Awdal and the strategic calculus in the Horn

The political tension that has engulfed Awdal region over the past three months is far more than a local dispute. It grew out of a cultural celebration that quickly became entangled in wider rivalries over identity, territory and political recognition. In December 2024, UNESCO listed the Xeer Ciise, the customary law of the Issa clan, as intangible heritage worthy of protection. Celebrations followed in Djibouti and Dire Dawa, and a major ceremony was scheduled for Zeila, Somaliland, in November 2025.

But by early October, organised clashes had begun in the town as youth groups split between those supporting the event and those opposing it. The Somaliland government intervened, arresting several participants and pressing organisers to postpone. But on 13 November authorities went further, announcing that the ceremony would be halted entirely.

Issa elders in Ethiopia rejected that decision, insisting the celebration would proceed on 5 December as agreed after the earlier postponement, and issuing a warning to anyone attempting to block it.

Awdal’s elders opposed holding the ceremony in Zeila', while Issa elders in favour declared they would go ahead regardless. The competing positions hardened, drawing in clan networks, neighbouring states and external patrons, and turning what began as a heritage celebration into a political flashpoint.

By early December the situation had become volatile. Between 4 and 6 December, the government made a string of rushed decisions driven by anxiety and the need to appear in control. On the afternoon of 4 December, officials abruptly lifted the ban on the ceremony, reversing their earlier order. The reversal sparked a new wave of anger. That evening, organised protests erupted in Borama. They quickly turned violent, leaving several people dead and many more injured. By nightfall, civil order in the city had largely collapsed.

The consequences were immediate and wide-ranging. Protesters attacked the Central Bank branch in Borama, the governor’s office and several police stations. Security forces struggled to regain control. President Abdirahman Irro addressed the nation the following night in an attempt to calm tensions, but the speech revealed how unprepared his administration had been for unrest of this scale. Leadership appeared strained. Residents, meanwhile, reacted in ways that mirrored the earlier response to the ceremony’s cancellation: some took up arms, others erected roadblocks, and flags openly challenging Somaliland’s authority appeared in public spaces.

At the peak of the crisis, Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement blaming Somalia for the disturbances. The release characterised the unrest as deliberate, coordinated and designed to inflame tensions and divide Somaliland’s people. Given that the government had just authorised the ceremony once again, the statement effectively singled out Somalia, suggesting that Somaliland and Djibouti had a tacit understanding behind the decision.

At the same time, while addressing the protests, Somaliland security forces acknowledged, ironically and staining their reputation, that unidentified snipers had killed civilians. The admission echoed the earlier claims by the Interior Ministry, that foreign hands were involved.

Taken together, these developments revealed weak governance and limited institutional capacity in the western regions of the country.

Furthermore, now under mounting pressure, the Hargeisa administration reversed course. On 6 December it cancelled the ceremony once again.

True to the pattern this conflict has settled into, any state move that appears to favor one side instantly triggers a backlash from the other. So the cancellation swiftly sparked a fresh, and even more intense escalation.

This was inflamed even further later that night, when the Issa Ugaas and the clan leaders behind the event, speaking from inside Ethiopia, declared they would go ahead by force. They urged all armed members of their clan to move into the Awdal border zone shared with the three neighbouring states.

Meanwhile, the Gadabuursi Ugaas accepted the call to mobilise. Both clans openly committed to confrontation and pledged to face each other in Zeila. Somaliland offered no direct response to these declarations. Yet with no clear state direction, the rise of armed non-state actors becomes increasingly likely, and with it, Hargeisa’s ability to steer events will further erode.

Ethiopia and Zeila

Ethiopia’s interest in Zeila is longstanding. Historical memory, including the medieval Ifat Sultanate, informs modern Ethiopian thinking about maritime access and regional projection. The contemporary chapter, however, intensified after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office. Following negotiations with Somalia’s former president Farmaajo, assurances and understandings about access and routes, including Zeila, surfaced in diplomatic exchanges.

Moreover, in October 2023, Abiy declared publicly that Ethiopia could not remain landlocked and would obtain maritime access through strategy or by force if necessary. He outlined three potential avenues, Somaliland (specifically invoking Zeila through its historic ties to the Ifat Sultanate), Djibouti, and Eritrea, each carrying its own costs and consequences.

Next, the tensions were further heightened by the ambiguous memorandum of understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa in January 2024. That agreement provoked regional unease and never fully materialised, but it became a bargaining chip in Ethiopia’s dealings with Mogadishu.

