The case for a national security council

Since assuming office just over a year ago, President Abdirahman Mohammed Abdullahi Irro has pursued an ambitious and largely unprecedented programme of defence and security reform in Somaliland. Framing security sector reform as both a state-building imperative and a political commitment, Irro’s administration moved quickly to operationalize a key campaign pledge: a 50 per cent annual salary increase for members of the security forces throughout his five-year term. This commitment reflects an effort to address long-standing grievances over low pay, and corruption within the security apparatus.

Beyond remuneration, the administration has initiated the systematic registration and biometric documentation of personnel across Somaliland’s security institutions. This measure directly targets the entrenched problem of “ghost soldiers,” fictitious and duplicated names on payrolls that have historically drained public finances and undermined operational effectiveness. Taken together, these steps signal a shift from ad hoc security management toward a more institutionalized and accountable model of security governance.

The reform agenda extends well beyond administrative rationalization. Central to Irro’s strategy was the nationalization and integration of approximately 6,000 clan militiamen and their weapons into state structures — representing the largest such effort in more than three decades of Somaliland’s statehood. In parallel, the government has drafted the country’s first-ever National Security Strategy, an attempt to articulate a coherent threat assessment and align military, police, and intelligence institutions under a unified strategic framework. The establishment of an air service within the national army further underlines the administration’s aspiration to modernize Somaliland’s defence posture and project greater territorial control. While some of these initiatives have already been enacted, others remain in early stages of implementation.

These reforms are unfolding against a backdrop of acute internal and external security pressures that both motivate and complicate Irro’s agenda. Domestically, the unresolved conflict in Las Anod, and the subsequent emergence of a rival administration that the federal government of Somalia has recognized as a federal member state, has exposed fissures in Somaliland’s political settlement. The proliferation of clan militias and recurring clashes in Sanaag, Awdal, and Salel regions point to a broader erosion of the state’s monopoly on the use of force, exposing Somaliland’s internal security challenges.

Externally, Somaliland is navigating an increasingly volatile regional and international environment. Intensifying competition in the Red Sea corridor has drawn in global and regional powers seeking strategic access and influence, heightening the security stakes for small but geopolitically positioned actors like Somaliland. At the same time, Hargeisa’s pursuit of non-traditional diplomatic partnerships — most notably with Taiwan and, more recently, Israel, the first state to formally recognise Somaliland as an independent and sovereign entity — has placed it squarely within overlapping arenas of geopolitical rivalry. These include tensions between Middle Eastern powers, as well as the broader strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. As a result, Somaliland’s internal security reforms cannot be analysed in isolation; they are deeply entangled with regional and global power contests.

Given the constraints of limited fiscal and institutional resources, the breadth of Somaliland’s security challenges, and the urgency of reforming its defence and security sector, the need for effective coordination, strategic prioritization, and strong institutional leadership is unavoidable. Without a clear organizing framework, even well-intentioned reforms risk becoming fragmented, and unsustainable. Establishing a solid institutional foundation is therefore essential if current initiatives are to generate cumulative impact and provide a coherent polices upon which future reforms can build.

In the context of the Irro administration’s modernisation agenda and the persistent gaps within Somaliland’s security architecture, the development of resilient national security mechanisms is critical, not only to address immediate threats but also to anticipate, manage, and mitigate emerging risks over the medium to long term. This requires moving beyond reactive crisis management toward integrated strategic planning that links political decision-making, security operations, and peacebuilding efforts.

Historically, Somaliland has maintained a degree of peace and stability rare in a region repeatedly affected by protracted conflicts. This relative stability has rested in part on the early establishment of security institutions, beginning with the creation of the Somaliland Police Force in February 1992, when an initial cohort of 112 officers was recruited. Over subsequent decades, the security sector expanded into eight distinct institutions tasked with safeguarding the state and its population: the National Police Force, National Army Force, Presidential Guards, Coast Guard, Prison and Correctional Force, Firefighting Brigade, Immigration and Border Control Force, and the National Intelligence Service. While these institutions have grown in personnel, and resources, their expansion has not always been accompanied by commensurate improvements in coordination, doctrine, and strategic oversight.

Alongside these forces, Somaliland has established multiple security and defence coordination bodies. The Somaliland Public Order and Security Act No. 51 of 2012 created the National Security Committee, while the National Army of the Republic of Somaliland (NARS) Act No. 105 of 2023 established the National Defence Council. More recently, a national peace council was formed by presidential decree in January 2025. Although each body has a distinct legal basis and mandate, their coexistence has also contributed to institutional overlap and blurred lines of authority.

