Does Sudan need foreign intervention?

Sudan is facing one of the worst humanitarian crises in modern history. The conflict, which erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has plunged the country into chaos. According to the latest reports, more than 26 million people are in need, with 11 million internally displaced and 2 million having fled to neighbouring countries such as Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan.

The fighting has devastated urban centres such as Khartoum and spread to 15 out of the 18 Sudanese states, including volatile regions like Darfur. This has exacerbated ethnic tensions, with civilians bearing the brunt of the violence, facing indiscriminate airstrikes, artillery shelling, mass killings, and sexual violence. The conflict could also have devastating regional consequences, with major regional actors accused of supporting the warring factions in Sudan.

Sudan’s worsening conflict has drawn urgent calls from both local and international human rights advocates for a civilian protection mission to address the rising atrocities committed by the warring factions. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) stand accused of widespread war crimes, including ethnic cleansing, starvation, and the systematic displacement of vulnerable local communities.

Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, a senior researcher in the Crisis, Conflict, and Arms division at Human Rights Watch (HRW), has told Geeska of dire consequences for civilians. “No place is safe for civilians in Sudan,” he said. “The SAF and RSF have committed crimes against humanity, including a campaign of ethnic cleansing in El Geneina. We also believe that there is a possibility that genocide has been or is being committed in Sudan.” He emphasised their calls for the international community to investigate.

He explained that the Jeddah Declaration for the protection of civilians, which was signed by the warring factions, has had no meaningful result, as both sides merely committed to upholding their legal obligations to protect civilians. He insisted that these warring parties have demonstrated a callous disregard for civilians and cannot be relied upon to protect them.

The capital of the Darfur region, El-Fasher, which has been under tight siege by the RSF for months, is on the brink of severe atrocities as the conflict between the warring factions continues to escalate, warned Kholood Khair, director of the Confluence Advisory think tank. Speaking to Geeska, she highlighted that the holiday season, when global focus is elsewhere, could see intensified violence, particularly in displaced camps in El-Fasher.  

El-Fasher, a city in the south of the vast North Darfur region is home to several major refugee camps which have swelled due to cycles of violence back in 2004. It has long been a focal point of Darfur’s humanitarian crises. Camps such as Abu Shouk and Zamzam have borne witness to tragic episodes, including a famine declared months ago in Zamzam, which claimed the lives of two children every hour. Following the outbreak of the current conflict, the city has experienced a dramatic surge in its population, as hundreds of thousands of civilians from areas such as Al-Geneina fled atrocities. In Geneina, the RSF has been accused of committing ethnic cleansing against Sudanese-African tribes, particularly the Masalit, resulting in over 15,000 deaths. The RSF, composed primarily of Arab identifying militiamen, has historical ties to similar campaigns of violence during the era of ousted Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir, when they were known as the Janjaweed.

While El-Fasher remains under the control of SAF and the Joint Forces, the RSF has been besieging the city for months, severely restricting civilian movements, and the flow of aid. Their tactics include indiscriminate air shelling and drone strikes targeting hospitals, markets, and refugee camps.

“The RSF has already created a pretext for entering the camps, claiming there are people inside with guns. We obviously know the risks of the RSF taking control of these camps. They have seen what happened to the Masalit (Sudanese-African tribe). They witnessed starvation, shelling, and relentless attacks by the RSF, indicating that the risk of atrocities is high.”

Kholood explained that the RSF was created by Sudan’s security services during the Omar al-Bashir era to crush a rebellion by the Masalit and other non-Arab peoples in Darfur, but also began targeting civilians and exploiting grievances between Sudanese-Arab and Sudanese non-Arab communities.  

She fears that the SAF’s current strategy is to keep RSF fighters in Darfur in order to regain control over Khartoum and the central al-Jazirah state. They might abandon their support for the Juba Peace Agreement signatories aligned with the SAF to face RSF retaliatory atrocities.

