Bamako under siege: A state strained to its core

“Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” (JNIM), the al-Qaeda affiliate in Mali, has escalated its military operations, exploiting internal divisions and the weakness of state institutions. Since last September, it has declared a blockade on Bamako, preventing fuel trucks from entering, and has maintained this siege despite intensive government attempts to end it. Fears have since grown about the possibility of Mali falling under al-Qaeda’s authority, as the group projects its vision of the region’s future under its rule.

The siege reduced fuel supplies by 80%, threatening to paralyze the national economy. Its effects were visible across the capital and surrounding areas: long lines at fuel stations, sudden spikes of more than 200% in the prices of basic goods, the closure of shops, markets, and factories, halted transportation, and, by late October, a two-week suspension of schools and universities to reduce fuel consumption.

The group developed its “siege strategy” by exploiting Mali’s landlocked dependence on regional neighbors, its reliance on overland trade routes, and its total dependence on energy imports. The goal was to cripple economic life, weaken the government, and deepen instability. But JNIM could not have succeeded in tightening its grip or seizing strategic areas— since its founding in March 2017 — without first exhausting the Malian army through sustained fighting in both the north and south.

Simultaneously, JNIM has benefited from substantial financial resources through ransom operations and acquired advanced weaponry by targeting military barracks and bases. Its momentum increased after the French withdrawal, the attrition of the Russian African Corps, and stalled army reforms under international sanctions. With effective control of northern Mali, the group announced months ago its plan to pressure the regime and topple it. Unable to take Bamako directly, it is now betting on economic warfare to inflame public anger against the military rulers.

The escalation would not have succeeded without attacks on fuel convoys entering from Senegal, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire, with dozens of trucks torched. The group also moved along the Mauritanian border and, for the first time, targeted Nigeria — signals that its operations now extend beyond Mali.

These dramatic developments have raised fears about the future of an already exhausted country. Western embassies — including those of the U.S., Italy, Germany, France, and Australia — issued evacuation alerts. International organizations warned of worsening instability after sustained attacks on supply routes, economic infrastructure, and the resurgence of kidnappings and assassinations, a hallmarks of Mali’s ongoing crisis.

Capturing Bamako is extremely difficult without alliances with other armed groups, alliances al-Qaeda knows it cannot secure. This realization pushed the group to experiment with a siege to pressure the regime.

Malian authorities tried to absorb the shock by restoring schooling and securing supply lines. President Assimi Goïta said during the opening of a southern mine that the government was working on solutions and called for national solidarity. He announced new measures, including military escorts for supply convoys to Bamako. Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop dismissed fears of the capital falling, saying the government had eased the siege.

Most indicators and expert assessments confirm that capturing Bamako is extremely difficult without alliances with other armed groups, alliances al-Qaeda knows it cannot secure. This realization pushed the group to experiment with a siege to pressure the regime, inflaming public and institutional anger and imposing a new reality on the ground.

Dominant narratives often invoke the fear of repeating the 2012 scenario, when armed groups swept toward the capital. But the real threat may lie elsewhere: internal actors dissatisfied with the current regime could exploit the crisis to overthrow the president. Signs of internal friction are growing, including a recently thwarted coup attempt, arrests of dozens of Malian soldiers and security officers, and the detention of a French national accused of mediating with French intelligence. The regime recognizes the seriousness of these threats, and experts warn that any coup or state collapse would further empower insurgent groups.

These internal crises intertwine with Mali’s troubled foreign relations. Foreign minister Abdoulaye Diop argued that foreign actors are exploiting the country’s security fragility to pressure the state, adding that Mali is counting on the solidarity of the Sahel Alliance and, indirectly, its new partner, Moscow.

Foreign cooperation could have been Bamako’s safety net. But after Assimi Goïta came to power, his government dismantled nearly all previous alliances. France — the former colonial power and a crucial partner of earlier regimes — has been pushed out and is now a distant observer, convinced that the Mali of 2012 will not return. Franco-Malian ties were severed, with Bamako nationalizing assets and restricting French influence under the banner of sovereignty.

American operational and intelligence support also weakened after the U.S. withdrawal from bases in neighboring Niger. Although Deputy Secretary of State Christop Landau tweeted that Washington is willing to expand cooperation after speaking with Mali’s foreign minister, practical support remains limited.

Meanwhile, away from the spotlight on the al-Qaeda siege, fighting with Azawad movements has resumed in the country. The collapse of previous peace agreements and renewed clashes have turned the situation into a snowballing crisis that could explode further.

And with bitter irony, the same justification once used for Mali’s last coup — defeating terrorism and ending rebellion — may once again become the very threat that undermines those currently holding power.

Questions about Mali’s future remain pressing. The bleakest scenarios imagine armed groups capturing Bamako and reshaping the region. Such projections are exaggerated, but they do not erase the real and persistent threat posed by jihadist groups, the demands of Azawad rebels, or the political crisis triggered by the regime’s abandonment of democratic commitments.

Expert assessments confirm that taking Bamako is extremely unlikely, requiring alliances JNIM cannot build. Recognizing this, the group turned to siege tactics to pressure the regime —succeeding in reshaping the political landscape. But after weeks of crisis, Bamako has begun to recover: schools and universities have reopened, supply lines are moving again, and the government is working to fully end the blockade.

Yet the dangers extend beyond Mali. The focus on Bamako obscures a broader regional reality. Jihadist expansion is increasingly regional, threatening states like Burkina Faso. The crisis challenges the Sahel Alliance’s ability to offer real support and to design a regional strategy beyond promises of a joint force — which is likely to falter as its predecessors did. Military solutions have failed to stop these insurgencies. Negotiation, still dismissed outright, remains an untested option that could address security crises that years of war have not resolved.

Ultimately, the siege will lift and security conditions will temporarily improve, but the insurgency will persist and expand within Mali and beyond. And with bitter irony, the same justification once used for Mali’s last coup — defeating terrorism and ending rebellion — may once again become the very threat that undermines those currently holding power.