Article 5 of the Public Order and Security Act No. 51 establishes a three-tier National Security Committee operating at national, regional, and local levels. Its mandate is to safeguard public order and national stability and to implement and monitor security-related decisions issued by the president and regional governors. At the national level, the committee comprises the president, vice president, ministers of interior and defence, chiefs of the army and police, and the director of the National Intelligence Service. At the regional level, it includes the regional governor, regional commanders of the army and police, and the regional intelligence director. At the local level, membership consists of district mayors and local commanders of the national army and police.

The National Defence Council, as outlined in the NARS Act No. 105, is composed of the president, ministers of defence and interior, the chief of the national army, the director of the National Intelligence Service, and the national security advisor, with the president retaining discretion to appoint additional members on an ad hoc basis. Supported by a secretary drawn from the armed forces, the council’s mandate focuses on formulating national defence policy and assisting the commander-in-chief in the management, guidance, and operational direction of the national army. In principle, the council plays a central role in the professionalization, development, and long-term strategic orientation of Somaliland’s armed forces.

In response to the outbreak of violent conflict in Las Anod in February 2023 and its subsequent spillover into eastern regions, President Irro inaugurated the national peace council on 21 January 2025. Unlike existing security-focused bodies, the peace council was given a broader mandate centred on creating an enabling environment for negotiation, consensus-building, and communal participation as foundations for sustainable peace. The seven-member council was tasked with promoting national unity, leading government-led peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives, and spearheading national peace conferences and settlement processes aimed at stabilizing conflict-affected communities.

Taken together, Somaliland’s security and peace architecture reflects both institutional innovation and structural fragmentation. While multiple bodies address aspects of security, defence, and peacebuilding, their mandates often intersect without a single mechanism to harmonize priorities, resolve inter-agency disputes, and translate political decisions into coordinated action. Against the backdrop of ambitious reform plans, escalating internal and external pressures, and persistent bureaucratic overlap, the imperative for effective coordination becomes increasingly evident. Given the interconnected nature of contemporary security threats, and the limitations of existing institutional arrangements, the establishment of a National Security Council in Somaliland would represent a critical step toward bridging these gaps, integrating strategic decision-making, and ensuring coherence across the Somaliland’s security and defence sector.

Despite the existence of multiple security and defence bodies, the case for establishing a Somaliland National Security Council rest on three interrelated considerations.

First, it responds to the problem of bureaucratic overload and institutional fragmentation. At present, Somaliland operates parallel security and defence structures with limited mechanisms for horizontal coordination, compounded by a highly fragmented intelligence landscape. Intelligence units embedded within individual security institutions often operate in isolation, both from one another and from the National Intelligence Service, undermining information sharing, joint threat assessment, and strategic foresight. In an era where security threats are increasingly interconnected, hybrid, and transnational, this lack of coordination constitutes a significant structural vulnerability. A National Security Council would provide an institutionalised forum for structured inter-agency cooperation, enabling the integration of intelligence, policy, and operational planning.

Second, the adoption of a national security strategy renders the establishment of a National Security Council not merely desirable but functionally necessary. By design, a national security strategy is cross-sectoral, linking defence, internal security, intelligence, and diplomacy. Effective implementation therefore requires a permanent coordinating body with the authority and capacity to align institutional priorities, monitor execution, and adapt policy in response to evolving threats. Existing structures lack this integrative function. A National Security Council, supported by a professional secretariat and led by the national security advisor, would fill this institutional gap, translating strategic objectives into coordinated government action.

Third, security sector modernisation is inherently a long-term process that extends beyond the tenure of any single administration. In the absence of a durable institutional anchor, reform initiatives risk becoming episodic, inconsistent, and reversed with political transitions. Without a permanent host, the Irro administration’s reform agenda remains vulnerable to bureaucratic drift and institutional discontinuity. Entrusting oversight, coordination, and strategic continuity to a National Security Council would embed reform within the state apparatus itself, ensuring coherence, and sustained direction over time.

More broadly, the overlapping mandates and shared responsibilities among existing security institutions, combined with the absence of a clear coordination framework, further reinforce the necessity of a central strategic body. Rather than duplicating existing institutions, a National Security Council would serve as a convening and harmonising mechanism, resolving inter-agency tensions and aligning political decision-making with operational realities.

Thus, it becomes clear that considering Somaliland’s evolving security environment, the establishment of a National Security Council is a critical institutional step. Such a body would reduce overlap, mitigate institutional disorder, and provide a multi-perspective platform for timely, informed, and strategic decision-making. By consolidating and complementing existing mechanisms, it would strengthen national security coordination while preserving institutional autonomy where appropriate.

Following the appointment of a national security advisor, the statutory creation of the National Security Council should logically and procedurally follow. With a clearly defined mandate to coordinate national security affairs and advise the president on defence, security, and foreign policy, the council would introduce much-needed coherence, continuity, and strategic depth to Somaliland’s national security architecture.