Gallopin explained that large-scale, deliberate attacks on civilians have been a hallmark of this conflict, making Sudan the largest human rights crisis in the world. “The death toll, both direct and indirect, is likely in the hundreds of thousands,” he warned, adding that with every passing month, the conflict in Sudan continues to expand, involving new domestic and foreign actors, which could lead to further atrocities against communities.

He urges the international community to act in the face of a catastrophe of this magnitude.

The argument for sovereignty  

In mid-October, Guardian columnist Simon Jenkins outlined his objections to the use of US bombs to end the war in Sudan. The article was less concerned with why such an approach would be ill-advised in Sudan and focused more on lessons from other US interventions, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, as the Economist’s Africa correspondent Tom Gardener observed, Jenkins was “literally arguing with himself” in a “debate nobody else is having.” The US has generally shown little interest in Sudan, and the genocide determination, which finally came on 7 January, was already described as “overdue” by Democratic Congresswoman Sydney Kamlager-Dove in early December.

Opposition to foreign intervention in Sudan, in the form of a protection mission, is closely tied to fears of sovereignty erosion. The SAF’s de facto government has been vocal in rejecting such missions, through press statements and diplomatic measures, such as suspending Sudan’s Igad membership. The SAF positions itself as the defender of national independence while presenting vague, unsubstantiated plans for civilian protection.

Yassir Zaidan, a security expert, expressed strong support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) as the primary authority responsible for protecting civilians in Sudan. “The movement of civilians from RSF-controlled areas to SAF-controlled areas speaks volumes about the SAF’s ability to provide safety and stability,” Zaidan noted, referring to the mass exodus of civilians fleeing the capital after much of it fell under the RSF control, as well as from other states like Al-Jazeera and Sennar.  

He argued that this dynamic reduces the justification for an international civilian protection mission, which has often failed in similar contexts due to logistical and political constraints. Zaidan said: “The SAF’s actions demonstrate a practical and immediate solution to safeguarding civilians, far more effective than relying on external intervention.”

Zaidan also pointed to the need for accountability, stressing that the RSF is the primary source of civilian harm. “Efforts must focus on holding the RSF accountable under international humanitarian law and pressuring its backers, especially the UAE, to cease their support,” he stated.

He underscored the importance of reinforcing SAF-controlled areas and enhancing local protection mechanisms as a sustainable alternative, insisting that strengthening these measures, combined with targeted sanctions and investigations into RSF atrocities, is the most realistic path to improving civilian safety.

The RSF, meanwhile, avoids direct public opposition to international intervention but tacitly benefits from the SAF’s stance. Critics argue that neither force has effectively addressed the humanitarian crisis, with the SAF leveraging nationalist rhetoric and the RSF maintaining strategic silence.

Skepticism about protection missions also stems from doubts over their effectiveness. Opponents view them as tools for foreign powers to exploit Sudan’s natural resources under the guise of humanitarian aid, citing past failures in similar interventions.

The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) remains firmly opposed to any foreign troop deployment in Sudan, viewing such moves as a veiled attempt to exploit the country’s resources under the guise of humanitarian aid. Fathi Al-Fadol, a central committee member of the SCP, told Geeska that the war in Sudan was a type of “proxy conflict” driven by international and regional powers vying for Sudan’s wealth. Sudan is a major exporter of gold and gum arabic, a key ingredient in soft drinks and confectionaries. Al-Fadol argued that foreign interventions, including proposed Igad deployments or any other troops, are part of a broader strategy to seize control of countries rather than offer genuine support to civilians. Citing failures in countries like Congo, Iraq, and Libya, he warned, “Sudan will not be an exception.” He instead called for a united front among Sudanese democratic forces to prioritise peace and resist what he described as “external manipulation.”

Both SAF and RSF resistance to these missions reinforces polarization, leaving civilians unprotected and the conflict unresolved, while fears of external control over Sudan’s resources further complicate the debate.

UNAMID in Darfur  

The experience of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) stands as a significant chapter in Sudan’s history of international intervention. Established in 2007 to address the brutal conflict in Darfur, UNAMID was tasked with protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid, and supporting peace efforts between warring factions.  

