and gross violations classified as war crimes and acts of genocide, as seen in West Darfur and Gezira State. 
 
AF: On what legal basis does Sudan accuse the UAE of involvement in genocide? Is there concrete evidence? 
 
MSH: Before approaching the ICJ, Sudan filed a complaint at the UN security council, documenting the UAE’s support for the RSF and violations of Council resolutions on Darfur. Weapons were smuggled through Chad, originating from Umm Jars airport. Eyewitness accounts from both Sudanese and Chadian citizens, including tribal leaders, confirmed the use of humanitarian fronts to deliver arms to the RSF. UN mechanisms later verified the types of weapons supplied by the UAE. These were used particularly against the Masalit community in West Darfur, resulting in the displacement of hundreds of thousands to Chad. The militia has resumed atrocities, including a recent incident at the Zamzam refugee camp. 
 
AF: How has the UAE’s involvement affected the security and humanitarian situation in Sudan? 
 
MSH: After being pushed out of Gezira and the capital, the RSF has relied heavily on drones to target civilian infrastructure, especially electricity stations in Merowe, Ed Debba, Atbara, Shendi, and White Nile State. These attacks disrupt essential services and increase the suffering of ordinary citizens. Many of these stations are connected to hospitals and other crucial institutions, compounding the humanitarian crisis. Additionally, mass displacement further strains host communities and disrupts production sectors. 
 
AF: Do you believe the international community will support Sudan in its lawsuit against the UAE? How do you assess the global response?  
 
MSH: The ICJ itself is a mechanism of the international community, so presenting our case there is a reaffirmation of its role and objectives. The court’s first session demonstrated seriousness and professionalism. As for international reactions, several affected parties welcomed the move. Even within the UAE, public opinion responded positively, expressing relief and praise. This legal action reinforces the credibility of the court and the principle of no impunity, while pushing back against harmful foreign interventions.