In December 2024 Somalia and Ethiopia reached a mediated compromise under Turkey’s auspices, and it culminated in The Ankara Declaration, which stipulated that disputes over Somaliland’s coastline would be resolved through bilateral arrangements between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa and that any leasing or contracting of maritime access should be channelled through Somalia’s recognised federal institutions.

Fast forward to the current crisis, when Issa leaders delivered statements from Ethiopian territory in November, and explicitly warned anyone who tries to oppose the ceremony, both Addis Ababa and the Somali Regional State maintained an unusual public silence. Somaliland, which initially blamed Mogadishu for the unrest, also offered no further explanation.

This collective quiet stood in sharp contrast to Ethiopia’s assertive intervention during the Da'awalay conflict only months earlier. In the present case, silence read less as neutrality and more as permissiveness and a passive consent, a posture that deepened local suspicions.

Those suspicions were visible in the Gadabuursi Ugaas’ response to his counterpart. Speaking from Borama, he claimed that his community was being “attacked from Dire Dawa,” the cultural capital of the Issa clan and the residence of their Ugaas, pointedly avoiding any reference to Djibouti or Somalia as sources of the threat.

At the same time, Issa representatives on the Zeila local council stated that they had mobilised volunteers “ready to die for this cause six months in advance,” underscoring the extent of their preparation and the confidence they felt in their backing.

That confidence is rooted in dynamics across the border. Within Ethiopia, the Issa have long been engaged in armed clashes with both the Oromo and Afar administrations. Their communities straddle the vital trade corridor linking Ethiopia to Djibouti, an area where confrontations with Afar groups are frequent. Control over this corridor, and the surrounding land, has been a persistent point of tension, often drawing in regional security forces. For Addis Ababa, which depends on the Djibouti route for its economic lifeline, this region is politically sensitive and strategically consequential.

However, in recent years, Issa groups in Ethiopia have also become significantly better armed, reportedly with logistical and political support from the Somali Regional State. It is therefore plausible to assume that these fighters form the backbone of the Issa Ugaas’ current assertive posture. There is scant evidence of sizeable Issa armed formations within Somaliland itself, and Djibouti, mindful of its own regime-security imperatives, remains particularly wary of allowing external militias to operate on its soil.

In this context, Ethiopian Issa fighters appear to be the most credible source of strength underpinning the Ugaas’ position in the Zeila dispute.

Allies and strategic calculus in the Horn

The Horn of Africa is entering a period of overlapping tensions that will reshape its geopolitical landscape. In September 2025, Ethiopia announced the completion of the filling of the GERD reservoir after a decade of work. Egypt and Sudan, meanwhile, voiced strong concern. More recently, Ethiopia accused Egypt of fomenting instability in the region, while Cairo declared it would do whatever it takes to protect its national interests.

In November 2024, Djibouti and Egypt signed a wide-ranging cooperation agreement. At the same time, Egypt and Eritrea strengthened their partnership as Cairo grew increasingly uneasy over the GERD project and sought to push back against Ethiopia’s growing ambitions for Red Sea access.

Cairo and Asmara have also deepened their covert links with the TPLF and Fano insurgencies inside Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, for its part, supports Sudan’s RSF, although Sudan and Eritrea have recently tightened their own relations in ways that are hostile to both Ethiopia and the RSF.

Seen from that angle of shifting alliances, Ethiopia now finds itself opposed by Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea and two armed groups within its borders.

The country is more closely aligned with Somalia, Sudan’s RSF, and the United Arab Emirates. If the UAE is part of Ethiopia’s camp, Qatar can be counted on the other side in the wider Gulf rivalry.

Somalia appears to stand with the latter bloc, after reaching a full understanding with Addis Ababa on the maritime deal brokered by Turkey.

Even so, Villa Somalia cannot be described as firmly tied to any alliance and may shift positions easily, especially with President Hassan Sheikh approaching elections.

Somaliland has not officially joined any side. During Muse Bihi’s presidency, its close partner was the UAE, but Abiy Ahmed renegotiated that understanding with Hassan Sheikh under Turkish mediation, which delivered a major blow. President Irro’s new administration appears keen to balance competing interests, and has so far avoided embracing the previous deal or committing to any particular alliance.

If Ethiopia fails to secure its goals through legal agreements or peaceful exertion of pressure, it is prepared to rely on the military strength it has built, the threats it issues and its willingness to externalize internal conflicts. What, then, are the possible scenarios?

Ethiopia has three potential directions if it decides to use force to gain sea access. This excludes routes toward the Indian Ocean through Somalia and Kenya, which hold little appeal because of distance, low strategic value and Ethiopia’s limited historical ties there. In contrast, the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden coasts are closer, strategically significant and deeply connected to Ethiopia’s history.