The roots of the Darfur conflict lie in decades of deliberate marginalisation and exclusion of regions such as Darfur from the political and economic power concentrated in Khartoum. Marginalised groups, particularly in Darfur, long suffered from systematic inequalities in the distribution of resources, land rights, and representation, which led to uprisings in the early 2000s. Rather than addressing these legitimate grievances, the government responded with brutal force, deploying militias such as the Janjaweed—later restructured into the RSF—to suppress dissent. These militias unleashed a campaign of violence that targeted ethnic communities perceived as supporting the rebellion, fuelling ethnic and regional tensions. This state-sanctioned strategy of violence and divide-and-rule policies not only entrenched grievances but also fragmented Sudanese society, creating a cycle of mistrust and conflict that persists today. This ongoing instability is rooted in a legacy of governance that prioritised domination over reconciliation, leaving unresolved issues to fester into a protracted and brutal crisis.

With a broad mandate and significant resources, it became one of the largest and most complex peacekeeping missions in UN history. However, its tenure has been the subject of intense debate, with its success often overshadowed by critics citing inefficiency and a failure to curb violence in the region.

The end of UNAMID’s mandate in 2020 left a contentious legacy, raising questions about the effectiveness of international peacekeeping in conflict zones like Darfur. While some view its departure as a shift towards local sovereignty, others see it as leaving a dangerous vacuum in a region still grappling with insecurity and sporadic violence. As discussions emerge about deploying new protection missions in Sudan, the UNAMID experience provides crucial lessons on the promises and pitfalls of foreign intervention, sparking debate over whether such missions can genuinely serve the interests of Sudan’s people or merely serve as instruments of external agendas.

Adam Rojal, the spokesperson for the coordination of displaced persons and refugees, highlighted both the strengths and weaknesses of UNAMID. “Their presence and rare patrols around vulnerable communities gave hope to local populations,” he noted. However, he criticised their failure to use force to protect civilians, referencing incidents near UNAMID bases where they did not intervene.

The Sudanese government was accused of attacking the Hamidia refugee camp in Darfur, where armed men reportedly killed seven people and injured 20 others on September 4, 2010, UNAMID announced it was unable to reach the camp to investigate the incident. According to UNAMID spokesperson” we received reports that several IDPs were killed this morning as a result of an attack by an armed group. However, we do not have an exact death toll. We dispatched a team to investigate the incidents, but they were unable to reach the area to verify who was responsible for the attack”.  

He also pointed out their inability to establish safe locations where locals could benefit from development opportunities and their frequent coordination with local governments, “who often prioritised their interests over those of the people.” Rojal emphasised that their failure stemmed from their mission to maintain peace, even though “there was no peace to maintain.”

Al-Fadol echoed this sentiment, asserting that protection missions do not contribute to establishing pathway to peace in country.

This experience has not deterred advocates of international intervention. Khair called for action to protect vulnerable populations, suggesting that it could be carried out remotely by providing local communities with reliable information about potential attacks. “People need to feel safe and have access to reliable information,” Khair emphasised. “When the international troops were present, communities felt the world was watching, which deterred atrocities,” she said. Without that, she believes the risks are unimaginably high.

Over the past months, disinformation has flooded Sudan’s social platforms, with both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) vying for control of the online narrative, often at great cost.  

The spread of fake news and misinformation has long been a challenge in Sudan’s digital space, but it has become particularly dangerous amid the ongoing conflict and political instability. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies found that east Africa had the “second highest number of documented disinformation campaigns on the continent” with Kenya and Sudan standing out as the countries most aggressively targeted. The RSF has notably exploited platforms like X (twitter), using inauthentic accounts and misleading content to further its agenda and shape both local and international perceptions. Meanwhile, the Sudanese army, to a lesser degree, utilizes the platform to counter RSF claims, sometimes resorting to fabricating victories to boost morale. International NGO’s, including SMEX, have increasingly emphasized the urgent need to combat fake news in Sudan, calling for stronger efforts to counter the digital misinformation that fuels the conflict and undermines peacebuilding efforts.