1. The Eritrean front

This route brings Ethiopia face-to-face with Fano and the TPLF, joined by Egypt and Sudan. If the conflict expands, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could also be drawn in. This path links directly to the Red Sea. Ethiopia would be confronting two insurgencies and potentially seven hostile states. The scenario is possible, and Ethiopia could secure its own backers, but the cost would be extremely high.

2. The Djibouti front

Djibouti sits along the railway that feeds Ethiopia’s economy and forms the southern edge of the Red Sea and the entrance to the Gulf of Aden. As a small state, Djibouti shields itself by bandwagoning with major powers. Five major militaries have permanent bases there, including the United States, China, France, Japan and Italy, in addition to other European deployments. It is difficult to imagine Ethiopia attacking the country through which its main trade corridor runs, let alone confronting the foreign militaries stationed there. Djibouti’s recent agreements with Saudi Arabia and Egypt further complicate this path. It is both militarily and politically prohibitive.

3. Finally, the third possible route for Ethiopia is the Awdal and Zeila front.

This is the least defended route. There are no significant forces capable of blocking Ethiopia, no active insurgencies in the area, and the previous maritime understanding between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu — despite its ambiguity — still stands.

Somaliland has no foreign military bases whose partners would intervene on its behalf, nor does Ethiopia depend on Somaliland economically as it does on Djibouti. This makes the Awdal option the most plausible, least costly and simplest.

Ethiopia therefore faces three war scenarios. The least likely and most costly is Djibouti. A northern conflict with Eritrea is unlikely but possible and would be expensive. The most likely and least costly is an advance into Awdal in Somaliland.

Regional powers further afield, such as Israel, also play a role. Israel has maintained a long and stable relationship with Ethiopia and sees it as a key regional partner and gateway to Africa. Israel strongly supports Ethiopia’s quest for sea access and cooperates closely with Addis Ababa on countering al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Houthi movement in Yemen. Their strategic objectives converge around the Red Sea and the wider Horn of Africa.

Somalia, by contrast, has no ties with Israel and has consistently condemned its actions in regional and international forums. Recently, Israel signaled interest in developing closer links with Somaliland in order to curb Houthi influence and counter Turkey’s expanding footprint in Somalia, which is backed by Iranian reach.

Israel is also concerned that Turkey may be advancing missile and nuclear weapons testing in areas that NATO and Europe have limited visibility over — suspecting that Pakistan may be providing technical assistance, along with access to Niger’s uranium deposits, a country where Turkey has been heavily involved since the July 2023 coup in the Sahel region. Somalia, too, is among the countries with significant uranium resources.

Meanwhile, in August 2025, Pakistan and Somalia jointly signed a five-year defense cooperation agreement covering multiple sectors, which triggered strong concern in India, given that India is pursuing a maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean and aims to become a security guarantor for the entire Indian Ocean region — including the Horn of Africa and East Africa — “a Net Security Provider.”

Militias and the Awdal Region

A clan that has been forming a civilian militia recently announced through its leaders that it is prepared for a clan-based conflict in Zeila. Footage posted online shows clan elders inspecting four militia stations. It appears that earlier mobilization by local groups has now evolved into an organized armed effort. It also seems unlikely that such a force could be created in the two to three days of protests in Borama unless there had been a longer-term plan, with weapons and training already in place.

The same elders said the Issa Ugaas who issued threats is bringing fighters from Ethiopia, and that additional civilian militias are present in Lughaya and will soon come out publicly.

Other elders speaking in Borama called for various armed groups from the city to gather in one location so they can be organized. They advised the groups to form structured and standing militias with a clear command hierarchy.

Overall, the current mood suggests that Awdal and Selel are at high risk of seeing the emergence of clan militias, armed civilian groups and organized insurgencies. The rise of non-state armed groups would place fresh pressure on Somaliland, which is still recovering from the civilian militias that appeared in the east less than a year ago, after the central government failed to maintain order there. That episode ultimately led to the Las Anod conflict and the city’s loss to Somaliland.

In conclusion, following the Borama protests, Awdal is now relatively calmer, but the region is clearly entering a difficult period. There are serious fears of clan clashes and the formation of civilian militias similar to those that once emerged in the east, whose eventual demobilization required major effort. To keep Awdal and Selel from sliding into crisis, the Somaliland government must work to stabilize the region and strengthen coexistence among its communities. It particularly needs to promote peaceful relations between the Issa and the Samaroon clans, support transparent accountability and offer compensation and acknowledgment for what happened in Borama, so the situation does not spiral again.